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CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Chinese-Russian Relations

By
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Table of Contents

FOREWORD	vii
THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA	1
Chapter I. Early Rivalry	1
Chapter II. 200 Years of Status Quo	25
Chapter III. After the Chinese Revolution	44
Chapter IV. After the Russian Revolution	68
THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS	99
CONCERNING A STRANGE DOCUMENT	127
RUSSIAN EMIGRES IN CHINA AT THE END OF THE 17th CENTURY	145
NOTES IN CHINESE	183
INDEX	185

Foreword

SINO-RUSSIAN relations constitute a unique phenomenon in world history—the phenomenon of two empires, both in full swing of expansion, which succeeded in achieving a delimitation of their interests and in establishing an extensive common frontier without at any time, over a period of three centuries, having had recourse to war.

Neither of the two empires had been especially peaceful. Russia during the past three hundred years has fought wars with every one of her other neighbors. As for China, the period of Russian expansion coincided with the reign of her Manchurian dynasty which, under its early emperors, was particularly vigorous and active. After a long period of isolation under the Ming, when China entrenched behind the Great Wall, the new emperors revived the old traditions of Tang and Han and began a successful penetration into Manchuria, Mongolia, and Central Asia, subjugating the native tribes; in each of these vast regions they were eventually to meet the Russians.

Great countries, Lord Palmerston once remarked, have no permanent enemies or friends—they have permanent interests. The permanent and dominating interests involved in the immense territories bordering China and Russia have undoubtedly been reciprocal security and defense. The two established empires, separated from one another by an ocean of nomads, had an identical historical mission—the “pacifying” and “civilizing” of these nomads in the interest of their own security. In order to accomplish this purpose, China and Russia followed an almost identical policy, but each carried it out

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

in her own way and according to her own historical traditions.

In the course of their expansion the two empires drew nearer to each other geographically, and of necessity certain rivalries developed which sometimes made collisions inevitable. Sino-Russian relations have had their ups and downs, but most of the conflicts of the past were of only a transitory character. After the disturbances which they aroused were settled, the policies of both countries always returned to the general line laid down by their permanent geopolitical interests. History never repeats itself identically, and the past seldom gives a clue to the future. Yet only through knowledge of the past can we attempt to understand the present.

The major part of this book was written in China during the war. The author is greatly indebted to the l'Aurore University of Shanghai for placing at his disposal many valuable works, collections, and documents from its own library, as well as from the well known library of Zi-Ka-Wei and the private library of Li Hung-Chang, which has been in the custody of the University. The author is especially indebted to Professor Kao Kien-long of the same University for the translation of many Chinese texts.

The translation from the French was made by Mrs. R. Krader and the editing was done by Mrs. T. Klorman.

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

CHAPTER I. EARLY RIVALRY

IT WAS during the period of the epic exploits of Chingis Khan, when the Mongols, a hitherto unknown people, burst upon the historical scene, that Mongolia began to play a role in Sino-Russian relations. For almost a century China and Russia had been parts of the same empire, united under the rule of the Grand Khans. The Mongol exploits were outstanding not only for the massacre and destruction¹ that accompanied them — they were distinguished as well for the firm rule which they established, the efficient system of communications which they organized, the widespread assimilation of peoples which they brought about, and the contact between great civilizations which resulted from them. "Pax Mongolica reigns in Asia," said Pelliot. Ambassadors and merchants, missionaries and travelers came from all parts of the world: Chinese and Uighurs, Persians and Russians, Italians and Franks, Buddhists, Taoists, Confucianists, Moslems and Jews, Nestorian and Catholic Christians flocked to the court of the Grand Khans. Unfortunately, data concerning the relations which must have existed at that time between Russians and Chinese, whether directly or through the medium of the Mongols, are extremely meagre. We do know that some Russian grand dukes and priests came to Sarai, the Golden Horde's capital on the Volga, and to Karakorum in Mongolia, to the court of the Grand Khans. Constantine, son of the

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Grand Duke Yaroslav, was there as early as 1243, and Yaroslav himself was present at the coronation of the Grand Khan Guyuk in 1246, where he came under the notice of Plano Carpini.² Alexander Nevskij was there in 1248. We know also that a Russian regiment was stationed at Peking during the reign of Tob-Timur Khan (1329-1333), and the Chinese Annals mention that one Bayan was named commander of the guards, which was composed of Mongols, Kypchaks and Russians.³ Unfortunately, not a single document describing their travels has been left by grand dukes, members of their entourages, priests, the military, or others of these travelers. European, Moslem and Armenian travelers — Plano Carpini, William of Rubruck, Odoric of Pordenone, Margnoli, Rashid, Hayton and Marco Polo, who eclipsed them all — were writing accounts of their travels which made them famous, but not a single account is to be found in Russian which contains any description of the routes taken by Russians who traveled to Mongolia or China — not a single description of the courts of the Grand Khans nor of the organization of the Mongol Empire. Even the descriptions of the Golden Horde and of the location and physical appearance of the towns are meagre and not to be compared with descriptions of them given by European and Moslem travelers of the time.⁴

This lack of recorded description was probably the main reason why any knowledge of China that the Russians might have had in Mongol times disappeared. In 1558, when Antony Jenkinson came to Moscow on his search of an overland route to China, the Russians were unable to furnish him with any information.⁵ When, much later, at the beginning of the 17th century, John Merick suggested an expedition to China via the River Ob', Tsar Mikhail Feodorovich sent a ukase, brief but

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

eloquent, to his *vayvodes* in Siberia: "Where is China," asked the Tsar, "is it rich, what can we lay claim to?"⁶

In one sphere of activity — that of diplomacy — the Mongol era had more lasting significance for future Sino-Russian relations. From their repeated visits to the courts of the Mongol Khans, the Russians became familiar with the diplomatic customs and protocol which the Mongols had borrowed from the Chinese, Persians and other great peoples of the Oriental world. Reading the accounts of European ambassadors who came to Russia during the 16th and 17th centuries, one is struck by the resemblance between the diplomatic customs there described as existing in Russia and those which the Russians themselves were to encounter in Peking: the same border procedure; the same questioning and chicanery on the part of the *vayvodes*; the same insistence of the *vayvodes* on receiving credentials actually addressed to the sovereign; the same arguments over titles; the same gift offering ceremony; the same isolation of ambassadors on arrival in the capital (they were kept house-prisoners until the day of their first audience); the same meal-time ceremony, during which the sovereign despatched to the embassies tables laden with dishes coming from the court.⁷ After more than a century of adherence to these practices—which could not have died out even as late as the middle of the 17th century—it is not surprising that the Russian ambassadors were less astonished to find the same practices in Peking than were the Dutch, the Portuguese and, later, the English. They also understood better than did their Occidental colleagues the political significance of certain of the usages that the Chinese tried to impose upon them; because the Russians, after two centuries of Mongol domination, had acquired considerable experience in dealing with Orientals, they sometimes offered stronger resistance.⁸ They plotted and

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

schemed at the court of the Khans, profited from dissensions among the Mongols, accepted gifts on all possible occasions, and, at a later period, took Tartar princes into their service. This training in the school of diplomacy was to be of great use to them later in subjugating nomad peoples in Siberia and in the early dealings with China. At the beginning of the 17th century, when rivalry between Russia and China first arose in the nomadic region separating the two established empires, the Chinese, masters of the art of "taming the barbarians," soon perceived that in the Russians they had met formidable opponents.

At the beginning of the 17th century the Mongols served as the bridge whereby Sino-Russian contacts, which had been interrupted after the fall of Chingis Khan's Empire, were re-established.⁹

Russia was then at the height of her expansion in Siberia. After conquering the northern regions whose peoples offered no resistance, the Russians turned south on the Ob, Irtysh and Yenisei rivers, where they did meet with opposition. Instead of disunited and scattered primitive tribes who served their leaders badly, their opponents were Burjats, Kyrgyz, Tungus, who possessed a degree of social organization, an influential aristocracy, and who were capable of forming alliances and organizing resistance. To the rear of these peoples throughout the southern marches from the steppes of the River Don to the shores of Yenisei, the Russians encountered Mongols and their Occidental cousins, the warlike Dzungars, or Kalmyks. Thus they learned that beyond the vast nomadic and semi-nomadic regions there was a strong stable empire with a great civilization. Vayvode Volynsky revealed this discovery to Moscow in 1608. With unconcealed emotion he reported: "Beyond the land of Al-

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

tyn Khan of the Mongols, three months' travel away, is the country of *Kitai*. Here there are towns built of stone, and dwellings such as are found in Moscow. The Tsar of *Kitai* is stronger and richer than the Altyn Khan. There are many churches in the town with bells that ring. But these churches are without crosses and we do not know of what religion they are. The people live like Russians, they possess weapons, and they trade with different countries from which they obtain precious objects from all parts of the world." This remarkable report, which was discovered by the historian, G. F. Muller, in the course of his researches into the archives of Siberia (1732-1742), was the point of departure of the still greatly confused Russian ideas concerning future Russian expansion; the limits of this expansion began to assume a shape—henceforth the Chinese Empire would have to be reckoned with. This belief was to become even stronger in the following years; Spathari already foresaw a partition between the two Empires. When, in 1675, he traveled through the border region, he remarked about the peoples living there: "It will be impossible for them to remain independent for long between the frontiers of our Great Sovereign and those of the Khan of China." But that point had not yet been reached. Almost the entire 17th century was a period of rivalry between the two neighbors over the "neutral zone," and the peoples of the "neutral zone" benefited from this rivalry. There was a succession of Russian missions to Mongolia. Often the various Mongol princes paid homage to the Tsar, at times promising him aid against his enemies, at times causing difficulties in matters of protocol, and asking to be treated as "younger brothers." Often armed bands invaded the soil of Russia or her dependencies and threatened their fortresses. These maneuvers were a reflection of changing relations between China and the Mongols. The

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Khans, while promising loyalty to Moscow, were sometimes allies and sometimes enemies of Peking.

More than two centuries had passed since the downfall of the Yuan dynasty. The Mongols, driven out of Peking, had returned to their steppes, from which they were still able to conduct invasions and even, in the middle of the 15th century, take prisoner a Ming Emperor. These were, however, no more than guerrilla exploits, without influence on world history. Mongolia was not even united. Khalkha, or Outer Mongolia (*Wai Meng-ku*)¹⁰ was separated geographically and politically from Inner Mongolia (*Nei Meng-ku*).¹¹ In each of these two parts, numerous dependencies were established under the khans who followed one another in rapid succession. Not one of them was able to impose his power on the others. These were the *Hsiao Wang-tzu*,¹² ("the little kings") as the Chinese Annals call them. At the beginning of the 17th century, moreover, only the country of Khalkha was independent.¹³ In Inner Mongolia, Chahar had fallen into the hands of the Manchus, who had already found a chief in the person of Nurhaci, the future founder of the Ch'ing dynasty (1559-1626). Likdan Khan, when he was taken prisoner, had given Nurhaci a grand memento—the seal of the Yuan emperors—which Likdan Khan had kept in his possession. After the death of Altyn Khan¹⁴ the other part of Inner Mongolia, the Tumed, quickly became "civilized"; it gave up the nomadic life and assimilated with the Chinese. The turn of Khalkha came later, when the first Manchu emperors revived the great traditions of the Han in China. Meanwhile, the China of the Ming had retreated behind the Great Wall and remained on the defensive against the *Pei-ti*, the Northern Barbarians. The Russians, therefore, could penetrate the country of Khalkha unhampered.

In 1616 the Russians sent their first mission to Altyn

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

Khan, prince of the western part of Khalka, whose capital was situated near the upper Yenisei.¹⁵ Headed by a Cossack ataman, Vasili Tiumentets, and one Ivan Petrov, the aim of the mission was to obtain the help of Altyn Khan against the Kyrgyz. Thus the Russians already considered the latter their subjects, but, because of the weakness of the Russian armies at the frontier, were experiencing difficulties in keeping them under control. The Kyrgyz, a warlike people, had once been a non-nomadic people; having lost their wealth, they had become nomadic, but preserved their influential aristocracy and traces of their ancient culture. Situated between the Russians, the Mongols and the Dzungars, they succeeded in retaining a degree of independence by affiliating first with one and then with another of their powerful neighbors. The aim of the Russian alliance with Altyn Khan was to put an end to these maneuvers. In the *sphere of relations with nomadic peoples the procedure of winning the friendship of the people of an outlying region in order to menace the rear of a closer neighbor was a common one. The two established empires, Russia and China, made equally good use of this procedure.*¹⁶ The similarity between the methods used by each to accomplish this purpose is interesting: the list of presents offered by Tiumentets to Altyn Khan is almost identical with the list of gifts sent to the Mongols in 1682 by the Chinese mission.¹⁷ Besides clothes of wool and other materials necessary to the nomads, we find listed the same female adornments, coral beads for necklaces, mirrors, pots and pans and even writing paper.

The Russian mission of 1616 did not have clear aims, nor did it attain any definite results. Conditions on the Mongolian plains were in a state of flux at the beginning of the 17th century. Altyn Khan listened deferentially to the long enumeration of the Tsar's titles, prom-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ised everything to Tiumenets, and even took an oath of loyalty to the Tsar, but the Russian envoy was not deceived by these outward demonstrations, and left knowing that he would have to come back again. The Russian mission's accounts of Mongolia, her geography, customs and beliefs, were not too detailed, but, such as they were, they made possible the sending, two years later, through Mongolia, of the first Russian mission of Ivan Petlin and Andrei Mundov to China. The description of the Mongol religion as it appears in the report of Tiumenets is most interesting: in it we find the first reference to Lamaism or "Yellow Buddhism," with which Russian sinologists were, much later, to be so much concerned. Altyn Khan himself explained to the Russian envoy the nature of the authority of the Khutuktu, who was seated next to him during the audience.¹⁸ "He is sent here," reports Tiumenets, "by the country of the Lamas (Tibet), and he is considered a saint by the people. He was able to read from birth. When he was three years old he died, and after remaining in the earth for five years, he came back to life. He can read from top to bottom and vice-versa, and he recognizes all the people whom he met in his former life."

As was to have been expected, Altyn Khan did not keep his promises. He was occupied with fighting against the Dzungars and he neglected the Kyrgyz. Moscow, for its part, gave refuge to his enemy, Kharakula, future founder of the Dzungar Empire. The relations, therefore, could not have been friendly, especially as Moscow, after the first Russian contacts with Mongolia and China, was pessimistic as to the political and commercial advantages which might be obtained from these two countries. On the basis of the reports of Tiumenets and Petlin, the Russians had arrived at the conclusion that there was "nothing to be expected from

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

the relations with Mongolia and China, since these countries are too distant, and it will be difficult for their merchants to come to us. As to the country of Altyn Khan, there are nomadic hordes there, warlike men, from whom we shall not be able to derive any advantage and who, on the contrary, will make perpetual demands."¹⁹

In fact, relations continued broken off until 1632, when an emissary of Altyn Khan suddenly arrived in Tomsk to propose, in the name of his sovereign, the payment of a regular tribute to Russia and aid in fighting the enemies of the Tsar; Altyn Khan desired to place himself under Russian protection; he even asked that a representative be sent to him whose presence would serve as a means of the Khan's paying homage to the Tsar. What had happened? Nothing definite as yet, but Altyn Khan had foreseen the menace from Manchuria. The Manchus had made a beginning at establishing relations with their neighbor, the Khan of Tushetu, and this was sufficient to impel Altyn Khan to seek a tie with Russia.

In 1634 a second Russian mission came to Mongolia. It was headed by Iakov Tukhachevskij, who, with a *d'iak* (secretary), Druzhina, was sent from Tomsk. This mission met with deceit and chicanery on the part of the Mongols. The Khan wanted to substitute his cousin for himself in the ceremony of submission, and he offered only a meagre amount of tribute. Druzhina, losing control of himself, used "impolite words" in the presence of the Khan. The mission departed from Mongolia. Was the break complete? Not at all. The Khan sent a large group of ambassadors to Moscow, presented the Tsar with two hundred sables from himself and one hundred from the Khutuktu; he naturally expected presents in return, and in order to avoid misunder-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ing, presented a little list. For himself he wanted gold, silver and precious stones, and for the Khutuktu, a Turkish or Persian horse (*argamak*), musical instruments for his temples, a complete crew of specialists—blacksmiths, locksmiths, tanners—a European physician and even “a monk who had made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem in order that he may teach us how the Christians practice their religion.” Moscow, exhibiting great patience, satisfied a part of these demands and sent a new mission, with Grechanin at its head. The reports of these successive missions are somewhat monotonous despite their picturesque details.

Grechanin's mission resulted in definite accomplishment: Altyn Khan agreed to perform the ceremony of submission personally; he still objected to the use of the word “*kholopstvo*” (servitude) which, after long discussions, was replaced by the word “subjection.” New demands were presented for gifts for the Khan, his mother, the princes close to him, and the Chief Treasurer. The contents of the baggage which the Russians had brought with them, and even their arms, were not enough to satisfy the Khan. The mission succeeded in bringing back a written document in which Altyn Khan formally acknowledged himself a subject of the Tsar (1631). This document was to become significant later, when Savva Vladislavich, a signatory of the Treaty of Kiakhta in 1727, brought it out of the archives of Krasnoyarsk for the purpose of displaying it during his negotiations with the Chinese.

For Russia the important thing for the time being was to hold on to the gains made and to watch over Altyn Khan. The Manchus did not remain inactive; they were already in contact with the Khan of Tushetu, their immediate neighbor, in an effort to obtain through him an agreement providing that all Mongol Khans

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

send the Manchus annually the symbolic tribute of *chiu-pai* ("nine whites")²⁰ i.e., eight white horses and one white camel. Moscow responded by sending a new mission (in 1638), with Vasilij Starkov and Stepan Neverov in charge, which was to visit not only Altyn Khan but certain other princes whom it was desired to keep within the Russian sphere of influence. Altyn Khan, sought after from two sides, assumed an air of importance. He did not utter a word during the audience, and refused to be the first to inquire as to the Tsar's health. His entourage explained to the Russian envoy that, as a descendant of Chingis Khan, the Khan expected the Russians to be the first to perform this act of politeness. Starkov did not give in, and retired to his tent without saying a word. There were persuasions and threats; the Russian envoys were denied food; in the end, through the intervention of the Khutuktu and, naturally, by the bestowal of gifts, all was arranged. An arrangement was even made concerning commerce with China—the first commercial accord under which the Mongols agreed to act as intermediary between the two empires. Henceforth the Mongol caravans which went to China to exchange cattle for silver, cotton goods and silk, were to bring Chinese goods to Tomsk, which was to become the center of Mongol-Sino-Russian trade. In his *stateinyi spisok*, or official diary of his journey, Starkov complained that the Mongols had treated the Russians in a miserly manner. "They gave us an unknown beverage, which they call 'chai,' made of leaves from a tree or herb with which I am not familiar. They put these leaves into water and add milk to it." On their departure, the mission had received the Tsar's tribute: Chinese satin and silk, two hundred sabres, and two hundred large packages (*bakhchas*) of "chai"²¹ whose value was estimated by the Mongols to be equal to the

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

value of one hundred sables. Starkov declared that this "unknown herb" would be of no value in Russia and asked that it be replaced by sables, but this request was denied. Thus was tea introduced into Russia.

For several years Altyn Khan remained loyal to Moscow, and commercial relations continued normal. Meanwhile the Manchus had conquered China and were occupied in pacifying her. The Russians advanced towards the Amur River, where Khabarov was already operating, and where Pashkov was soon to cross Lake Baikal. Mongolia was thus somewhat neglected by the two rivals, who were too preoccupied elsewhere. In 1656, however, the old Altyn Khan undertook to send one of his sons to Peking, to the court of Emperor Shun-chih, to present the tribute.²² His other son, Lobzdan (Lozan, in Russian sources) suddenly advanced with a large army against the Russian Kyrgyz. The Russian towns of Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Kuznetsk, whose garrisons were weak, were in peril, when the news of Altyn Khan's death became known, and Lobzdan returned to Ubsa-nur in order to assure his succession. What was the cause of these maneuvers? Grechanin, who of course took a mission to the new Khan Lobzdan, was unable to discover it. Lobzdan spoke of the alliance with Russia and asked for help against the Dzungars, but did not consider himself any longer a subject of the Tsar, and merely promised to obey him "as a younger brother obeys his elder brother." Lobzdan's reign, however, did not last long. In 1661, he quarreled with Dzhasaktu Kahn and killed him. He was forced to flee. With him the Altyn Khans disappeared from Mongolia.²³ The center of gravity moved farther east, towards the domain of Tushetu Khan whose brother was soon to become Khutuktu, thus considerably enhancing the prestige of this khanate.

Under these circumstances Sino-Russian rivalry in

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

Mongolia could not but increase. In Peking, Emperor Shun-chih had died (1661); K'ang-hsi was not yet of age, and the four regents were occupied in suppressing revolts in southern China. For several years the only weapon the Chinese had against Russian influence in Mongolia was propaganda. On no occasion did the Chinese fail to subject envoys and even ordinary couriers to the ceremony of *kotow* in the presence of Mongol envoys. All edicts concerning Russia began invariably with the recital: "Russia is situated far to the northwest." But Russia was not quite as far away as that, since she was moving closer and closer to the frontiers of Tushetu Khan after having subdued the Burjat Mongols of the Selenginsk region. Her Cossacks advanced in triumph towards the Amur River, and the Manchu armies were unable to check them. The Mongols, who were trading with Nerchinsk, the Cossack supply base, were well informed regarding the situation. Struggling with Dzhasaktu Khan and, behind him, with the menace of the famous Galdan, chief of the Dzungars, Tushetu Khan could not remain isolated; he looked for a powerful defender, and hesitated as between China and Russia.

In 1682, after having defeated the rebels in southern China, K'ang-hsi turned his undivided attention towards the north. Two problems there called for prompt solution. The first was the advance of the Russians, who had arrived at the River Zeja and its tributaries; K'ang-hsi's numerous letters of protest to Moscow having remained unanswered, nothing was left for him but to take up arms. The second problem was posed by the situation at Khalkha, where dissension among the Khans continued, while from the west arose the menace of Galdan, who appeared to be on excellent terms with the Russians. K'ang-hsi, therefore, had to insure peace and

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

neutrality by diplomatic means. In 1682 he started his great campaign on the Amur; in the same year, a Chinese mission, bearing rich gifts, was sent to Khalkha. Through the *P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang-lüeh*²⁴ (the official account of the campaign of 1682-1689), we are fairly well informed concerning the military activities of the Chinese and the Russians of that period, which came to an end with the Treaty of Nerchinsk. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the diplomatic activity of the two opponents in Mongolia during the same period is much scantier. What exactly was the aim of the Chinese mission sent to Urga in 1682? Was it limited to affecting a reconciliation between Tushetu and Dzhasaktu Khan, protégé of Galdan, in connection with which, we are told, K'ang-hsi demanded mediation by the Dalai Lama?²⁵ It appears that some agreements concerning the Russians must also have been concluded. The *Shih-lu*, in fact, reveals that the Mandarin Mala, who had the task of effecting the economic blockade against the Russians on the Amur in order to cut off their supplies, suggested that the trade of the Mongols with Nerchinsk be stopped. "Your servants ask Your Majesty to order the Khan of Khalkha to recall his subjects from the neighborhood of *Ni-pu-ch'u* (Nerchinsk) and to prohibit their trade with the Russians . . . The Emperor ordered the transmission of Mala's report to the Khan in order to keep him informed."²⁶ On the eve of the conference with the Russians, in 1688, K'ang-hsi sent Arani,²⁷ head of the *Li-fan-yüan* (Ministry of Colonial Affairs), to Urra; (later, Arani was one of the delegates at Nerchinsk). What was the aim of Arani's mission? The Chinese Annals give us a version which is too "official." "Inasmuch as the Emperor wanted to avoid alarming the population by the passing of our troops (accompanying the peace delegation) through the country of Khalkha,

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

he sent Arani to the Khutuktu in order to ask him to reassure the inhabitants and to order them to live in peace by continuing their usual occupations."²⁸

It seems improbable that a Minister of Colonial Affairs would have traveled across the Gobi Desert to take care of a simple police matter. Moreover, why was he sent in this case to the Khutuktu, the ecclesiastical head, and not to the Khan? Would we not be much nearer the truth if we accepted the version of W. Mayers, who assures us (unfortunately, without indicating the basis of his assertion) that in 1688, in the Council of the Khalkha princes, it was proposed that the princes place themselves under the protection of Russia; since the opinions of the princes were divided, they called on the Khutuktu, who declared himself opposed to this suggestion, asserting that "the Yellow Church" would not be protected in this case; the Khalkhas, thereupon, agreed to place themselves under the protection of China.²⁹

Russian sources do not furnish more detail than the Chinese on the diplomatic activity in Mongolia during the years preceding the Nerchinsk conference. On the basis of the external facts, made known to us especially through the detailed research of Cahen,³⁰ this activity was extensive. Golovin, principal negotiator at Nerchinsk, spent more than two years in Selenginsk and Udinsk, near the frontiers of Mongolia, before proceeding to Nerchinsk; his instructions required him to approach the Khutuktu and the Tushetu Khan (whom the Russians called Ochiroi Khan) before negotiating with the Chinese; a courier, Vasili Perfiliev, charged with carrying a letter from Golovin, together with presents, was in Urga in 1687; the emissary of Golovin, Stepan Korovin, came later, remained there for a period at the end of 1687 and the beginning of 1688; another emissary,

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Kachanov, was there in 1688, probably at the same time as Arani, head of the *Li-fan-yüan*.

However this may be, later events indicate that the Chinese diplomats were more successful than the Russians. Ochiroi Khan, when he learned that Golovin's entire army consisted of only five hundred *strel'tsy*, sent a force of four thousand Mongols, under the command of his brother, Batur, against him. The Mongol army carried rifles and cannon supplied by China.³¹ Selenginsk and Udinsk were besieged and Golovin's situation there was becoming more and more precarious, when Batur suddenly lifted the siege and hurriedly returned with his troops to Mongolia, where Galdan began his famous invasion of Khalka.

The details of this invasion and its effect on the Sino-Russians negotiations resumed in 1689 at Nerchinsk are sufficiently well known. At the very moment when the Chinese delegation was on its way to Selenginsk (which was at first chosen as the place of the conference), expecting to find Golovin in serious difficulties with the Mongols there, Galdan accomplished his sudden invasion, defeated the Mongols and forced the Khutuktu and Tushetu Khan and their whole entourage to seek refuge on the frontiers of China. Gerbillon has left us a vivid description of the exodus of tens of thousands of Mongols fleeing their country with women, children, herds, horses and camels, which the Chinese delegation met on the way. Not less interesting, although less well known outside of China, are the accounts of two other witnesses of this tragic episode—Chang P'êng-ko³² and Ch'ien Liang-tse³³—members of the peace delegation, who, being the only Chinese among the Manchus surrounding them, felt themselves strange. It was not without secret joy that they noted in their diary the consternation of the Manchu dignitaries on hearing the bad

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

news from the mouths of the first refugees. Songgotu, principal delegate and commander of the army which accompanied the delegation, immediately dispatched someone to search for the other delegates, who were traveling by different routes. A secret council was held. "Everybody is afraid, fantastic rumors are circulating, nobody knows where the truth lies." There was alarm concerning the fate of the head of the *Li-fan-yüan*, Arani, who was in Mongolia at the time of the happening of these events. A few days later, having been able to make his escape, Arani joined the delegation. He at once drew up a report which was sent to the Emperor. "In the evening, the rumor started to spread that the army of the Olöts (Dzungars) was near and our soldiers fled. Their chiefs were unable to keep them back; Songgotu, the commander in chief, put on a cuirass and had the horses kept in readiness all night. We did not sleep. The only ones who were not afraid were we two Chinese, but still we could not sleep because of the noise. . . . The next morning all delegates congratulated one another as if we had escaped death."³⁴

We know that the delegation had to return suddenly to Peking. They were not disappointed by this; on the contrary, they had been impatiently awaiting the Emperor's order to this effect. "If the Imperial Edict had been a few days later in arriving we would all have become 'devils of the desert' (we would have been dead). What saved our lives was a trick of the emissary of Khalkha who, riding at full speed, reached Peking to ask the help of the Emperor. The Emperor questioned him concerning the location of the delegation and the army accompanying it which he should have met on the way. In order to provoke the 'holy wrath' of the Emperor, the emissary replied that the whole army had been destroyed by the Dzungars. The Emperor thereupon

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

hurriedly dispatched two of his guards to make reconnaissance along the route. These guards met us and transmitted to us the order to return to Peking."³⁵ The following year, when the delegation was again sent to the conference, which this time was to be held in Nerchinsk, the two Chinese did not participate in it, the delegation being wholly composed of Manchus.

At the conference of Nerchinsk, the Mongol question was not discussed. Although the Khan and the Khutuktu had accepted China's protection, their territories were still occupied by the Dzungars, and they themselves were merely emigres. The diplomatic success which China had gained in Urga in 1688 was counteracted by the fact that it involved her in a war against the Dzungars. The struggle was to be a terrible one. It was to last, with short interruptions, for more than sixty-five years; diminish considerably the resources of China; and account to a great extent for her political decline in the 19th century. The entire foreign policy of China was for a long time to be influenced by this war.

The Russians were only too pleased by this. Already in Nerchinsk the Chinese had shown themselves more conciliatory than they had been a year earlier, and in order to insure Russian neutrality they offered to grant ever greater trading facilities. Russian caravans had never encountered as favorable a situation as they did in the period between the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) and the Treaty of Kiakhia (1727). Nevertheless, the Chinese did not want Russian prestige to increase too much, especially in the eyes of the exiled Mongols, who might begin to ask themselves whether their choice of a protector in 1688 had been a good one. (The Mongols were to be unable for ten years to return to their country; Galdan was defeated and com-

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

mitted suicide in 1697.) This is why we note the difficulties which were created for the Russian envoys at this time in matters of protocol: for example, the letter brought to Peking by the Russian envoy Isbrantes Ides, in which the Tsar's titles were mentioned before those of the Emperor, was, at a public audience, returned to him. For the same reason the propaganda of "Russia is very far away" was intensified. In order to show how much nearer China was, the Emperor increased the number of his visits "in Tartary," which have been so well described by Father Gerbillon. Even before he had liberated Khalkha, the Emperor had convoked a solemn meeting of the Mongol princes in Dolo-nur, in Inner Mongolia, in order to conduct the ceremony of investiture of Tushetu Khan and the Khutuktu, the new vassals of the Emperor. Gerbillon was present at this meeting in 1691, which the Emperor attended in person surrounded by great pomp: there were a brilliant retinue, princes and mandarins in ceremonial dress, richly decorated tents and numerous imperial guards. The Khan and the Khutuktu came to meet the Emperor and would have prostrated themselves had not the Emperor restrained them, taken them by the hand and led them near to his throne, where he solemnly handed over to them the official documents and the great seal. Thus, Khalkha officially became a dependency of China.

The Russians were able to ignore this event for a considerable time. In the beginning, while the new protectorate was still occupied by the Dzungars, Russian couriers and caravans as well as the Isbrantes Ides (1693) embassy took the Manchurian route to reach China, passing Nerchinsk and Naun (Tsitsikhar).³⁶ Later, when Khalkha was liberated and the Khan and Khutuktu had returned to Urga, the Russians found hardly any changes due to the new status of the country. Because the route

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

through Manchuria was much longer than that through Selenginsk and Urga (the detour via Nerchinsk-Naun took eighty days longer), permission to travel via Urga was readily granted them. In 1704 the chief of the Savatiev caravan was the first to take this route on a return trip from Peking, and after this all caravans, missions and couriers adopted the route, which became the official one.³⁷ The internal administration of Khalkha, moreover, remained in the hands of the Mongols. The "pacification" steps taken by China had as their only result an increase in the number of *ho-shun* (principalities) and the placing at their head of minor princes who received their titles from the Emperor; by this means, Peking was able to weaken the power of the Khan and Khutuktu and to foster support for itself among the Mongol aristocracy. (K'ang-hsi created 72 new princes, and this number was to increase later). On the other hand, the court at Peking made itself the protector of Lamaism, which had already shown itself to be a magnificent instrument of "pacification" in Inner Mongolia; the number of lamas increased constantly, and soon every family was to dedicate at least one of its sons to the vocation of lama.³⁸ Outer Mongolia, however, remained an open country, and the Russians were not yet experiencing any difficulty in entering it, or even establishing themselves at Urga.

Gradually, however, measures tending to isolate Mongolia from the outside world began to be adopted. The Khan and the Taidji were forbidden to enter into relations with foreign countries. Frontier control of foreign merchants and couriers was intensified. This control was removed from the Mongols and placed in the hands of Manchu representatives in Urga. These measures, which naturally were directed primarily against Russia, had little effect so long as the Mongol-Russian border was

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

not demarcated; the Treaty of Nerchinsk, in fact, had only fixed the border between Russia and Manchuria east of the Argun River; west of the river, the enormous frontier of more than 1800 kilometers with Outer Mongolia remained undetermined. By accepting even the slightest limitation, Russia would thus formally recognize the rights of China in Mongolia. It is understandable that she was in no haste to establish a border too precisely, since she also considered herself to have certain rights deriving from the submission of Altyn Khan in 1634. Chinese objections in this matter were for a long time unavailing. However, incidence of desertion increased; the stipulations in the Treaty of Nerchinsk relating to extradition of deserters were a dead letter in the absence of a fixed border. The situation became worse after 1718, when K'ang-hsi's great campaigns against the Dzunggars (Tsevan Rabdan), in the region of Hami and Turfan, started. The Chinese armies passing through Mongolia demanded of the Mongols transportation, horses, fodder and cattle; in order to evade these demands, the Mongols in increasing numbers emigrated to Russia. In 1720, at the audience given to Ismailov, the Emperor himself insisted on the necessity of fixing the Mongol frontier, and he recalled that his ministers had several times requested that this be done. Ismailov confined his reply to the statement that he would faithfully report the demand to the Tsar. But the Chinese were determined to wait no longer. When the news arrived in Peking that seven hundred families from Mongolia had crossed the border and been welcomed in Russia, a serious conflict broke out. Ismailov was obliged to leave the Chinese capital without even having started to discuss the plan he had brought with him of a trade agreement. Lange, his aide, originally assigned the post of consul in Peking, was likewise forced

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

to leave the city soon after. A caravan en route to Peking was stopped at the frontier and all Russian merchants were expelled from Mongolia.

For five years diplomatic and commercial relations between China and Russia remained completely broken off. At times it even seemed as if a war were inevitable. But K'ang-hsi died in 1722, and his successor was soon able, without losing prestige, to attempt a reconciliation. Russia responded favorably to the overtures by dispatching a large mission, with Savva Vladislavich as ambassador; this mission was obliged to yield on a matter of principle and agree to proceed with the establishment of the Mongolian frontier, thereby recognizing, *de jure*, China's sovereignty in Mongolia.

In 1727, after two years of negotiations, Vladislavich signed the Treaty of Kiakhta, which marks an important date in Sino-Mongol-Russian relations. Regarding this treaty Cahen says: "The mission of Vladislavich obtained lasting results for Russian diplomacy and commerce, for science and civilization."³⁹ It is difficult to accept this evaluation without reservations. The main point of the Treaty of Kiakhta was the closing of Mongolia to the Russians. Official caravans could still pass through on the way to Peking once every three years, but general Russian trade was excluded and was limited to the border region, where henceforth Kiakhta was to play a role analogous to the role assigned to Canton in the maritime trade with the Occident. It is true that in order to obtain this result China had to offer compensations. Russia obtained the right to have her "ecclesiastic and diplomatic mission" in Peking and to send language students there to learn Chinese. These concessions to Russia seemed considerable ones at the time, but we know now that the diplomatic role of this mission was not to be an important one; its significance in the field

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

of religion was not to be compared with that of the Catholic missions; and the scientific consequences did not become important until the end of the 18th century, and more especially in the 19th century. As to the "lasting results" in the field of trade, it is sufficient to recall that during the period between the Treaty of Nerchinsk and the Treaty of Kiakhta, Russia had been able to send twelve official caravans to Peking, not counting numerous private ones; after the conclusion of the Treaty of Kiakhta she was not able to send more than six caravans in all, since the difficulties placed in the way of Russian trade by Peking had forced her, as early as 1762, to give up completely the sending of caravans to China. Henceforth she was left with nothing but the trade in Kiakhta, which was likewise suspended by China for a total of twenty years during the thirty-year period between 1762 and 1792.⁴⁰

This disagreement arose from the fact that the political concepts of Russia and China, which had come into conflict at the Kiakhta Conference, were so totally different and were not reconciled by the signing of the treaty. The concept which guided the Russian negotiators had been formulated by Peter the Great, who saw only two possible policies for Russia in the Far East—war or trade ("voyevat ili torgovat")—and who, occupied as he was by his wars in Europe, chose trade. China, however, had a completely different conception of policy toward Russia; she wanted neither war nor trade; she was simply seeking security through isolation. For her the principal aim of the Kiakhta Treaty was to close Mongolia and transform its vast territory into a buffer state, under the exclusive control of China, between herself and Russia.

By the Treaty of Kiakhta, Russia lost all the advantages in Outer Mongolia which she had created by her

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

efforts during more than a century, and this in spite of the "squatter's rights" which she believed were hers by virtue of the fact that she had been the first to enter the country of Khalkha in the beginning of the 17th century. This defeat was not even to be redressed in the 19th century, the period of the Russian revenge in the other border regions, the region of the Amur River in Manchuria and of the Ili River in ancient Dzungaria. The opening of China in the middle of the 19th century, moreover, was to reduce considerably the interest in Mongolia as a route of "free" access to isolated China.

It was only in the 20th century that entirely new factors—political, economic, demographic and, above all, strategic—brought a revival of the Mongolian question in Sino-Russian relations.

CHAPTER II.

200 YEARS OF STATUS QUO

AFTER THE RUSSIAN recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Mongolia a long period of nearly two centuries followed during which the status established by the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727) had been maintained. And this despite the fact that the treaty had been patently disadvantageous to Russia; that the stipulations concerning trade, modest as they were, had been frequently violated; and that incidents involving deserters occurred repeatedly at the Mongolian frontiers and were the persistent subject of sharp correspondence between the Chinese *Li-fan-yüan* and the Russian Senate. How can we account for the fact that under such conditions peace obtained for so long a period? The question is all the more interesting since it has been raised not only with respect to Mongolia, but also with respect to northern Manchuria, where the status established somewhat earlier, by the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), was maintained for almost as long a period. We are faced with an historical phenomenon—the peculiar character of Sino-Russian relations as contrasted with the relations between China and the other Occidental powers.

Varied theories have been advanced to explain the phenomenon, most of them by political writers impressed partly by "Slavic imperialism," partly by the "traditional pacifism" of Russia and China, but impressed above all by the successes of Russian diplomacy in China during the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, when important results

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

had been obtained without recourse to arms. It is obvious that these theories have been based less on analysis of historical facts than on mere, often surprising, conjectures of their authors. Thus, they speak of an "affinity between Russian and Chinese ideologies," an affinity affirmed without further proof and explained by the fact that the two peoples are "both heirs of the great Empire of Chingis Khan." Even more, these theories assure us that "the similarity of the ethnic character of the two nations" results quite naturally in "the peculiar intimacy of two peoples."⁴¹

There are other theories, of a more scientific nature. Recently the new "Eurasian" school of Russian historiography has been credited with bringing to the fore the importance of Asiatic factors in Russian history. Unfortunately there are neither sinologists nor specialists in Chinese questions among the "Eurasians," so that the opinions of representatives of this school concerning Sino-Russian relations are not sufficiently based on facts, especially the facts contained in Chinese sources. Faithful to their general doctrine, which considers expansion in Asia the basic historical task imposed on Russia by the "geopolitical" conditions of the Eurasian plain, they saw in the treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta only a blocking of this expansion. They interpreted the long observance of the status established by these treaties as the abandonment by Russia of her basic interests in Asia, and the responsibility for this abandonment was laid to the St. Petersburg government which, since the time of Peter the Great, had been directed too much towards "occidentalism"; on the other hand, the more "active" politics of the middle of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th was hailed by them as a return of Russia to her historical traditions and the awakening of her "Eurasian consciousness."⁴²

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

It is obvious that these schematic and far too abstract opinions ignore important facts and take no account of the numerous factors which caused Russia and China, for the best interests of each, to come to an understanding in 1689 and again in 1727; do not take into consideration the extremely important results obtained by the long observance of the status established by these treaties, under which previous acquisitions were consolidated and the Siberian domains kept intact at the most dangerous moment of "Ch'ing imperialism"; and, as seen in the light of more recent events, completely ignore the fact of the evolution in Chinese politics which ultimately caused a *volte face* in Russian politics.

This is not the place to examine still other opinions on the subject, especially as most of them are of a historical-philosophical rather than a purely historical character. It appears preferable to refer to the most pertinent documents of the period and to try to draw the proper conclusions from them.

It is true that Sino-Russian relations of the period which concerns us here have received little study.⁴³ In general historians are more interested in the "dynamic" periods in which external events succeeded one another rapidly than in "static" periods of slow evolution. There was a long period following the conclusion of the Treaty of Kiakhtha which was particularly dull. No spectacular event occurred, no further treaty was concluded, no important exchange of embassy took place. Some historical works omit this period completely and go directly from the first quarter of the 18th century to the middle of the 19th.⁴⁴ However, it is only by careful study of this long and generally neglected period that we can understand the true nature of the problems which arose in 1853-1860 on the Amur River, and es-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS


pecially those which arose in 1911-1915 in Mongolia and which concern us here directly.

These problems did not arise spontaneously. The great formulators of Russian "active" politics—Nevel'skoy and Muraviev in the 19th century, Kosakov and Korostovets in the beginning of the 20th century—had their predecessors a hundred and fifty years earlier: Lorenz Lange, diplomatic agent and one of the best of 18th-century Russian experts on China; Gerhard Friedrich Muller, great historian, who spent more than ten years in Siberia in travels devoted to research; Miatlev, Governor of Siberia; and Jacobi, Commandant of Selenginsk, the latter two, administrators and colonizers of great importance. The cautious and conservative statesmen of St. Petersburg — Nisselrode and Voronkov in the 19th century, and Witte and Sazonov in the 20th—who did not always agree with the impatient "colonials," also had their predecessors in the 18th century: Vladislavich, negotiator of the Treaty of Kiakhta and formulator of the policy of maintaining the *status quo*; Ostermann, minister of foreign affairs and the best Russian diplomat of his time; later Chancellor Panin and the Empress Catherine II herself.

In contrast with the Russian political doctrines, the two schools of which remained in opposition for two centuries, were the Chinese conceptions, the study of which is even more important, since in the final analysis they prevailed during the long "static" period; it was the sudden modification of the Chinese concepts that precipitated the events of 1911-1915.

On the 23rd of July, 1727, three days after the conclusion of the Treaty of Kiakhta, Vladislavich had his immediate collaborators as well as several native chiefs of the Mongolian border sign a rather curious testi-

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BOARDS OF RUSSIAN	-
EXPANSION IN 1535	- - - - -
IN XVI CENTURY	- X - X - X -
IN XVII CENTURY
IN XVIII CENTURY
IN XIX C. (1857-1917)
IN XIX C. (SECOND HALF)
IN XIX C. (SECOND HALF)
PRESENT SINO-RUSSIAN



THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

monial. "We, the undersigned," this document reads, "having been neither coerced nor bribed by anyone, testify under oath that the newly established frontier is highly advantageous to Russia and that actually Russian possessions have been extended into Mongolia a distance of several days' march and in certain sections of even several weeks'."45 Vladislavich needed this testimony to take back to St. Petersburg, where he feared he would find strong opposition to the treaty he had concluded. In 1731 he was obliged to revert to the question and to present a secret report which bore the title "The Condition and Strength of the Chinese State."⁴⁶ The report is a veritable profession of faith, containing a complete program which was later to be the inspiration of Russian policy in the Far East for more than a century. The views expounded in this report concerning Russian expansion in Asia, the danger of too rapid advance, and the necessity of maintaining friendly relations are singularly reminiscent of the ideas expressed during the course of the preceding century by Spathari and Krizhanich.⁴⁷ Vladislavich did not try to sugarcoat the pill, he did not present the concluded treaty as a success, he did not even mention the "advantages" obtained for Russian trade or the establishment of the mission in Peking. He declared frankly that the alternatives he had to face in Kiakhta were acceptance of the treaty or war. "We may easily conceive of a war with China," he admits, "but we must take into consideration the fact that this would not be an easy undertaking. We would have to concentrate at the border at least ten regiments of the line and an equal number of regiments of irregulars, which would have to face all the Chinese forces and perhaps the Mongolian as well. The cost of such an undertaking, even assuming that it should be successful, will never be recovered.

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

opportune to intervene in Peking and demand that all restrictions imposed upon our caravans be removed; that the Russian mission be freed of the insufferable surveillance of the Mandarins, which hinders all trade; and that the dispute concerning frontiers be settled favorably. As long as the Dzungars keep the Chinese in check on the battlefields, the latter will not dare to defy the Russian Court. We even believe that this is an excellent time to seek the extension of our frontier to the Amur River."⁵⁰ The Collegium of Foreign Affairs sent cautious instructions regarding the representations to be made in Peking, and left unanswered the suggestion to advance the frontier to the Amur River.

During the same year another instance arose in which the government of St. Petersburg, according to historian Muller, gave proof of its "extreme conservatism." In the year 1733 the Mongols repeatedly tried to secure Russian protection against the harassments of the Chinese. The Khutuktu himself showed so much friendship toward Russia that the Emperor of China caused his residence to be shifted to Dolonor, in Inner Mongolia, in order to remove him from the Russian border. Muller says: "Nevertheless, the Russian government not only did not encourage the passage of Mongol tribes into Russia, but expelled by force of arms those who had succeeded in crossing the frontier. The slogan of St. Petersburg called for strict observance of the treaties concluded with China."

A quarter of a century later the Russian policy of non-intervention in Mongol affairs was put to a much more serious test. In 1756, Ch'ing-kung-tsa-pu,⁵¹ a Khotokhoit prince, one of the most influential of the Mongolian chiefs, and who was at the head of an army guarding communications for the Chinese forces in battle with the Dzungars, revolted; within a few months

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

the revolt, in the form of an uprising against Chinese domination, had spread over almost all of Outer Mongolia.

Until recently there has been little information available concerning this rebellion, and the only source in European literature which contains any details of it appears to be the papers of Courant, who obtained the data from the chronicle *Tung-hua lu*.⁵² Since the publication, in 1937, of the *Ch'ing shih-lu*,⁵³ secret annals of the Ch'ing dynasty, much more abundant documentation has been available. There are entire volumes of the *Ch'ien-lung Shih-lu*⁵⁴ filled with decrees, edicts and proclamations of the Emperor, referring solely to "the revolt of Ch'ing-kun-tsa-pu." These documents reveal the gravity of the rapidly moving events which befell China at the moment when the main body of her armies was far away engaged in pursuit of the famous Dzungar chief, Amursana. "Even at the time of the struggle between Galdan and K'ang-hsi," says Courant, "the Empire did not seem to have been so shaken." These documents also reveal the astonishing ability of Ch'ien-lung in dealing with the situation, and depict, perhaps better than any other record, the remarkable talents of this monarch, who was a great administrator, diplomat, and a real empire builder. He did not lose a moment in mobilizing all his resources; he turned to the Dalai Lama to bring pressure on the Mongol clergy and on the Khutuktu himself; he displayed an extremely able diplomacy regarding the princes, overwhelming with favors those who had remained loyal, quietly isolating others of whom he was less certain, immediately arresting the most suspect and calling them to Peking, where they were ruthlessly executed. In addition to employing force and ruses, he remained faithful to Chinese traditions in his wide use of persuasion.

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

In the proclamations addressed to princes and tribal chiefs, he elucidated a complete political philosophy surprising for his time.

One of the reasons for the revolt of the princes was the rigor with which the Emperor acted against those responsible for the lack of success in the military operations against the Dzungars; the descendants of Chingis Khan furthermore considered that they could not be subjected to punishment like mere subjects. In a remarkable decree¹⁶ Ch'ien-lung firmly asserted the right to compensate and punish, "according to law," all servants of the state, including the Mongol feudal princes. Omnipotent potentate of China and Son of Heaven, and regarded as a demi-god, he invoked in this case not "the Will of Heaven," nor even the pleasure of the absolute sovereign, but the argument—more convincing to his mind—of "the interest of the State." Without distinction, princes as well as simple subjects, members of the imperial family as well as tribal chiefs, Manchus, Chinese, Tumeds, Khalkhas, had to submit to the interests of the state.

At this moment so critical for China, the five most influential chiefs—among them Tushetu Khan and the Khutuktu himself—approached the commandant of Selenginsk, Jacobi, and asked him to transmit to St. Petersburg an announcement of their intention of accepting the status of a protectorate and of becoming Russian subjects. Jacobi, who for many years had struggled unsuccessfully to have the restrictions imposed on Russian commerce lifted, and who was under a severe strain because of the constant harassments of the Chinese Mandarins, barely concealed his joy when he learned of this Mongol demarche. He immediately transmitted the proposal to Governor Miatlev, who himself was not slow to grasp the importance of the opportunity being offered

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

to Russia. In an enthusiastic report addressed to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, he asked that the Mongol offer be accepted immediately.⁵⁷ "It is not only a matter of the five chiefs," he added, "since the example of the Khutuktu will be followed at once by all the Khans and by forty-nine *zaisans* of Khalkha. Thus, the Chinese army will be cut off from its bases, and Russia will be able to dictate terms to Peking."

The government of St. Petersburg was faced with a difficult problem: it could not simply decline the offer of the Mongol princes; on the other hand, the government was already involved in serious difficulties because of the fact that it had given sanctuary to Amursana, and the Chinese armies, pursuing the Dzungar chief, had even violated the Russian frontiers. St. Petersburg preferred, therefore, to temporize. When the government's "complete instructions," the contents of which, unfortunately, are not known, finally arrived, it was too late. The revolt had been suppressed and "the Emperor of China," as Governor Miatlev reports bitterly, "had become reconciled with the princes."⁵⁸ The resentment of the "colonials" and all those who, even in St. Petersburg, had criticized the timid politics of the government, was indeed great, all the more so since Russia had apparently gained nothing by her attitude of neutrality.

After the suppression of the revolt in Mongolia, the war with the Dzungars was energetically brought to an end, and this double success of China served to enhance the pride of her leaders. As the obstacles to Russian commerce had still not been lifted, the Russian Senate, in a letter to the *Li-fan-yüan*, pointed to the services which Russia had rendered China at the time of her conflicts with the Mongols and the Dzungars. The answer of the *Li-fan-yüan* was arrogant and insulting: "During the submission of the Olöts (Dzung-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

hars) Russia did not intervene for the good reason that she had neither the strength nor the means to do so. Moreover, if she had intervened, our victorious troops would have inflicted upon her a defeat as crushing as the one which they inflicted upon the Olöts.”⁵⁹

In order to understand the effect which such an answer must have produced in Russia, it should be borne in mind that the event occurred in 1760, in the midst of the Seven Years War, when Russian troops had beaten those of Frederick the Great and had just entered Berlin. However, the Senate maintained its calm; in very moderate terms it made known to the *Li-fan-yüan* that the arrogance of the latter would not modify traditional Russian politics, nor would Russia declare war on China unless absolutely forced to do so. Mention of “war” produced an instantaneous effect. The *Li-fan-yüan* hastened to answer that China likewise was not thinking of a war with Russia.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, it continued to display a disdainful arrogance. Seeking to bring about a change in the tone of the Chinese letters, the Senate informed the *Li-fan-yüan* that Russia “occupies nearly half of the territory of the entire world, that she is a great Empire, not to be treated like the Dzungars or the small Tatar peoples.” “It is ridiculous,” was the answer of the *Li-fan-yüan*, to imply that comparison of any sovereign with the omnipotent Emperor is intended! Especially if it involves a person of the female sex, under the reign of one of whom Russia happens to be.”⁶¹

The situation was far from indicating any “peculiar intimacy of Sino-Russian relations.” In reality relations were often such as to demand great self-control on the part of the Russian government to see, in the continual violations of the treaty, damage to trade and offenses against Russian prestige, only “minor vexations” which,

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

according to the watchword of Vladislavich, had to be "disregarded in order to avoid a great conflict with China." This ungrateful policy could not be a popular one; indeed, it met with ever stronger opposition not only among the "colonials" of Siberia, but also among influential circles in St. Petersburg. The malcontents soon found a spokesman—the historian Muller. With the accession to the throne of Catherine II, Muller became hopeful of changing the line of conduct, which he deemed unworthy of Russia and detrimental to her interests in Asia. In a secret memorandum submitted to the court and entitled "Reflections on the War with China," Muller made the outright proposal of war as the only means of setting the situation to rights, and set forth vigorously the principal demands of Russia: first, the return of Amur, "the Russian river," and then of Mongolia, "the country of Altyn Khan, a Russian subject." To support his thesis, the learned author made liberal use of arguments based on history; at the same time he outlined what he considered to be the strategical points involved which were intended to convince the young sovereign of the case with which the proposed undertaking could be accomplished. His efforts, however, were fruitless. In spite of her youth, the new Empress was realistic and even less inclined than her predecessors to "romantic" undertakings. Moreover, the remarkable memorandum of the great historian was filed among the archives and did not come to light until a hundred and twenty years later.⁶²

The line of conduct followed by Russia since the conclusion of the treaty of Kiakhta was not modified. Indeed, under the reign of Catherine II it was even more strongly confirmed. Sino-Russian relations apparently became stabilized following the long and patient negotiations of Kropotov, who was twice sent to China, where,

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

in 1768, he signed an addendum to the Treaty of Kiakhta settling the question of Mongol deserters, and especially after 1792, when a supplementary protocol was signed by Nagil. The number of frontier incidents diminished, trade in Kiakhta was no longer interrupted, and the diplomatic correspondence itself took on a calmer tone. It was then that the real advantages which Russia had derived from her policy of maintaining the *status quo*, and which for a long time had been understood by only a few clairvoyant statesmen, became apparent.

The historical task of pacifying the nomads in the border regions of China and Russia inevitably fell to one of these established empires. Russia was most desirous of leaving the role of policeman to her partner, since to undertake this task herself would involve her in a long fight with the Dzungars, the Mongols and, probably, China. The policy adopted by the Ch'ing in the conquered regions derived from the basic ideas as to means of assuring her own security which China had pondered for centuries.⁶⁵ Russia profited from this policy, indirectly but definitely. Her domains in Siberia, insufficiently populated and poorly defended, had been saved, and the important work of colonization could be carried on unhindered.

Indeed China's protectorate in Mongolia was simply added to the existing feudal system of the native tribes; it embraced not so much the territories involved but the people and their grouping in *ulusses*, *aimaks* and *khanates*, whose chiefs owed taxes and services to the superiors in the hierarchy and, ultimately, to the Emperor of China. Neither taxes nor services were more than nominal and were not essential to China, whose colonial policy had a purely strategic aim. China sought neither the development of the second-rate pasture-land

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

territories of the protectorate, nor an increase in population through colonization. On the contrary, she envisaged only the creation of a belt of buffer states surrounding her own territories. The less populated this buffer, the better it fulfilled its strategic role. Thus, after the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Peking government forbade Chinese and even Manchus to enter the new territories on the Amur River; in addition, the natives of the regions near the Russian frontier were evacuated. These measures had a dual aim. They prevented deserters from crossing the border, and they made more difficult a possible Russian advance into the desert thus created. In 1858-60, when the Russians came into possession of the Amur region, they found there less than 11,000 indigenous inhabitants, and in the entire region of the Ussuri, less than 2,000 inhabitants.⁶⁴

This policy of "creating a vacuum," so advantageous to Russia, since it cleared the troublesome nomads from her frontiers, was maintained by China in Mongolia for almost two centuries. The Mongols had never been a numerous people. According to the census of 1918, the population of Outer Mongolia numbered 700,000,⁶⁵ and it is doubtful whether it had been greater during preceding centuries. The Chinese, after having established their protectorate over Outer Mongolia, or the territory of the Khalkhas, not only refrained from colonizing the vast plains of these regions, but took measures to hinder colonization. Concerning this, the most interesting documentation is found in the *Li-fan-yüan tse-li*,⁶⁶ or Code of the Tribunal of Colonial Affairs, the highest authority in the Administration of Mongolia. This code, containing all the regulations adopted since the establishment of the protectorate, was promulgated for the first time in 1696 by K'ang-hsi;⁶⁷ later it was revised and completed by Ch'ien-lung in 1789,⁶⁸ and by Chia-ch'ing in

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

1815.⁶⁹ The main provisions of this code were still in force during almost the entire 19th century. To begin with we find in the code a prohibition against Chinese crossing the Mongolian frontier. Special permits for a limited stay, issued only by the *Li-fan-yüan*, were given to merchants. We find also that, under the code, Chinese were forbidden to cultivate land in Mongolia, and Mongols to lease their pasture. Finally we note an absolute prohibition against Chinese marrying Mongol women.⁷⁰ It should be borne in mind that these measures, the political aim of which is obvious, were added to others mentioned above which were aimed at "pacifying" the Mongols by propagating Lamaism, ordaining celibate lamas in ever greater numbers, and developing monasteries. These measures, which were intended to serve Chinese strategic interests, could, at the same time, only serve Russia's advantage by strengthening the security of the Siberian frontiers, and this far "better than the fortified lines were able to.

Thus, vast regions, thinly populated and without efficient means of transportation, separated Russia from China, and this veritable "no-man's land" was carefully preserved in its original state by China herself. Is it surprising that for as long as this state of affairs was maintained—which it was throughout the 18th and 19th centuries—Russia had no interest in intervening to modify the *status quo* in Mongolia?

It was modified, and somewhat brusquely, by China. It is generally believed that the break with old traditions in the relations between China and her subject peoples was brought about by the revolution. Indeed, the revolution of 1911 proclaimed the equality of all races composing the Chinese nation, and adopted the flag of five colors symbolizing the union of Chinese, Man-

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

thus, Mongols, Tibetans and the Mohammedan peoples. We know that this equality did not preclude an extreme centralism, nor really take into consideration the rights of minorities.⁷¹ In the name of the principle of race equality, the new republic banished from the official language the very term "*wai-fan*"⁷² which means "dependency," or "colony," but with this it also sought the elimination of the local autonomy which the minorities had enjoyed for centuries.

In reality the beginning of the abandonment of the old traditions, the revision in colonial politics, the forced assimilation of the minorities, and the measures adopted for colonization of the "dependencies" took place long before the revolution. Hami, Tursan, Urumtsi and the other regions of former Dzunggary saw great waves of Chinese emigrants beginning with the second half of the 19th century; later, rapid colonization occurred in Manchuria, especially in the region of the Amur River. However, the two main "*wai-fan*," Mongolia and Tibet, continued to be free of this colonization until the beginning of the 20th century. In 1906, however, a special office for the colonization of Mongolia was created in Peking. Emigration of Chinese to Outer Mongolia, prohibited for two centuries, was now not only permitted but encouraged. All sorts of privileges were granted to Chinese colonists, and intermarriage with Mongols was authorized. The Chinese population in Mongolia began to grow rapidly and untoward consequences of this were immediately felt by the Mongols, whose lands were frequently confiscated and pastures constantly diminished in order to make room for the rising number of colonists. Furthermore, transportation and outfitting of the new arrivals required funds. The Mongols, who for two centuries had paid only nominal tribute to Peking, found themselves obliged to pay ever mounting taxes.

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

The government of Peking decided to establish a strong base in Urga, in order to maintain an important garrison there, and for this purpose began the construction of barracks, at the expense of the Mongols, whose recruitment into the Chinese army had in the meantime been initiated.

It is not difficult to imagine the effect which these measures produced in Mongolia as well as in Russia. Official Chinese documents published after the launching of the separatist movement of the Mongols reveal that it was recognized that the Chinese administration during the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty "had committed abuses" which had aroused in the Mongols a "real hatred of the Chinese." As for Russia, it is understandable that she could not remain indifferent to the total destruction of the system which for two centuries had assured the security of her frontiers and formed the basis of her relations with China. The forced colonization of Mongolia destroyed the buffer which had separated the tiny population of southern Siberia from the masses of the Chinese population and created at the same time a demographic as well as economic danger for the Russian regions. Even more threatening was the establishment of a Chinese military base in the neighborhood of the Trans-Siberian railway, the only Russian line of communication with the Far East which, in case of a conflict in the Pacific, would thus be menaced.

It is not surprising therefore that the opposition of the Mongols to the overthrow of their century-old status was well received in St. Petersburg. But Russia, faithful to her traditions, acted with great circumspection. When, in May, 1911, the Mongols, unable any longer to endure the oppression of the Mandarins, sent a large delegation, headed by Prince Hanto, to St. Petersburg to solicit the

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

intervention of Russia in their behalf, their lamentations were heard rather coldly. The attention of the Russian government was taken up by the Balkan War, and the complications in the Far East were considered most inopportune. A friendly representation was made to China, however, following which the Amban Santo, chief of the Chinese administration in Urga, promised to ease certain severe administrative measures, but in return demanded the recall of the Hanto mission.

This was the situation in Mongolia when the Chinese revolution, which caused immediate repercussions in Urga, broke out in Wu-ch'ang.

CHAPTER III.

AFTER THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

WE ARE well enough informed today concerning the events which occurred in Mongolia in 1911-1915 and which passed unnoticed in a Europe too absorbed at the time in its own troubles. In addition to the official texts, published after the war,⁷³ there is now available the testimony of the principal personalities of the dramatic struggle which almost precipitated Russia and China into an armed conflict.⁷⁴

As soon as the news of Wu-ch'ang arrived in Urga, the situation there became aggravated. The most influential of the Mongol chiefs met in the palace of the Khutuktu, where a most Oriental scheme of action was immediately elaborated. The Khutuktu gave notice to the Anban Santo that the Mongols, prompted by sentiments of loyalty towards the dynasty under whose protection they had lived in peace for two centuries, had decided to defend it against the rebels threatening Peking. To this end, they undertook to mobilize their best cavalry regiments and to send them to Peking to protect the sacred person of the Emperor. Santo, accordingly, was asked to return to these regiments all the weapons at his disposal, and in view of the urgency of the affair, only three hours' time was granted him. The amazed Mandarin hesitated, whereupon another ultimatum was sent him inviting him and his entire retinue to quit Mongolia because of his disloyalty to the dynasty. Santo, with barely two hundred men of his guard at his disposal, could only yield; he asked the Russian consul

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

to give him protection against violence at the hands of the Mongols. Once the Amban had left, the princes and lamas forgot their loyalty to the dynasty, proclaimed the complete independence of Mongolia and decreed the expulsion of all Chinese officials and a strict prohibition against Chinese colonization in Mongolia. Some time later, news of the abdication of the Emperor arrived, and the Khutuktu was proclaimed Grand Khan of the Mongols.

All these events took place in the midst of a great agitation which extended to the most remote *ulusses*. But as soon as the first wave of enthusiasm had passed, the question of what to do next arose. Fearing Chinese reprisals, Mongolia once again turned to Russia for assistance.

Korostovets, back from Peking, was in St. Petersburg at the time. He tells us, in his book, of his first conversation with Sazonov. "The Mongols have got themselves into a mess," the minister told him, "now they are trying to force our hand to get them out of it. Now, any complication in Asia at this time can only weaken our position in Europe. . . The future of Russia lies in the Balkans and on the Straits, and not on the Yenisei or on the Black Irtysh. Are we not above all a European power?"

History had repeated itself. The opinions of the minister were in opposition to the views of those diplomats who believed, not without justification, that Russia was not exclusively a European power but also an Asiatic empire, and that her interests did not permit her to remain indifferent to the fate of Mongolia. At the head of these diplomats was Kosakov, who directed the Far Eastern affairs of the ministry, and Korostovets himself. As had Muraviev sixty years earlier, on the question of

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

the Amur River, they succeeded, thanks to the personal intervention of the Tsar, in gaining their point.

Sazonov had submitted a report to the Tsar analyzing the difficulties involved in the problem of Mongolia and the international complications which any hasty act was apt to entail; he ended with the recommendation to temporize while observing quietly the further development of events. "To observe quietly—I agree," the Tsar wrote on the report "but we must not let the opportune moment pass." This annotation decided the affair—Russia could not let slip the opportunity which events offered her for intervening in Mongolia.

What was the aim of this intervention? Sazonov, in a speech in the Duma,⁷⁶ formulated the demands of Russia under three categories: China must refrain from colonizing Mongolia, agree not to send troops there, and respect local autonomy. Indeed, this was nothing more than the restoration of the old status of Mongolia, which had been maintained for two centuries. There was one new element, however. The former status had not been defined by any treaty; it was a *de facto* status based on the traditional system of relations between China and her subject peoples. When this system was first shaken and then completely overthrown by the revolution, a new basis had to be found, and this could only be achieved by agreement between China and Russia. This was precisely the most delicate phase of the question. The young Chinese Republic did not intend to put the Mongol question on an international plane; it considered it a purely internal question.

A presidential mandate was issued which refused to recognize the independence proclaimed by the Mongols, and which incorporated Mongolia as an integral part of China's territory, assimilating her as a mere province. The mandate proclaimed: "The Chinese Republic will

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

no longer make any distinction between the five races of China, as was done under the Empire. The dependencies ("wai-fan") henceforth will be treated as home provinces." This intransigence was aimed especially at Russia. As to Mongolia, the Chinese tried to win her over by persuasion and concessions.

A lengthy telegraphic correspondence began between President Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Khutuktu. The content of this correspondence is most interesting and indicates that the correspondents had very precise ideas concerning the situation. Both clearly saw what Spathari had realized in the 17th century—that Mongolia, situated as she was between China and Russia, could not retain her independence. But while Yüan Shih-k'ai, as had K'ang-hsi, and even Shun-chih, before him, feared the influence in Mongolia of the Russians, who threatened to "break down the door of China," the Khutuktu sought to use this influence as a means of weakening China's control in Mongolia and, after the fashion of Altyn Khan in the 17th century, to profit by the Sino-Russian antagonism.

Yüan Shih-k'ai telegraphed the Khutuktu: "In order for a nation to be independent she must have a large population, great riches, a strong army and a well organized government. Although your Mongolia possesses a large territory, its population is not equal to the population of the smallest province of our Republic; the economic condition of your people is miserable and does not permit the levying of sufficient taxes to support an army. With the development of Lamaism, your people has lost its former martial qualities. Your government is based on the clan system and cannot be compared with the system of civilized nations. Your power does not even extend to the four *aimaks* of Outer Mongolia. During the past century Mongolia could not have

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

existed for one moment without China's protection. . . On the other hand, Mongolia is indispensable to China. The relations between these two countries may be compared to those between the lips and the teeth, or a door and a court. If the lips are parted, the teeth are exposed. If the door is broken down, the court is endangered."⁷⁷

The Khutuktu's answer was not without malice. He said: "It is true that our population is rather small, our people poor and lacking in military spirit, that it is difficult for them to assure themselves an independent existence. We are indebted to Your Excellency for your desire to help us, and the future of Mongolia will depend to a great extent on China's action. If China is able to radically reform her administration, put her own house in order, reorganize her relations with foreign countries and consolidate her frontiers, then Mongolia's existence will be assured and China herself will not have to fear an invasion from the north." The Khutuktu did not want to appear to be less adept than his correspondent in the art of using metaphors. He continued: "The position of Mongolia, squeezed between her powerful neighbors, is like that of an egg surrounded by stones; the slightest impolitic act is capable of reducing us to the status of Korea or Formosa." He closed his communication by unexpectedly proposing arbitration through Russia.⁷⁸

Yüan Shih-k'ai protested against this suggestion; he wanted no foreign mediation, and offered to send his representative to negotiate directly with Mongolia. In highly conciliatory terms, he exhorted the Khutuktu to cancel the Mongol declaration of independence, and declared himself ready to make concessions: the Mongol princes would receive favorable treatment and the Mongols would enjoy wide autonomy in local affairs.

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

"The only desire of China is to see Mongolia free of all foreign interference, and this can only be attained if it forms a part of the Republic of the five races."⁷⁹

The Khutuktu remained cold towards these exhortations. "The principle of the Republic of the five races," he answered, "is worthy of great admiration. But in view of Mongol customs and habits, which are different from those of the other races composing the Republic, we believe that it is best for us to live separately."⁸⁰

Meanwhile, Korostovets arrived in Urga at the head of a mission and began his negotiations with the Mongols. Among his interlocutors, besides the lamas, who shared the realistic opinions of the Khutuktu, were men who had already had contact with European civilization. The latter, not without assistance from the Russian intellectual *Buryats*, drew up the plan of a completely independent "Greater Mongolia," expecting that Russia would magically transform their dreams into political reality. "Their brown faces," Korostovets tells us, describing his first encounter with the Mongol representatives, "with their high cheek bones and slit eyes, displayed eager attention and the utmost curiosity, as if a prestidigitator was before them who would demonstrate his sleight-of-hand." One of the representatives brought to the conference the treatise on international law by Bluntschlic, which had strayed, who knows how, into Urga. He demanded that Mongolia be allowed the three indispensable (according to Bluntschlic) components for assuring the independent existence of a state, namely, a monarchy, territory, and population. To this end he demanded the incorporation into the future state of not only Outer Mongolia but also Inner Mongolia, and even the province of Barga. Korostovets had to exert all his powers of persuasion to combat this doctrinaire

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

maximalism and temper the Mongol demands. It was the feeling of the Russian government that the agreements with the Mongols must in no way endanger the possibility of later negotiations with China; they were to be merely a means of demonstrating to the latter that the Mongolian problem could not be solved as a purely Chinese problem, nor even as a Sino-Mongol problem, but that the solution seriously concerned Russia, and that the problem was—as indeed Russia had always represented it to be—a Sino-Russian-Mongol affair.

Hence a memorandum was prepared by Korostovets which made no further mention of Mongolia's independence, but referred only to her autonomy. The door was left open for an understanding with China. "The Russian Imperial Government," the text of this document stated, "will assist Mongolia to the end of maintaining the autonomous regime which she had established, protecting her right to maintain a national army and her decision to permit neither the presence of Chinese troops on her territory nor the colonization of her land by the Chinese."

The signing of the protocol, the first Russian-Mongol document since Altyn Khan's act of submission in 1638, was scheduled to take place on the third of November (21st of October) 1912, at the Russian Consulate. All that day the Russian delegates waited for the Mongol representatives. They finally arrived, at ten o'clock that night, explaining that the astrologer consulted had fixed this hour as the most propitious.

In spite of the precautions taken by Korostovets and the moderateness of the terms agreed to at Urga, a storm of protest broke out in China when the news of the Mongol-Russian agreement became known. Reading the newspapers of that period one is struck by the violent

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

tone of the demonstrations, which spread to all important centers of China. Outer Mongolia, that remote colony of insignificant population, which had lived autonomously for two centuries and which had interested the rest of China but little, suddenly came to the forefront of current affairs. A flood of indignant telegrams began to pour into Peking from all the provinces demanding the despatch of a military expedition to Mongolia even at the risk of provoking an armed conflict with Russia; the newspapers printed violent articles denouncing the inertia and weakness of the government in the face of Russian imperialist designs. The Cabinet threatened to resign. Liang Mên-ting, Minister of Foreign Affairs, left his post and went to Tientsin. Tuan Ch'ijui, Minister of War, was compelled to announce that the country was ready, if necessary, to go to war with Russia, but that the cold which had set in made a military undertaking impossible for the time being.⁸¹

Huge demonstrations took place in the great cities. An organization to finance the Mongolian campaign was formed in Peking; telegrams were sent to all *tu-chün* (military governors of the provinces) asking them to encourage support of the call to arms. In Canton, a mass meeting was held which was personally presided over by the chiefs of the nationalist movement, Hu Han-ming and General Chên Chun-ming, at which it was decided to equip a complete division to be sent to Mongolia immediately.⁸² The governor of Chekiang, Ch'ên Tê-chuan, declared himself ready to send all his troops. There was great agitation in Shanghai. Excited speeches were made, and a "Society to Save Mongolia" was founded which, naturally, resulted in an increase of telegrams exhorting the government not to give in to Russian pressure. An even more important event—the beginning of an anti-Russian boycott—took place in Pe-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

king and Tsingtao, where the notes issued by the Russian-Asiatic Bank were not accepted.

In reality, Chinese internal politics played a considerable role in this campaign. For "Young China," (the future Kuomintang), the Mongolian affair was an excellent pretext for attacking the government of Yüan Shih-k'ai, making him unpopular, and overthrowing him if possible.

If, in order to achieve this, the nationalists had to show themselves more "imperialist" than the Emperor of the overthrown dynasty (who had respected the traditional autonomy of Mongolia) this would not embarrass them in the least. The reply of C. C. Wu, future Minister of Foreign Affairs, to an English newspaper that had expressed astonishment at this attitude of the "anti-imperialists," pointed out that two other great republics had acted in a similar manner: "France at the beginning of her existence as a republic crushed the revolt in Vendée, and the United States fought a bloody civil war in order that the number of stars in their flag might not be diminished."⁸³

History sometimes plays unexpected tricks. Ten years later the same nationalists were again faced with the problem of Outer Mongolia. At that time Soviet Russia was to have concluded a treaty with Urga which would go much farther than Korostovets' agreement, since by its terms Russia was to recognize not the autonomy, but the independence, of Mongolia, and, as assurance, was to bring her troops to Urga. Nevertheless the head of the Kuomintang, in the famous communique released jointly by himself and the Soviet representative, A. Joffe, in Shanghai on January 26, 1923, not only did not oppose the Russian action, but declared that he "does not view an immediate evacuation of Rus-

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

sian troops from Outer Mongolia as either imperative or in the real interest of China."⁸⁴

However this may be, Yüan Shih-k'ai was not slow in guessing at the maneuvers of his opponents; he was not taken in by the "popular demands" which, under the pretext of sending to far-off Mongolia troops loyal to the future dictator, would let the southern troops of Chckiang and Kiangsu make their way north. He thought, too, that the demonstration of public indignation had lasted long enough. The Peking press was ordered to moderate its tone, and it was declared outright that the government would try to settle the Mongolian question through the ordinary channels of diplomacy. The Chinese minister in St. Petersburg went to see Sazonov, who told him: "For the time being, it is only a matter of Russia's recognizing Mongolia's autonomy, not her independence. If China assumes a reasonable attitude, her sovereign rights can still be safeguarded. If not, the situation might grow worse. Since the Russian-Japanese War the Chinese government has taken a contemptuous attitude towards Russia; in Peking, negotiations relating to Mongolian affairs have hung fire for almost a year, and all propositions advanced by Russia have been ignored. We were finally obliged, in order to defend our interests, to negotiate directly with Mongolia." The Chinese minister pointed out that his country had just been established as a republic and that the action of Russia at this critical moment was contrary to the spirit of friendship that prevailed between the two countries. Sazonov responded coldly that China's attitude towards Russia did not justify the use of the term "friendship."⁸⁵

On the other hand, the soundings which had been taken by its ambassadors in the principal capitals quickly convinced the Peking government that China had no

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

chance whatsoever of obtaining the support of the great powers. Neither England nor France was anxious to endanger the triple entente by intervening in an affair which did not concern either directly. Japan was especially cool and indifferent. China had every reason to believe that an understanding already existed between Japan and Russia and that reciprocal spheres of influence had been delimited. There remained Germany, who could not act alone; and the United States, whose intervention, as the Chinese press had remarked, was improbable, since she "could not in all decency support the principle which she had just violated herself in Panama."⁶⁶ Yüan Shih-k'ai finally decided to enter into negotiations directly with Russia.

By November 20, 1912, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lu Ch'en-hsiang, had given Krupensky, Russian minister in Peking, a draft of an agreement containing the following seven points: (1) the sovereign power in Mongolia is China; (2) no foreign power has the right to maintain troops in Mongolia nor to transfer its subjects there for reasons of colonization; (3) the Chinese government agrees not to increase the number of its agents; (4) China will be permitted to maintain a police force of a certain size for the protection of Chinese residing in Mongolia; (5) pasturelands belonging to the Chinese government will be freely utilizable by Mongol princes and chiefs; (6) agricultural projects, development of mines, and construction of railways will be authorized in Mongolia only on consent of the Chinese government; (7) the treaties concluded by Mongolia with foreign powers will be cancelled, and henceforth no treaty may be concluded by the Mongols without the authorization of the Peking government.

These propositions were far from what Russia desired. However, they constituted an important step

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

towards the settlement of the Mongolian question by placing it on the international plane and by admitting the principle of a settlement by agreement with China. Krupensky accepted the first point without argument, recognizing China's right of sovereignty in Mongolia, but he submitted the other clauses to St. Petersburg. Long and laborious negotiations began, in a particularly unfavorable atmosphere. The southerners continued their determined opposition to any negotiations with Russia; they demanded the resignation of the "pro-Russian elements" in the Peking government, especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lu Ch'en-hsiang. "a well-known pro-Russian, bearer of a high decoration of the Tsar," and his collaborator and protege, Li Chi-ao, the future ambassador to Russia, and even that of Chang Ching-tun, a former student in St. Petersburg, whose crime was that of translating into Russian the well-known work of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao on the life of Li Hung-chang.

The Sino-Russian negotiations continued nevertheless, but remained secret. Meanwhile, elections for the first Chinese Parliament took place, the results of which were most unfavorable to Yüan Shih-k'ai. When the deputies met in April, 1913, the Kuomintang had nearly half of the seats in the Chamber and a clear majority in the Senate.

The draft agreement on Mongolia, presented to the Chamber on the 30th of May, 1913, was discussed in several secret meetings. In spite of the brisk opposition of the Kuomintang, it was approved by a majority of twenty votes, mainly those of members of the Chin-pu-tung Party, which had been founded under the presidency of General Li Yung-lung, the future President of the Republic. The affirmative vote of the Chamber took place on the 8th of July; the draft was then to

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

go to the Senate (where it had no chance whatsoever of being accepted), but on the 19th of July an open revolt known as the "second revolution"—broke out. The entire Yangtse valley rose against Yüan Shih-k'ai, and the great cities of Hankow, Wuchang, and Nanking fell into the hands of the rebels commanded by General Huang Hsing. In Shanghai itself, the arsenal was attacked and the Wusung forts were taken by the revolutionaries.⁸⁷

Yüan Shih-k'ai's response was unexpected. His well-equipped troops were sent to the south, where, within two months, they had mastered the situation. The measures of repression enforced were severe and most of the influential opposition chiefs had to flee and seek refuge in Japan. On the 10th of September Yüan Shih-k'ai chose a new cabinet with Hsiung Hsi-ling as Premier, Sun Pao-chi as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the well-known "reformer," as Minister of Justice.

The negotiations with Russia were at once resumed. The opposition in Parliament was no longer to be feared: none of its influential members dared to show himself in Peking. Yüan Shih-k'ai took advantage of the situation to proceed with the presidential elections. On the 6th of October he was elected President of the Republic by a regular majority. The next day the Chinese Republic was recognized by the Powers. The election and the recognition by the Powers made the President's position strong, and the government did not hesitate to carry out a parliamentary *coup d'état*. The Kuomintang was declared dissolved and the 360 deputies who were members of this party were deprived of their commissions; a large number of them were arrested. The presidential order regarding the dissolution of the Kuomintang was dated the 5th of November, 1913.⁸⁸

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

the same date as the Sino-Russian accord on Mongolia. Since Parliament could not be convoked for want of a quorum, the Sino-Russian accord was ratified by the President of the Republic.

The accord was embodied in five articles and four supplementary notes. It provided for no less than the return of Mongolia to her traditional status of buffer state between the two empires. In itself the agreement constituted a new and very important development: the status of Mongolia, which formerly had been only *de facto*, resting on no written constitution, was now sanctioned by an international agreement. Russia recognized China's sovereignty in Outer Mongolia, while China, on her part, recognized the autonomy of the country. The two signatories pledged not to send troops to Outer Mongolia and to abstain from colonizing it. Finally, in a noteworthy clause, China accepted the good offices of Russia in the establishment of Sino-Mongol relations in conformity with the new accord and according to the Mongol-Russian protocol of November 3, 1912. The supplementary notes of the accord were no less important. Once more Russia declared that Outer Mongolia, although an integral part of Chinese territory, would take part in all future Sino-Russian negotiations dealing with common territorial and political questions; the three parties were to confer for the purpose of determining questions of Russian and Chinese interests arising from the new conditions; the final supplement rejected Mongol aspirations concerning Inner Mongolia by limiting the territory of the new autonomous state to the regions which formerly had been under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Ambans of Urga and Kobdo, and the "Tartar general" of Uliassutai.⁸⁹

On the whole the accord of November 5, 1913, reconciled the interests and aspirations of the three parties

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

concerned, but, like every compromise, it did not completely satisfy any one of them. It is strange that in spite of the forced procedure of its ratification, this agreement, once concluded, was generally considered in China as a victory for national diplomacy.⁹⁰ Indeed, China obtained guarantees against Russia's total annexation of Mongolia; by limiting autonomy to the territory of Outer Mongolia, she checked the separatist movement which was coming to the fore in Inner Mongolia; in exchange, she had only reduced to writing her acknowledgment of a state of affairs which had actually existed for more than two centuries. In Russia, one section of public opinion was dissatisfied with the treaty and accused the government of having jeopardized the possibilities which the Korostovets agreement had opened up. But the St. Petersburg government had from the very beginning posed only aims which were already well defined, and we know that it was bound by international agreements. The group most discontented with the Sino-Russian treaty were the Mongols, who thought that Russia had betrayed their interests. The Mongols had to be brought to reason at all costs and made to accept the bitter clauses of the new instrument, accept the limits of their autonomy, and recognize Chinese sovereignty. In accordance with the agreement concluded, this difficult and disagreeable diplomatic task fell to the Russians.

A great deal of information on the work done by Russia during the years 1913-1914, prior to the convocation of the Sino-Mongol-Russian conference at Kiakhta is available today. Several years ago Moscow published Sazonov's secret reports to the Tsar on the subject of Mongolia and the correspondence between the St. Petersburg Office of Foreign Affairs and its diplo-

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

matic agents in Peking, Tokyo, and Urga, as well as a series of diplomatic documents covering this period.⁹¹

At the time when Krupensky began his negotiations with the Peking government in 1912, the Mongols, fearing a blow to their aspirations, sent to St. Petersburg an important mission headed by Sain-Noyan Khan, their Prime Minister. In the words of Sazonov, in his report to the Throne, they wanted "to assure Russian assistance in the joining of Inner Mongolia to the possessions of the Khutuktu of Urga."

The Mongol dignitary was welcomed to the Russian capital with great pomp and was granted two audiences by the Tsar, who conferred on him a high order; but when he attempted to initiate negotiations with the Russian statesmen, he was promptly presented with the accomplished fact of the conclusion of the Sino-Russian agreement on the 5th of November. "We pointed out to Sain-Noyan Khan," Sazonov wrote to Miller, his agent in Urga, "the great importance of this agreement for Mongolia, since by this act the Chinese government officially recognized the existence of a Mongol state which, although in a relationship of vassalage to China, in fact remained independent in every respect except for territorial questions and foreign politics, and even in regard to these questions, Mongolia retained a voice in the decisions to be taken." Sain-Noyan Khan at first appeared satisfied with the explanations given him, but changed his mind after receiving instructions from Urga, and sent a note to the Russian minister in which he asserted his government's unshakable decision to insist on Mongolia's complete independence and on the unification of all Mongol tribes under the authority of the Khutuktu of Urga. In the ensuing negotiations, Sazonov thought it necessary confidentially to acquaint Sain-Noyan Khan with the international situation, which

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

made the desires of the Mongol government impossible of realization. The Russian minister's statement is especially interesting as it enables us to understand the moderate attitude taken by his country in this affair. "Most of the Powers," Sazonov explained, "do not wish to see China disintegrate. It was only through the efforts made by Russia that an autonomous Mongolia was created at all. Urga's declaration of independence in 1911 had indeed produced a very unfortunate impression on the great powers, especially England and Japan; we succeeded in preventing foreign intervention in the Sino-Mongol conflict only by giving positive assurances that under no circumstances would we support the Mongol hope of separating from China those regions where either Japanese interests (Inner Mongolia) or English interests (the regions of Kukuror and Tsaidam, bordering on Tibet) already existed."⁹²

The elucidations of the Russian minister appear to have made a strong impression on Sain-Noyan Khan, who had to admit that possibly his government had gone a bit too far. Nevertheless, he insisted on the necessity of including in autonomous Mongolia certain *hoshuns* (districts) which had already placed themselves under the authority of the Khutuktu of Urga.

A significant incident, cleverly exploited by Russian diplomacy, helped further to convince the Mongol Prime Minister. This was disclosed for the first time by the publication of a secret report to the Throne by Sazonov.⁹³ As early as September, 1913, at the time of Krupensky's negotiations with the Peking government, the Mongols had tried to interest Japan in their project of absorbing Inner Mongolia. The Mongols had started negotiations with one Kodama, a representative of the South-Manchurian Railway, who was passing through Urga, for the concession to the Japanese of a railway

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

line in the part of Inner Mongolia neighboring on southern Manchuria. It appears that the overtures were favorably received by Kodama. The Mongol maneuver, however, was intended especially to impress Russia. Moreover, while continuing the negotiations with Kodama, the Mongolian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Handa, handed a confidential note to the Russian agent in which the project of a Japanese concession was presented as originating with Japan. The St. Petersburg government at once ordered its ambassador in Tokyo to approach the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Makino. The latter responded by giving formal assurances that his government had never given such instructions to Kodama and that any negotiations that might be going on in Khalkha were in no way related to the policy pursued by the Japanese government.

The incident appeared to have been closed, when, some months later, on Sain-Noyan Khan's arrival in the Russian capital, the latter, to the great astonishment of Sazonov, handed Sazonov an envelope containing a letter from the Khutuktu addressed to the Emperor of Japan. Sain-Noyan Khan humbly requested that the letter be delivered by hand through the Russian Embassy in Tokyo. He was not reticent about disclosing the contents of the letter to the government of St. Petersburg. This text, translated into Russian and published in full by the *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, is highly informative. After recounting the history of Mongolia's declaration of independence to the Ch'ing Empire, the Khutuktu informed the Emperor of Japan that his "weak state had been recognized by a powerful neighbor, Russia, which had already concluded a treaty and a trade agreement with Mongolia." But at the present time "our Inner Mongolia, bordering on China, is hard hit by a great calamity; Chinese troops, after having

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

invaded her frontiers, first burnt temples and monasteries; they exterminated men and women, old and young indiscriminately, plundered their property and made raids on their livestock; as a consequence of these outrages, one part of the population is forced to recognize, fictitiously and in semblance only, the Chinese Republic, while continuing to plead for our protection and defense." The Khutuktu admitted that because of lack of arms his troops could not repel the enemy, and he ventured to implore the Sovereign of Japan to come to his aid. "When Mr. Kodama, an official person of your country, appeared in our capital, we informed him of our desire to establish amicable relations between our two states, and we proposed to him that your High Government, after obtaining a railway concession from us in Inner Mongolia, take steps suitable to prevent Chinese troops from violating our border. Now we turn to Your Imperial Majesty asking that his high protection be granted us to help our just cause. In the event you consent, we beg you to make strong representations to the Chinese government that it refrain hereafter from sending its troops into Inner Mongolia so that we may carry into effect what we aspire to—the union of Inner Mongolia with our Outer Mongolia—in order to preserve our nation and our religion."

After studying the letter Sazonov decided to send it to Tokyo for delivery to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He wished, as his secret report to the Tsar says, "to demonstrate to the Mongols the futility of their hope of help from the Japanese government and the necessity for their relying solely on Russia at the beginning of their political life." At the same time Sazonov asked his ambassador in Tokyo to point out to Baron Makino "to what extent the visits and the activity of Mr. Kodama take on the character of a low political intrigue,

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

impeding the actual delimitation of the Russian and Japanese spheres of influence, on which the Tokyo cabinet itself had insisted."

According to the telegram received from Malevsky-Malevich, *charge d'affaires* in Tokyo, Baron Makino seemed greatly embarrassed when the Khutuktu's letter was delivered to him, saying that he did not know whether he could accept and present to his Sovereign the letter of the chief of a state with which Japan had no diplomatic relations. He then asked whether the Russian government knew the contents of the letter, and received from the *charge d'affaires* a reply in the affirmative. He expressed his surprise that Russia, knowing that the purpose of the letter was to establish direct relations between Mongolia and Japan, had nevertheless consented to deliver the Khutuktu's letter. The Russian diplomat replied by pointing out that Russia wished to maintain a loyal attitude towards the Japanese government, but that on the other hand, as the Khutuktu's letter seemed to be the direct result of Mr. Kodama's activity in Urga, it seemed desirable on this occasion to have it frankly out with Tokyo. Baron Makino once more gave categorical assurance that Kodama had not been commissioned or authorized to undertake negotiations in Urga. The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs did not believe that Kodama had been sent to Mongolia by any of the opposition parties; according to him, Kodama was simply "a volunteer who wanted to distinguish himself."⁹¹ A few days later, after having talked it over with his Premier, Yamagata, Baron Makino returned the Khutuktu's letter to the Russian diplomat, declaring that his government had decided not to accept it. He requested, however, that the entire incident be kept secret in order that the opposition not be

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

given a new pretext for reproaching Japanese diplomacy for its conciliatory attitude towards Russia.

The decision of the Japanese government was received with satisfaction in St. Petersburg; Sazonov, in his report to the Tsar, characterized it as a "wise decision." Returning the Khutuktu's letter to Sain-Noyan Khan, the Russian minister did not deny himself the pleasure of emphasizing the extent to which the Japanese government "considered childish the Khutuktu's attempt to involve Japan in his plans of unifying the Mongols and of separating their territory from China." The minister added that this incident should be a good lesson to the young Mongol state at the beginnings of its political activity.

The lesson had undoubtedly been brought home. By the end of his stay in the Russian capital, Sain-Noyan Khan had arrived at more moderate views; he accepted the participation of Outer Mongolia in the Russian-Mongol-Chinese conference to be convoked for the purpose of completing by a tripartite agreement the Russian-Mongol protocol of November 3, 1912, and the Sino-Russian agreement of November 5, 1913."

The tripartite conference met at Kiakhta in September, 1914. The discussions lasted five months. Although the Chinese delegation was several times on the point of breaking off negotiations and preparing to depart, the patient efforts of Miller, the Russian delegate, resulted in a convention being finally arrived at and signed on June 7, 1915.

On the whole the convention only affirmed the fundamental bases of the Urga and Peking agreements, some details being added solely for reasons of prestige. China was given the right to reinstate her representative, the Amban of Urga; if the Khutuktu should preserve his title, assumed in 1911, of "Bogdo Cheptsun Damba

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

Khutuktu Khan," ("Great Venerable Sacred Reincarnated Ruler"), this title was henceforth to be conferred on him by the President of the Chinese Republic.⁹⁶

Thus, after long and patient effort, was the status of Outer Mongolia established; thus, for the first time since the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727) were Russian and Chinese interests in this country defined.

The agreements, concluded during the course of World War I, remained in effect, formally, for only a short time. Soon after came the Russian Revolution, the Allied intervention in Siberia, and a violent civil war in China. The principles behind these agreements, however, proved to have a remarkable vitality. After a long period of unavoidable difficulties, the two states, as soon as normal relations between China and Russia were reestablished, were obliged to revert to the formulas of the 1912-1915 agreements, which, in spite of their defects, best met the interests of the parties concerned.

Before it disappeared from the scene, the Tsarist government had effected two slight alterations in the previous agreements, one of which would more accurately define the territorial limits of Outer Mongolia, and the other determine the status of Hulunbuir (Mongolian Barga), which was adjacent to the Province of Tsitsihar (in Manchuria), as well as that of Tannu-Urianhai.

On October 24 (November 6), 1915, an agreement was concluded between Krupensky, the Russian ambassador in Peking, and Lu Ch'en-hsiang, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, by which the region of Hulunbuir, with its Mongol majority, was separated from Outer Mongolia and transformed into a special province under Chinese administration.⁹⁷ At the same time, the Russian consul-general at Urga informed the Mongolian government that Russia reserved her rights to the region of Tannu-Urianhai, which she had possessed, in

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

fact, before the establishment of Autonomous Mongolia; that, therefore, in the future, the Mongolian government was to abstain from sending its officials and troops into the *hoshuns* of this region.⁹⁸

It is interesting to note that these two supplements to the agreements of 1912-1915 likewise survived the disorders of the revolutionary period. The region of Hulumbuir remained a part of Manchuria, and the region of Urianhai, excluded from Outer Mongolia, was reserved for Russian colonization under the name of "Republic of Tannu-Ola" (Tannu-Tuva).

The St. Petersburg government, occupied by the war, was unable fully to realize the advantages of the creation of an autonomous Mongolia. True, it had obtained railway concessions, the right to install telegraphic communications equipment and to exploit the gold mines (the "Mongolor" company was founded with French capital), but none of these projects was put into working operation, since the war effort demanded the entire resources of Russia. Russian-Mongol trade itself soon declined due to scarcity of goods and shipping difficulties.

China, on the contrary, was not slow in taking advantage of her position as "sovereign" of the new state. First she tried to strengthen her prestige. Immediately after the conclusion of the tripartite agreement the Mongol delegates were invited to Peking to greet "the elected Emperor," as they called the President of the Chinese Republic. On this occasion the old court protocol, officially abolished by the revolution, was restored. The Mongol delegates had to present their "tribute" to the President and perform the nine ritual genuflections of the *kotow* before him. Encouraged by this sign of submission, Yüan Shih-k'ai took a further step and sent to the Khutuktu a great golden seal and the diploma

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

establishing his title of "Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Khutuktu Khan," but ordered his envoy to deliver these insignia of dignity only after the Khutuktu had performed the three traditional genuflections. This time, however, he met a stubborn refusal. The Khutuktu answered Yüan Shih-k'ai in a letter saying that "his office of supreme chief of the Yellow religion in Mongolia did not permit him to cringe before a simple Chinese mortal, and thus violate Buddha's law." Consequently, he was "obliged to refuse any sign of favor whatsoever," which, by the way, he could "very well dispense with."

CHAPTER IV.

AFTER THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

WITH the advent of the Russian Revolution the equilibrium established by the tripartite agreement, and which had been attained with such difficulty, was immediately broken. With the main guarantor of her status momentarily in default, unfortunate Outer Mongolia was to become the easy prey of intrigue and, it may be added, the most fantastic plans, all of which, in the absence of the stabilizing force of Russia, seemed workable. Violent crises followed one another in a chain reaction, until the time when a new equilibrium was reached based on the resumption of normal relations between China and Russia.

The first of these crises was brought about by the attempt to involve Outer Mongolia in the "Pan-Mongolian movement." This movement was launched with the aim of separating Outer Mongolia completely from China in order to build around her an immense Mongol state which would include Inner Mongolia, the region of Hulunbuir, Tibet, and the Buryat region of Russian Transbaikalia. These plans, which had been in process since the end of 1918, were built up by a young unknown Cossack officer, the future Ataman Semenov, who, by means which have remained a mystery, quickly found powerful support.

It is probable that we shall never learn the entire truth concerning the origin of this movement, its inspirers, its supporters, and the obstacles which finally brought about its failure. In his memoirs of his political

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

activity during the years 1917-1919, the Ataman Semenov gives many details, even specifying the names of hotels at which he stopped in the course of his numerous pilgrimages, but when he alludes to the "Pan-Mongolian" affair, he becomes extremely discreet. He tells us, however, that beginning in the autumn of 1918, he enlisted Mongols and Tibetans in his "Asiatic Corps," which was composed mainly of Buryats, since he considered Russians at that time contaminated by Bolshevism. He devotes only three lines to the "Pan-Mongolian" conference, held in the beginning of 1919 in Chita, which was composed of representatives from the different regions which were to form the future great state; he tells us only that "questions of prime importance were decided there."⁹⁹ Not a word is said about the second "Pan-Mongolian" meeting, convoked on March 2, 1919, in Verkhne-Udinsk, but Chinese sources inform us that this conference was of even greater importance than the first. For the first time an official representative of Outer Mongolia participated. The Khutuktu, although opposed to the new movement, had to yield to the strong pressure exerted in Urga "by certain powerful agents"; he sent as delegate a prince of the Tushetu clan.

The conference of Verkhne-Udinsk worked out a complete program for the newly planned state, which was then submitted for approval to the Khutuktu of Urga. It was proposed to create a unified government for all Mongols, with the seat of government in Khailar, create an army of 20,000 Mongol-Buryat soldiers, and confer the title of Mongol Prince on Semenov; finally, in order to overcome the last hesitations on the part of Urga, it was proposed that a detachment of 4,000 Buryats be sent to Urga. A delegation was nominated to go to Paris for the purpose of presenting the plan of

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

the new state to the Allied powers then meeting at the Peace Conference, and to request its recognition. Indeed, the delegation was sent, and it was accompanied by Captain Barrow, an American officer on a special mission to Semenov.¹⁰⁰

The plan for the creation of a "Pan-Mongolian State," to comprise an area of more than two million square kilometers and include the territories which were direct dependencies or under the protectorate of China, Russia and Great Britain, appears fantastic to us now. But it was not so at the beginning of 1919, when new states were created almost everywhere and often out of nothing, under the cloak of the principle of the "rights of nationalities." While the formation of "national states" in the west, within the confines of the former Russian Empire, was at that time unanimously supported by the Allies, who were preoccupied with creating the famous *cordon sanitaire*, the situation appeared different as regarded the Far East. Here the creation of a "Pan-Mongolian State" might result in important advantages to Japan alone and be to the detriment of China and the other Allies, above all England, who could not view the establishment of a "lamaist corridor," extending all the way to India, with a favorable eye. The ambitious plan was not even submitted to the Allies for examination. Kolchak's defeat in Siberia, the advance of Soviet troops and, soon after, the evacuation of Transbaikalia by Semenov, caused it to die a natural death.

But two years later the fevered brain of the famous Baron Ungern¹⁰¹ revived the "Pan-Mongolian" plan, and in 1934-1936, following the creation of Manchukuo, the question was brought up once more. This time, to be sure, the plan was a much less ambitious one; it did not contemplate the inclusion of either the Russian Buryat territory or Tibet. "There can be little doubt,"

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

W. H. Chamberlain wrote in this connection, "that some of these officers cherish dreams of a Pan-Mongolian State, protected by Japan, purged of any Bolshevik influence and based on the ancestral tribal customs and the lamaism (a kind of corrupted Buddhism) which has long been the dominant religion in Mongolia."¹⁰² And a French observer, André Pierre, gave precise details of these dreams of the "adepts of Pan-Mongolianism": "They thought of creating a Mongol state which would unite all Mongols dispersed in Manchukuo and Outer and Inner Mongolia."¹⁰³

The direct result of Semenov's "Pan-Mongolian" activity was to provoke a reaction on the part of China, who decided to take energetic steps against the attempt to separate Outer Mongolia. Prince Kudashev, the Russian minister in Peking, who continued to enjoy diplomatic recognition, although he no longer represented any government, had foreseen this result of Semenov's "Pan-Mongolianism." From the beginning he expressed to Semenov his disapproval on the ground that Semenov's plan jeopardized the tripartite agreement of Kiakhta, to which the Chinese still adhered.¹⁰⁴

On April 1, 1919, barely a month after the Pan-Mongolian conference of Verkhne-Udinsk, the Chinese Amban of Urga telegraphed Peking requesting that troops be despatched for the protection of Outer Mongolia against the invasion which was in preparation. He added that if the Khutuktu and the majority of the princes were opposed to the plan of uniting with the Russian Buryats and of forming "the Pan-Mongolian State," strong military pressure was expected to overcome their reluctance and to win them over forcibly to the separatist movement. The failure of Semenov's undertaking only precipitated events. The same forces

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

which had supported his ambitious plan, and which had tried to tear Mongolia away from China, made a sudden about-face when they saw the plan disintegrating; as though they had been converted by a miracle, they went to the other extreme and rallied behind the Anfu clique of the Peking government, which sought the complete reintegration of Mongolia under Chinese administration and the abolition of her autonomy. From that time on the Mongolian problem was in the forefront of the political situation of China. It was not only a question of foreign policy but, as in 1912-1913, of internal policy as well.

In this connection David Frazer, the *Times* correspondent in Peking, wrote: "It is a curious fact that the question of relations between North and South China, which for a long time has absorbed the complete attention of Chinese politicians and which is, indeed, a fundamental question for the country, has been suddenly relegated to the background to give place to the Mongolian problem, which in itself is of minor importance. The northern militarists suffered defeat in the south, and, instead of trying to come to terms with the Southerner, they preferred to effect a diversion in Mongolia, to regain their prestige. An anti-foreign policy is always popular in China, and if, by annulling the tripartite Russian-Chinese-Mongol agreement, they could succeed in making China the absolute master in Mongolia, the glory would revert to Tuan Ch'i-jui and his Anfu clique."¹⁰⁵

Indeed, on July 20, 1919, a presidential mandate converted the War Participation Bureau (which had lost its meaning after the conclusion of the Versailles peace) into the Northwestern Frontier Defense Bureau, and conferred the powers of commander-in-chief on the most unruly figure of the Anfu Club, General Hsü

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

Shu-tseng, better known as "Little Hsü." The commander-in-chief was to promote "development of communications, agriculture, cattle-raising, planting of forests, development of mines, and regulation of the salt industry, trade, education, and military defense," in the region placed under his administration. As no appropriation was given him for carrying out this vast program, "Little Hsü" immediately asked that the right to establish foreign relations in the interest of Mongolia be included among his powers. These powers were granted him. Thus, for help in his economic program, he could at once turn to his friends, who had much to hope for from establishment of a new administration in this country. Dissatisfied with the too-moderate attitude of the Amban Chêng-I, who favored the preservation of the *status quo* in Mongolia, "Little Hsu" went himself to Urga in order to make his famous *coup d'état*.

In November, 1919, the world learned, not without surprise, that the Mongols, having decided of their own free will to end their autonomy, had presented a petition to the Peking government asking for their complete reintegration into the Chinese Republic. The request was graciously granted, and the presidential mandate of November 22, 1919, announced the return of the prodigal son to the "family of the Five Races."

A Chinese historian and diplomat tells us how this trick of "Little Hsü's" was accomplished. "On his arrival at Urga. . . General Hsü made personal calls upon the leading princes of Mongolia and, giving costly presents, he succeeded in the end in persuading them to send in a voluntary petition asking for a cancellation of their [Outer Mongolia's] autonomy. The petition was handed for ratification to the Hutukhtu, who, playing to gain time, referred the matter to the two Houses [the Assembly of the princes and of the lamas] for consider-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ation. An uncompromising attitude was shown by a majority of the members of the two Houses, with the exception of those who had received presents from General Hsü. As a result of this deliberation, the Hutukhtu granted an audience to both General Hsü and the Resident [Amban Chêng-I] and informed them on this occasion of the decision lately reached by members of the two Houses who could see no reason for this step being taken at this time. While the interview was going on, General Hsü purposely had his troops lined up in front of the Hutukhtu's palace to display his superior forces. But the Hutukhtu was not to be cowed and he refused persistently to acquiesce in the Chinese demand. . .

"Infuriated by the determined opposition of the Living Buddha, General Hsü struck out those clauses in the proposed agreement promising good treatment to the Mongols and substituted for them eight conditions that were much harder than those originally presented. On the next morning, an ultimatum was addressed to the Hutukhtu, demanding compliance with the new terms within forty-eight hours, and at the expiration of this period, if the document was still unsigned, both the Hutukhtu and all his ministers would be arrested and transported to Kalgan. This threat was immediately referred to the two Houses for action. Great indignation was aroused when the new terms were made known, and hot debates ensued which, it was reported, kept the neighbors awake for three consecutive nights. A large faction which was for armed resistance finally gave way to moderation, when it was brought home to them that it was absolutely impossible for the Mongol soldiers to oppose the better-equipped troops of Little Hsü's army. Thus the Chinese won the day, but they had to be contented with the signatures of the Ministerial Council

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

only, for the Hutukhtu could not be persuaded to attach his name to the document."¹⁰⁶

All this did not prevent the *Wai-chiao-pu* from stating, in response to the note of Prince Kudashev, formally protesting the unilateral voiding of the tripartite agreement of 1915: "In 1911, the Mongols, of their own accord, broke away from China and the situation thus created demanded Sino-Russian-Mongol agreements. Today, again of their own accord, they renounce their autonomy, thus making the agreements concluded purposeless."

Having successfully brought about the abolition of Outer Mongolia's autonomy, General Hsü was named "Pacification Chief" of the country, and the "pacification" began. The Amban Chêng-I was removed and arrested because of his too-moderate policies, the Mongol troops were disarmed, and the government headquarters was occupied by Chinese military forces. Heavy taxes were levied and the exactions and abuses multiplied. Not content with this trivial income, "Little Hsü" turned to the friends who had promised him their support. A loan of fifteen million dollars, with a mortgage on the mining and agricultural resources of Mongolia as security, was granted him by the Sino-Japanese Exchange Bank. Another loan of twenty million dollars for the construction of the Urga-Kalgan Railway was negotiated. The Chinese historian whom we have quoted above sadly remarks: "Public opinion in China, therefore, was skeptical as to who was really going to profit from [Outer] Mongolia's cancellation of autonomy." As to the Mongols, he tells us, "their hearts were lost to the Chinese people as a result of the disgraceful and inhuman practices of General Hsü's unpaid soldiers, who set about killing the innocent Mongols, plundering them and robbing them of all their belongings."

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Fortunately, the reign of the Chinese High Commissioner [commander-in-chief] did not last long. The government of the Anfuites in Peking was overthrown by General Wu P'ei-fu, the Northwestern Frontier Defense Force was abolished, and "Little Hsü" ousted. The former Amban Chêng-I was again sent to Urga, but reconciliation with the Mongols was no longer possible. The princes, the lamas, and the entire population hoped for but one thing—liberation from the Chinese yoke.

This was the situation in Outer Mongolia in the autumn of 1920, when the unfortunate country was to suffer still another crisis, this time one provoked by the schemings of Baron Ungern-Sternberg.

We know of this adventure: the tragic and romantic side won the Baron wide publicity which gave a false picture of his character and the real scope of his ambitions. The author of a detailed account of Ungern's exploit, and himself one of the participants in the adventure, rendered, perhaps unintentionally, a real service to historical truth by clearing up certain myths created around the legendary Baron.¹⁰⁷

Reduced to its proper dimensions, this adventure resembles one of the episodes of the civil war in Siberia, when, retreating before the "Red" forces, some of the "White" detachments were forced to cross the border in search of refuge abroad. In Chinese Turkestan, in Manchuria and, later, in Shantung, some of these, after the fashion of their 17th-century predecessors, the famous Albazinians, simply took service with the *tu-chün*, the Chinese governors. Baron Ungern's detachment had a more brilliant fate; it arrived in Mongolia at the very time when the inhabitants, overtaxed by the abuses of "Little Hsü's" administration, were on the verge of an open revolt and were seeking military support wherever

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

they could find it. When he arrived in Aktsha, on the Mongolian border, with the remains of the famous "Asiatic Corps," founded previously by the Ataman Semenov,¹⁰⁸ Ungern at first did not plan to head for Urga; even less did he plan to intervene in the struggle of the Mongols with the Chinese, or to attack the Mongol capital. His first plan was to reach Troitskosavsk, a Russian town situated near Kiakhta, where he intended to join the partisans, who, according to his information, were continuing the fight behind the Soviet lines. It was only when he found it impossible to negotiate the mountainous region of Kentei that he decided to take the only passable route to Urga. Once arrived at the Barum-Tereledge River, thirty kilometers from the capital, Ungern requested authorization to enter the town and remain for a short time; he requested provisions for his troops, offering to pay in gold.¹⁰⁹ The answer was delayed, and the Baron, learning that the Chinese garrison was making preparations for defense suddenly decided to attack Urga. Repulsed with heavy casualties, he was forced to retreat to the Barum-Tereledge River. He was not prepared for the severe Mongolian winter season which was approaching, and his troops were frightened at the thought of wintering in the open air under light tents. The situation with regard to provisions was even more tragic; to cut into meager stocks was out of the question, and meat could be procured on the spot only with great difficulty, since the frightened Mongols had created a vacuum around the "Asiatic Corps." The situation, which daily became more alarming, appeared hopeless. The men, and, above all, the Russian officers, began to desert the camp, abandoning the unfortunate Baron. What remained of the detachment was forced to resort to ordinary banditry in order to obtain provisions. This banditry was methodi-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

cally organized. One column was assigned the Kalgan route, another the Manchurian route, and these systematically intercepted the infrequent Chinese caravans which traveled the routes. The chronicler of this episode candidly observed: "The days when our outposts sent us their loot of flour, sugar, salt, and clothing, were considered by us as days of festival."¹¹⁰

At Ungern's most critical moment a fortunate coincidence brought him into contact with influential Mongols. The merchants who on rare occasions supplied him with the cattle, horses, and food which the Baron was wise enough always to buy at a high price and pay for in fine gold pieces, one day approached him and told him of a group of officers of the Tsetsen Khan's clan who were eager to visit the foreign camp. Ungern appreciated the situation immediately; jumping on his horse, he rode for two hundred and fifty kilometers without stopping, to meet the princes and lamas of this clan. Gradually other connections were established with different *aimaks* and even with the Khutuktu's entourage itself. The situation in Mongolia became more and more tense; the resistance of the inhabitants to the extortions of the Chinese provoked terrible reprisals, and the Chinese authorities did not hesitate to confine the "Living Buddha" himself to his palace. Ungern knew how to exploit the general indignation aroused by this unprecedented sacrilege, and soon his small detachment, which had been forced to resort to banditry and been scorned and deserted by the population, became the force on which the Mongols began to found their hopes for liberation.

The situation in Ungern's camp changed completely. Food and horses arrived in abundance; men came from all sides to enlist under the flag of Baron "Dzhan-Dzhin," as he was called. It is peculiar that the Chinese

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

were the only ones who did not know of the presence, even near Urga, of forces organized against them.

At the end of January, 1921, a group of Tibetans arrived at the camp who offered their services in the performance of an audacious *coup*—they proposed to kidnap the Khutuktu from the palace, where he was guarded by Chinese troops, and take him to a place of safety in the mountains. The Tibetans were placed under the command of a Russian Buryat officer and accomplished their mission successfully during the night of February 1st. Of the one hundred men composing the Chinese guard, ninety-six were killed. The next morning Urga was attacked by the main body of Ungern's troops and taken by assault. The Chinese garrison suffered heavy losses and had to retreat to the north. For three days the population of the capital was occupied with burying the corpses. Then started the famous "purge"—wholesale execution of suspects, especially Chinese and Russians. The Khutuktu returned to the town, and an independent Mongol government was proclaimed, with the "Living Buddha" on the "precious throne." Baron "Dzhan-Dzhin" was appointed supreme military adviser and was overwhelmed by the complete devotion and respect of the Mongols.

From this brief sketch of the facts, it can be seen that the Ungern adventure hardly constituted a pre-conceived undertaking forming part of a general plan. Those who try to present Ungern as the executor of the program set up in 1919 by the Ataman Semenov first of all commit a chronological error. At the time that Ungern undertook his operations in Mongolia, the "Pan-Mongolian" plan had already suffered a most complete defeat on the international plane, and, as we have seen, its principal inspirers, far from continuing the idea of separating Mongolia from China, gave their help to

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

the undertaking of "Little Hsü" in order to reestablish Chinese authority there. Furthermore, it was only after Urga had been taken that Baron Ungern, intoxicated by success, began to conceive of further action.

A reading of the appeals and orders of the day (*prikazes*), the letters seized at the time of Ungern's capture by Soviet troops and which have been published in Washington,¹¹¹ and the testimony of his own collaborators, reveal a succession of confused, even contradictory, plans, ephemeral products of a brain affected by delusions of grandeur. Sometimes Ungern saw himself at the head of an independent Lamaist Greater Mongolia coming to grips with China; sometimes he called for an alliance of the Mongols with the Chinese for the restoration of the Manchu dynasty. All this, naturally, without forgetting the fight against Communism. Thus, on the occasion of the Khutuktu's coronation festivities, in May, 1921, the Baron made a fantastic appeal full of quotations from the Apocalypse and lamaist writings, announcing his "punitive expedition" against this "universal enemy." Sometimes he went so far as to proclaim a crusade, of a sort, against the whole "foul Occident," which was to be purified by the sabres and guns of his partisans. "With my Mongols," he said to the officers surrounding him, "I shall go to Lisbon!"¹¹²

We know what was the tragic end of this bloody Don Quixote's adventure.¹¹³ The incoherence of his plans, the relations which he tried to establish with the Chinese, especially with the entourage of Chang Tso-lin, quickly made him suspect with the princes and lamas, while his "purges," which were of an incredible cruelty,¹¹⁴ and the looting and extortion indulged in by his troops, finally changed the sympathies of the population, for the "military genius" who liberated them from oppression, into hate. The first set-

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

back which he suffered in his encounters with the Reds was sufficient to bring about a revolt within his own ranks. Barely a month after his great triumph at the coronation ceremonies for the "Living Buddha," he quit the Mongol capital, which the Soviet troops occupied on the 6th of July. By that time Ungern had succeeded in reaching Transbaikalia. He occupied Selenginsk, but shortly thereafter was again forced to retreat into Mongolia, to the valley of Elzin-gol. His troops revolted and deserted *en masse*, and he had to flee. He fell into the hands of a Mongol detachment, which bound him hand and foot and abandoned him in the steppe. There he was discovered by Soviet soldiers, transported to Siberia, tried in Novo-Nikolayevsk, and publicly executed.

The immediate result of Baron Ungern's adventure was Soviet interference in Mongolian affairs. The facts of this intervention provide the concrete lesson that transitory events, merely secondary ones, leave no enduring impression, and that in every case we must get down to the basic historical factors.

In the beginning the intervention pursued only internal political aims. The Soviets tried to annihilate the "White" Russian forces scattered in Mongolia and, contrary to Russian historical tradition, offered their support not to the Mongols, but to China. On November 10, 1920, Moscow telegraphed Peking that at the request of Chinese authorities in Urga, Soviet forces had been ordered to enter Mongolia in order to assist the Chinese garrison in the Mongol capital in liquidating the "Semenov-Ungern bands." On November 27th, another telegram stated that, it having been learned that the attack against Urga had been repulsed, the previous order had been cancelled. The Chinese government

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

promptly protested against this attempted intervention and in a telegram sent on December 31st, stated that it had never asked for assistance from the Soviets. In regard to this, the editor of *China Year Book* remarks: "There is reason to believe that the Chinese authorities in Mongolia actually did seek Red assistance to strengthen their position."¹¹⁵

But the following year, when Ungern took Urga, the policy of the Soviets reverted to the traditional line of aiding Mongolia, and detachments of the Red Army were given the mission, not only of liquidating "the bands of the White Guard," but also of supporting the Mongolian independence movement. With the aid of Russian Buryats, a Mongol "National-Revolutionary Party" was set up in April, 1921, which worked so well that it soon obtained the general support of the population, including the lamas, princes, and the Khutuktu himself, who had become disgusted with Ungern's conduct. Moreover, as we have seen, the Red Army encountered only negligible resistance. After the seizure of Urga, the "National-Revolutionary Party" retained the Khutuktu at the head of the new "People's Government," and the transfer of powers from the old government to the new was recorded in the edict of September 1, 1921. This document is interesting because it emanated from the old government as well as from the new "People's Government," and gives the Mongol version of the events of 1919-1921. The edict says: "In the third year, we Mongolians, under the pressure of the circumstances of the time, have lost our rights of autonomous government to the benefit of the Chinese, the autocratic reactionaries. Last year an officer of the Russian White party, Baron Ungern, with his forces, invaded Mongolian territory, mobilized Mongolian soldiers, and, thus reinforcing himself, gave battle and drove out from Urga

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

the Chinese *hamins*—officers and soldiers. In accordance with the declaration of Baron Ungern of the need of re-establishing the autonomous government by all princes and influential people, the latter, after a discussion of this question, put the Boghdikhan [Bogdo Khan] on the precious throne and created the Yamen of Internal Affairs and all the other five *yamens*. In view of the fact that Baron Ungern with his forces left for the north, and in view of the weakness of our forces and the lack of armament, and also in view of the possibility of an assault by the Chinese reactionaries, as early as last year, an appeal for assistance was made to foreign powers by the Boghdikhan, and many *wangs* and *khans* who, obtaining such assistance, established at Kiakhta a people's government which mobilized model forces, and having driven out the *ghamens* [hamins], laid the foundation of the state of Mongolia, fortifying the nation and improving the conditions of the masses. Urga, the capital, was occupied on the first [day] of the second moon. After the occupation of Urga, the People's Government, together with the officials of our five (old) ministries, opened free discussions, which resulted in resolving to establish immediately a new people's government in accord with the requirements of the times and the progress of the people, leaving the Boghdikhan on the precious throne and handing all seals and documents of all ministries to the new People's Government. The resolution was reported to the Boghdikhan, who sanctioned it."¹¹⁶

Having revived Russian diplomatic traditions in Mongolia, Moscow owed it to itself to legalize the situation by formal agreement. Because of its revolutionary origins, the Soviet government could not revert purely and simply to the treaties concluded by the old regime. It therefore signed, on November 5, 1921, a new agree-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ment with Mongolia, which restated the basic principles of the protocol signed in 1912 by Korostovets. Since the Soviets had not yet reestablished diplomatic relations with China, they were not obliged to spare Chinese feelings; therefore, they recognized Mongolia not as an "autonomous" state, as had Korostovets, but as an "independent" state, which, nevertheless, did not prevent them, three years later, from recognizing China's sovereignty over the Mongols. It is surprising to note that the Mongol-Russian agreement maintained extra-territoriality for the Russians (Article 5); with regard to the territorial limits of Outer Mongolia, Russian diplomats, as we have said, confirmed the point of view of their predecessors. The region of Urianhai, which the St. Petersburg government had reserved for purposes of colonization, continued to be excluded from Outer Mongolia and later became the "Republic of Tannu-Ola."

On concluding the treaty with Urga, Moscow, following the St. Petersburg pattern of 1912, sent a representative as economic adviser to the Mongol government; the position formerly occupied by Korzin was taken over by Butkevich (Butin). The latter at once introduced strict commercial controls and a series of fiscal reforms having as their aim an increase of government revenues. He also tried to transplant to Mongolia the radical methods of the Soviet economy, but here he met with insurmountable difficulties. The section of the population on whose support the Soviets could count for their economic and social policy in Mongolia was, indeed, very weak. According to Maisky,¹¹⁷ 44.6 per cent of the male population consisted of lamas, 5.6 per cent of princes and nobles, 16.6 per cent of serfs (*shabinars*), 26.2 per cent of cattle-breeding peasants. The peasants (*arats*) accounted for hardly 10 per cent of the total

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

population. It is not surprising therefore that the far too radical economic policy advised by the Soviet agent brought about general discontent among the Mongols, a discontent which from the beginning of 1922 on assumed alarming proportions. Reprisals alone were sufficient; inspired by the Soviets, the "People's Government" was forced to resign. It was of course soon reconstituted. But the Premier, Bodo, a strange personality, a *ci-devant* lama, former employee of the Imperial Russian consulate, and principal negotiator of the agreements with the Soviets, was removed, and an influential prince, Tsetsen Khan, as well as one of the "Living Buddhas," the Shakhansha Khutuktu, were included in the new government. The Russian adviser was recalled and replaced by another, more moderate, one.

The resistance of the Mongols and the economic difficulties which these radical experiments encountered in a country of nomads were not the only factors which caused the change in Soviet policy in Mongolia. International political exigencies also played a role. Having established its power in Transbaikalia up to the border of Manchuria, and having begun the reoccupation of the Maritime Province, the Soviet government felt compelled to seek a *modus vivendi* with China and Japan. Just as it had entered into negotiations with Japan in Dairen through the intermediary of the Far Eastern Republic, its satellite created for this purpose in China, it sought to enter into relations with Peking. The great historical heritage of Russian interests in China, indeed, was awaiting settlement; and the question of Outer Mongolia came to the fore. Just as, once before, the Russian-Mongol agreement concluded by Korostovets in 1912 had attained its real significance only after the conclusion of a treaty with China in 1913, so the Soviet-Mongol agreement of 1921, in its turn, had to

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

be confirmed by China. The Mongols themselves, faithful to their traditional policy, tried to counterbalance the too-exclusive influence of Moscow and called for the establishment of political and commercial relations with China.¹¹⁸

We can only briefly recount here the different steps which characterized Sino-Russian relations prior to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1924. We know that for almost two years after the victory of the revolution in Russia, China continued to recognize the treaties concluded with Tsarist Russia. She even signed new agreements with the Russian minister in Peking, although he no longer represented any government; for example, the agreement of November 20, 1917, suspending payment of a share of the Boxer indemnity; the agreement of December 19, 1918, revising customs rates, and others. Gradually, however, China began to take advantage of the situation created by the absence of a recognized Russian government by unilaterally abolishing certain treaties under which she had been bound. Thus, in November, 1919, she abrogated the tripartite treaty (1915) concerning Mongolia; in August, 1920, she suspended, on her own authority, the payment of the Russian share of the Boxer indemnity; the same year, in violation of the treaty of 1881, she established customs houses along the western frontier with Russia; and, beginning with the end of 1919, she assumed military protection of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Finally, by presidential mandate of September 23, 1920, China ceased to recognize the Russian diplomatic and consular representatives, took over the Russian concessions in China and abolished extraterritoriality for Russian subjects, placing them under Chinese jurisdiction.¹¹⁹

The powers, through the medium of the diplomatic

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

corps in Peking, protested only feebly against these actions. While they disapproved of the unilateral character of these acts, the great powers did not at that time wish to see the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the Soviets. Under these conditions the Chinese government, satisfied with its easy successes, let slip the extraordinary opportunity contained in the famous declaration of Karakhan, who offered to return to China, without compensation, all Russian concessions, including the Chinese Eastern Railway. When, in the following year, the Soviets renewed their offer, their terms were already less categorical; instead of offering the Chinese Eastern Railway as an outright gift, they proposed to negotiate the terms of its return.¹²⁰

The declarations of the Soviet government created a sensation in China. Under pressure of public opinion, the government sent a mission to Moscow, headed by General Chang Tsü-lin, but did not give him power to negotiate, just as a little later, it accepted in Peking a Russian trade commission under the direction of Yurin. The negotiations were dragging on, when news arrived of the conclusion of the Soviet-Mongol agreement, the text of which was not made public until April, 1922. The Chinese government was quick to send a protest to Paikes, who had replaced his predecessor, Yurin, in Peking. The Chinese note said: "On your arrival in Peking, we questioned you regarding the information we received from General Li Yuan on the subject of the Russo-Mongolian Treaty, and you replied that these rumors were without foundation. However, during a recent conversation, we again put the question to you, following the recent publication in the newspapers of the text of this treaty, and you admitted that the report was true." Recalling Soviet declarations, the note then expressed the astonishment of the Chinese

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

government at the action "of the Soviet government [which] is similar to the policy assumed by the former Imperial Russian government towards China."

From this time on the Mongolian question was the stumbling-block in Sino-Russian negotiations. The attitude of the government and the opposition in China were completely modified. If, in 1913, the government of Yüan Shih-k'ai tried to come to an understanding with Russia, the Kuomintang, as we have seen, on the contrary violently denounced Russian imperialism and called for a punitive expedition against "the rebel province." This time it was the government that took an intransigent attitude; the Kuomintang, on the other hand, called for an understanding with Russia, even declaring, on the occasion of the famous interview between Sun Yat-sen and Joffe, that the evacuation of Russian troops from Mongolia was "neither imperative nor in the real interest of China."

However, it became increasingly clearer that Mongolia was only a pretext, and that the position of the government regarding the question of reestablishing relations with Russia depended on the whole aspect of China's internal and external situation. When, at the end of 1923, after the failure of Joffe's mission, Karakhan started his negotiations with C. T. Wang, the Mongolian question occupied only a secondary position. Although Karakhan was willing to recognize Chinese sovereignty in Mongolia, as Krupensky did in 1913, he refused, nevertheless, to cancel the Soviet-Mongol treaty of 1921, and withdraw the Soviet forces from Urga. In spite of these reservations, the Sino-Russian treaty was signed by him and C. T. Wang on March 16, 1924. It is true that the Peking government immediately disavowed the signature of its representative who, according to the government, had only been empowered to prepare

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

the draft of the treaty and not to sign it. A note was addressed to Karakhan demanding the cancellation of the Soviet-Mongol agreement of 1921 and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Mongolia as a preliminary condition for the conclusion of a Sino-Russian treaty. A lively and often witty correspondence, began between Karakhan and Wellington Koo, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Sino-Russian treaty was suddenly concluded on May 31, 1924, and to everybody's surprise it was based on the text of the original draft worked out by C. T. Wang. In a separate note Russia pledged to withdraw her troops from Mongolia after the Sino-Russian conference which was to settle various details.

This conference never took place, but the Soviet government, of its own accord, withdrew its forces the following year and informed Peking of this in a note of March 6, 1925.

The international status of Outer Mongolia has since been determined by two diplomatic instruments which are, in reality, mutually contradictory. One is the Mongol-Russian treaty of November 5, 1921, recognizing the independence of Outer Mongolia; the other is the Sino-Russian treaty of May 31, 1924, recognizing Chinese sovereignty in this country. Although these two agreements are clearly analogous to the treaties concluded in 1912 and 1913 by Tsarist Russia, there is, nevertheless, a very marked difference. By the Russian-Mongol treaty of 1912, Tsarist Russia recognized not the independence of Mongolia, but only her autonomy, and this recognition of autonomy was accepted, in turn, by China, in the Sino-Russian treaty of 1913. On the other hand, Soviet Russia, by the Soviet-Mongol treaty, recognized Mongolia's independence; the Sino-Soviet agreement of

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

1924 not only contradicts this by admitting Chinese sovereignty, but does not even mention Mongolia's autonomy. Furthermore, the Tsarist Russian agreements of 1912 and 1913 were supplemented in 1915 by the tripartite Russian-Chinese-Mongol agreement; this time there was no convention concluded in which Mongolia participated. Thus, if China did not officially recognize Outer Mongolia's autonomy, neither did Outer Mongolia accept Chinese sovereignty. The absence of a tripartite treaty similar to that of 1915, or a direct Sino-Mongol convention, was particularly disadvantageous to China, since it permitted Mongolia to interpret her autonomy as widely as she wished, and permitted Russia, while admitting Chinese sovereignty, to turn this wider interpretation to account. Thus, the Mongolian Great Khural [Constituent Assembly] on November 26, 1924, adopted a constitution in which the powers of the government of the "People's Republic" of Mongolia¹²¹ were defined as follows: ". . . to represent the Republic in international relations; to conduct diplomatic negotiations, and to conclude political, commercial, and other treaties with the Powers; to modify the frontiers of the Mongol state; to declare war; to conclude peace; to ratify international treaties; to float loans abroad, etc."¹²² Soviet Russia, on her part, declared: "The Soviet government recognizes Mongolia as a country belonging to the Chinese Republic, but enjoying an extremely wide autonomy, permitting her to prevent any Chinese interference in her internal affairs, and to establish independent relations."¹²³

The Peking government was not able to establish a *modus vivendi* with Urga, now known as Ulan Bator. As a condition of the resumption of normal relations, the Mongols called for the recognition "of the right of the various races of China to settle their own affairs."

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

There the matter rested for the Nanking government also. China still had occasion to protest to the Soviet government against the planned delimitation of the Mongol-Russian frontier, against the conclusion of a Mongol-Russian trade agreement, against the planned concession of the railway linking Ulan Bator with Kiakhta, against the establishment of telegraph and air lines. But soon it became obvious that the Mongols were gradually turning away from China and drawing nearer to Russia. For the first time in their history, they became aware of geographical and ethnic factors which inclined them towards Russia rather than towards China. Indeed, Outer Mongolia is geographically nearer to Russia than to China, from whom she is separated by the Gobi Desert; ethnically, too, she is nearer to the Russian Buryat Mongols than to the Chinese and Manchus. But, what is perhaps most important, it was from Russia that there came the fresh current of Occidental ideas which trickled into the country and successfully fought against the outmoded ideas of lamaism and the ancient Chinese culture.

In the past, Russia had been prudent in her role of civilizer, and the St. Petersburg government, as had been the Manchu emperors before them, was anxious to preserve the social order in Mongolia, which was based on lamaist theocracy. Korostovets tells us how, through his good offices, the first Mongol newspaper was founded in Urga. Before 1913 newspapers had been entirely unknown there; only almanacs or the astrological calendars of the lamas were read. The first number of *Shine Toli* (*New Mirror*), which a Russian Buryat, Dzhamssaranov, published, created a sensation. The entire edition was immediately bought and a second edition had to be printed at once. The paper contained general facts about the globe, the five continents of

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

the world, heat, cold, wind, lightning and thunder, the various states and their governments, nomadic and non-nomadic life. This was more than enough to cause a sharp reaction in all the monasteries, which saw in it a blow against the lamaist religion. The article on the earth was particularly disturbing, since Buddhist dogma taught that the earth was flat. The lamas complained to the Khutuktu. Korostovets wrote: "I had to temper the reforming zeal of Dzhamtsanov, since I had not the slightest intention of setting the powerful caste of lamas against us."

Since then times have changed. The Soviets did not have the scruples that Tsarist Russia had in dealing with the theocratic and feudal regime in Mongolia. Before the arrival of the Russians, there had been no lay schools in Mongolia, and the monasteries were the only centers of culture. In collaboration with Soviet instructors, the young "People's Republic" set about covering the country with a network of schools. In 1936 there were to be found seventy primary schools, five secondary schools, three technical institutes, and several professional schools; furthermore, a large part of the adult population attended what was called the "centers for the liquidation of analphabetism."¹²⁴ An intellectual class sprang up, still weak, but already comprising a number of teachers, engineers, physicians, and male nurses. Before the Russian influence had made itself felt, the population had not known of western medicine; their health needs were taken care of by lamas and healers, who used Tibetan remedies and practices stemming from magic and sorcery. Russian physicians appeared in Mongolia in 1923 and several stationary and itinerant health squads were created in the country. The lamas themselves went there to be taken care of.

Soviet Russia not only brought western civilization to

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

Mongolia, but also was the source of new ideas which began to revolutionize the social and economic life of that country. Thus the ties binding Mongolia to her great neighbor were strengthened even further. Already the constitution of 1924, under Russia's direct influence, proclaimed the abolition of the distinctive titles and insignia of the princes and *khans* as well as of the privileges of the religious chiefs; it ordered the confiscation of large pasturelands, the abolition of tithes levied by the monasteries; it freed the *shabinars* (serfs of the lama monasteries); it introduced monopoly in foreign trade, and put an end to the exploitation of the *arats* by the large Chinese traders. Of course, some of its declarations were on paper only. Total suppression of the feudal and religious system could only take place gradually. There was organized resistance by the former chiefs and the higher clergy, and, on the other hand, excesses by youthful followers of Soviet ideas.

We have seen that in 1922 the first introduction of radical social reforms in Mongolia suffered a bitter failure. Another attempt, in 1929-1932, was a more serious one. The "People's Republic," inspired by the Russian example, carried the experiment of collectivizing the peasants to the extreme. The similarity between the collectivization system introduced in Mongolia and the system in the U.S.S.R. was such that some observers at that time thought that there was lacking only a decree to sanction the accomplished fact and include the Mongol republic in the Soviet Union.

However, nothing of the kind happened. The "geopolitical" factors which determined the international status of Outer Mongolia proved stronger than the radical doctrines. Furthermore, the experiment of collectivizing the nomads ended (as in the U.S.S.R.) in catastrophic results for the "national sheptel,"¹²⁵ which

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

had to beat a quick retreat. The seventh Great Khural, convoked in 1934, to a great extent restored the personal property of the nomad *arats*, reinstated private trade, and also returned to the sectarian practices in regard to the clergy.¹²⁶ There is no doubt that all these decisions were made at the suggestion of Moscow, at a time when, in order to stress their full significance, *Pravda* wrote: "The People's Republic of Mongolia is a bourgeois democratic republic. The breeding of cattle by the nomads constitutes the basis of the national economy. With the exception of a small number of herds bred on state model farms, all cattle is the personal property of the *arats*."¹²⁷ The significance of this declaration is clear. Outer Mongolia, as a "bourgeois republic," necessarily had to remain outside of the Soviet Union, which includes only "socialist republics."

It is possible to conceive that economic considerations which prevented the building of a socialist republic in a country of nomads were not the only ones which caused the Soviet government to respect the international status of Outer Mongolia. The Tsarist government, in 1912-1915, had penetrated into Mongolia cautiously, its eyes constantly fixed not only on China, but also on Japan. The agreements which it concluded with Mongolia and China in 1912 and 1913 were accompanied, if not preceded, by an arrangement with Japan concerning allocation of reciprocal spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia. Soviet Russia was in a different situation. At the time of the conclusion of her treaties with Mongolia in 1921 and with China in 1924, she had not yet established diplomatic relations with Japan. We do not know whether or not the Mongolian question was discussed later, for example, at the time of the Russian-Japanese treaty of 1925. The fact remains that the swift

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

change in policy decreed by the Mongol Great Khural and the Soviet declaration regarding the "bourgeois" character of the Mongol republic and its independence from Soviet Russia coincided precisely with an event of great importance: the creation and the placing under powerful protection of a new state on the eastern frontiers of Mongolia—Manchukuo. Rightly or wrongly, the government of Ulan Bator believed that Mongolia's independence was endangered by the presence of Manchu troops and forces of her protectors in the neighborhood of her border.¹²⁸ Repeating the traditional gesture which Mongol leaders for three centuries had made whenever they believed themselves to be in danger, Guendon, the Mongol Premier, turned to Moscow for assistance.

The Soviet government, as its predecessors had been, was very careful; it contented itself with giving verbal assurance, on November 27, 1934, that it would give its support to Mongolia "in case of necessity." The situation, however, grew worse. Serious frontier incidents broke out, notably those of June 23 and 25, 1935; finally, on July 4th, the Manchukuo government claimed the right to send a permanent representative to Ulan Bator, and demanded authorization for the construction of a special telegraph line in order to assure communications between the capital of Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo. These demands were rejected as "contrary to the independence of the People's Republic." In spite of the creation of a joint frontier commission, frontier incidents again broke out and, at the end of November, 1935, the work of the joint commission was suddenly halted.

It was at that time that Guendon deemed it necessary to go personally to Moscow at the head of an official delegation. The aim of the mission was to obtain a

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

written pledge from the U.S.S.R. in place of the "gentlemen's agreement." Because the attitude of the Soviets remained cautious, Mongolia thought it necessary to launch a public appeal, in the form of a letter addressed by Amor, President of the Khural, to Kalinin. Negotiations (which remained secret for a long time) were resumed. Suddenly, on March 1, 1936, a sensational newsflash went round the world. Stalin had revealed, in an interview with Roy Howard, President of the Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance, the pledges made by the U.S.S.R. to Mongolia. Following is the most important part of Howard's report of this interview:

"Howard: What would be the attitude of the U.S.S.R. in case the People's Republic of Mongolia were attacked?

"Stalin: In case the People's Republic of Mongolia were attacked and its independence endangered, we would lend assistance to the republic and we would help it as we did in 1921.

"Howard: Then an attempt to take possession of Ulan Bator would mean a positive action on the part of the U.S.S.R.?

"Stalin: Yes, that is what it would mean."

On March 13, 1936, a protocol of "mutual assistance" was signed in Ulan Bator by Tairov on behalf of Soviet Russia and by Amor and Guendon on behalf of Outer Mongolia. Article 2 of this protocol is precise: "The Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic undertake, in the event of military attack upon one of the contracting parties, to render each other every assistance, including military assistance."

It is interesting to note that China, in her capacity of "sovereign of Mongolia," found it necessary to protest against this protocol,¹²⁹ but the Soviets replied at once

THE ROLE OF MONGOLIA

that the protocol did not include any territorial claims with respect to either China or Mongolia and, therefore, did not interfere with China's sovereignty.¹³⁰ *Pravda* recalled that the conference provided for by the Sino-Russian agreement of 1924, which was to discuss, among other matters, the problem of the security of the Mongolian frontiers, had not yet met, and that, therefore, Russia had the right, at the request of the local authorities, to take steps looking to the defense of the Mongolian frontiers, whose security China was obviously powerless to assure, as well as of her own frontiers. The Soviet publication then added these lines, which could have been written long ago by Sasonov, if not by Sava Vladislavich himself: "Outer Mongolia is the strategically ideal field for any aggression. Her conquest would constitute a direct menace to the Baikal region, the Trans-Siberian Railway, and all of the Russian Far East."¹³¹

Peace was saved in Mongolia. And so it was saved later, too, when China, her ruler, herself became involved in an armed conflict which turned into a general conflagration affecting almost all the peoples of eastern Asia. . .

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

THE ROLE played by the Jesuits in the diplomatic field during the early period of Sino-Russian relations is an historical phenomenon which cannot fail to evoke astonishment among those who study it with some care. Is it not, in fact, extraordinary that a tiny group of Europeans, foreigners to both Russia and China, priests of a religion hardly tolerated, if not persecuted, in both countries, should have played the role of intermediaries in highly important matters involved in the diplomatic relations between these two great empires and should have been able to retain this position for almost a century in spite of all the changes that took place in Russia and China!

How did this strange three-sided association come about? Why did China and Russia have recourse to the services of the Jesuits? How did the latter conceive of and perform their delicate and sometimes dangerous functions? These questions are easier to pose than to answer satisfactorily, since this very strange page in diplomatic history has up to the present time been very poorly elucidated.

Chinese contemporary chronicles make little mention of the members of the Society of Jesus. If it is true that they held official positions in the capital and often had honors heaped upon them, nevertheless they remained on the fringe of official Chinese life. They served rather as personal advisers of the Emperor, who met them in the privacy of his palace in order that they

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

not be given too much publicity. In the eyes of the general public they always remained "western barbarians."

The information contained in Russian sources is somewhat more abundant, but here, too, the Russian representatives had to exercise the utmost circumspection, since "Latinism" was as suspect in religion as it was in politics. At the time of the Nerchinsk Conference the Jesuits acted in a more official capacity and thus came more noticeably under the public eye. Later, they had reasons of their own for not drawing attention to themselves.¹³²

Yet, in correspondence and private memoirs of the Jesuits we find the most abundant information: in the diary of Father Gerbillon, which was published as early as 1735,¹³³ in the *Correspondance du Père Verbiest*¹³⁴ and other scattered letters, and in some biographies of a more or less scientific nature.¹³⁵

Diplomatic documents edited or translated by Jesuits constitute a fourth source of data, a critical examination of which by sinologists is still to be made. Dr. Fuchs, in connection with the Treaty of Nerchinsk,¹³⁶ and Father Weiger, in connection with the Treaty of Kiakhta,¹³⁷ have furnished us with good specimens of what such studies can reveal and it is now possible to draw the conclusion that the Fathers, in their capacity of translators, performed functions related to true diplomacy rather than pure linguistics.

In the light of this it is not surprising that the historians have been divided on the question of evaluating the true nature of the role of the Jesuits in Sino-Russian relations. Some, minimizing their contribution, see them as interpreters pure and simple; others, exaggerating in the opposite direction, believe that they were genuine intermediaries and inspirers of political action. The facts,

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

as far as we know them do not appear completely to bear out either of these versions. To substantiate this here, without giving a complete survey of the activity of the Fathers during a period of more than ninety years, it will suffice to consider the origin of their relations to the envoys of Moscow in Peking at a time of serious crisis in the relations between China and Russia—a crisis which was solved by the conclusion of the Treaty of Nerchinsk.

From this brief survey it will at once be seen that from the very beginning the Fathers were neither mere translators nor—at Nerchinsk—inspirers of political action.

Another aspect of their activity—their rôle as scientific documentators and informants in both countries—will likewise be apparent from this sketch. In the opinion of this writer the nature of the services rendered by the Fathers in this field, to China as well as to Russia, explain better than any other conjectures the reason that they were retained for so long as intermediaries in Sino-Russian relations.

In 1676, when the Jesuits intervened for the first time between Russia and China, the relations of those two states had already had a long history. Following the voyages of discovery there had been, during the 17th century, envoys, embassies, and even diplomatic correspondence on both sides. Petlin and Mundov in 1619, Baikov in 1656, Perfiliev and Setkul-Ablin in 1658, Milovanov in 1670, Setkul-Ablin again in 1672, and Porshechnikov in 1674 had come to and stayed in Peking. The Governor of Ninguta in 1669, and the Mandarin Makulci ("Mangutei" in Russian sources) had gone to Nerchinsk in 1670 to negotiate agreements with the Vayvoda Danila Arshinsky. Letters between Peking and

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Nerchinsk had been exchanged in 1670-1671. From these numerous instances it can be seen that the Russians and the Chinese did not need to have recourse to the services of the Jesuits in order to correspond with each other. Russia did not approach China directly but rather through countries situated between them, and especially Mongolia; it was therefore natural that the Mongols, accessible to both, should become the intermediaries in their relations. Interpreters of the Mongol language were not rare in Russia and especially in Siberia after the subduing of the Buryats. At the time of the departure of the first ambassador, Baikov, we find that there were already Mongol interpreters in Moscow, who wrote the Mongol (Tartar) text of Baikov's *gramota* (credentials).¹³⁸ For China the use of the Mongol language presented even fewer difficulties, since Russian affairs were under the *Li-fan-yüan* (sometimes inaccurately called, in English, the Colonial Office, or Office of Mongolian Affairs), which had charge of most of Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang.

Nevertheless, beginning from the time of the Spathari embassy, Mongol gave place to Latin. This change was an important one. The Chinese abandoned a language which was familiar to them for one completely unknown and for interpretation of which they had to rely entirely on the Jesuits; for the Russians, the change involved inconveniences of both a political nature—since Latinism in all its forms had been fought—and of a practical nature—since the number of Latin interpreters was limited.¹³⁹ Among the few Russian documents that have been preserved in the National Palace Museum in Peking is a letter dated at Nerchinsk the 15th of July, 1703, in which the Vayvoda Shishkin stated that he had received a letter in Latin from Peking but was unable to understand it, and demanded a Mongol translation of it.¹⁴⁰

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

In spite of all the inconveniences, Latin was adopted as the diplomatic language; apparently great advantages in its use must have been found. For a proper understanding of the situation it should be remembered that in diplomatic dealings of that time the personality of the interpreters employed was a matter of the highest importance. Interpreters were not merely translators, but also guides, councillors and the main agents of investigation regarding the country to be approached. All of Russia's colonization as well as her Asiatic policy were based on investigation. The conquest of Siberia was primarily a work of discovery, as Maurice Courant correctly remarks.¹⁴¹ "Each *ostrog* [stockade], each *zimovie* [winter quarters] is a center of observation and a point of departure. One hears of new tribes and one sets out to find them by going up unknown rivers; the Siberian discoverer spends half his life on water and ice."

Investigation was comparatively simple as long as it was concerned with primitive tribes without a history, but as it turned to better organized and less nomadic peoples, the difficulty increased. When it was directed to China, investigation became a matter of scientific work. Concerning this country, everything had to be discovered: geography and routes of communication, ethnography and customs, politics and ideology, relations with subject countries, and trade. How could the Russians obtain all this information about a closed country, in which they could not circulate even when they had permission to enter it, without being at once isolated, watched, and placed under virtual arrest? The sinologist, Staunton, remarked of McCartney's embassy at the end of the 18th century, "They entered Peking as beggars, they stayed there as prisoners, and they were expelled as thieves."

In comparison to other European countries, Russia

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

was in an advantageous position, owing to her proximity to Mongolia, a rather accessible region which was in permanent contact with China. By multiplying her expeditions to Mongolia,¹⁴² she could enrich her store of knowledge of China. It is surprising to note from reading the *nakaz* (instructions) of Baikov, the first ambassador, the extent to which, as early as 1654, Moscow was informed on Chinese matters. Court protocol, the customs and chicancry of the mandarins, the treatment accorded ambassadors—everything was precisely perceived. The chapters concerning trade show that Russia also knew well the products of the Chinese market, in which products of Russia were already to be found. The *nakaz* also contained a valuable indication of the limits of Baikov's province: he was allowed to handle affairs of protocol and commercial questions, but not the "most important questions" (*samie velikie dela*), which he was to avoid at all costs. These "most important questions" were evidently the political questions such as that concerning the Russian advance on the Amur River and the resulting rivalry with China in the border countries and the border peoples of China and Russia.

Twenty years later, when these "most important questions" were posed in an imperative manner and signalled the possibility of an immediate crisis in Sino-Russian relations, other men than Baikov and his Mongol interpreters and other means of approach had to be found. It was then that Spathari's embassy and the first relations of the latter with the Jesuits of Peking occurred.

The fact that the Emperor K'ang-hsi was under age, and that internal struggles were going on in China (three successive revolts in the provinces of Kwantung and Kwangsi, on Formosa, in Fukien, and in Yunnan) were advantageous to Russia in her advance along the Amur River. For a time it was to the interest of both

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

countries to consider the frictions caused by this advance as merely local incidents provoked by the *lo-ch'a* (Russian irregulars) and in which the responsibility of the government was not involved. A time came, however, when the need for an explanation became imperative—the time of the famous Gantimur affair, which occupied the limelight of Sino-Russian politics for more than twenty years.

Gantimur, an influential Tungus prince who had been entrusted by Peking with an important position, had gone over to the Russians with his entire tribe; he had been received in Nerchinsk and been baptized, the latter fact making his extradition impossible.

The affair involved China's prestige among her subject peoples so deeply that K'ang-hsi sent what amounted to an ultimatum to the Tsar;¹³ for the Russians to return Gantimur, however, meant the jeopardizing of their entire colonization policy. It will suffice merely to recall how this colonization took place.

The Cossacks and *promyshleniks* [traders] demanded three things of the natives whom they met on their path of penetration: provisions, *yasak* (a levy of furs), and an oath of allegiance to the Tsar. It was easy for the Russians to obtain the oath of allegiance, of which the natives hardly understood the meaning; with somewhat more difficulty they were able to obtain some sable skins, of which there was no lack in the country; when, however, the natives were asked to furnish provisions, which were scarce and precious, and when they learned that furs were to be a regular tribute, they fled, revolted, or attacked the intruders unawares in order to do away with them. After a period of violence, plotting, and rebellion, however, they submitted, knowing that they had nothing with which to oppose the conquerors' weapons. Nevertheless, they demanded one condition be-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

fore yielding, namely, that they be protected against other intruders who might come to plunder them, above all against the Manchu mandarins. This is the origin and significance of the rivalry which developed as the Russians advanced along the Amur River. In this also lies the great importance of the question of "deserters," of whom Gantimur was the most representative. Thus, the delimitation of spheres of influence as between Russia and China became a necessity; but this need came to be understood only gradually, so considerable were the divergencies, in the beginning, between the conceptions of each of the two states as to its power and that of its neighbor.

The Manchu Emperor heightened his efforts to bring about the return of Gantimur. After addressing several letters to Nerchinsk, Peking, without waiting for the Tsar's answer, sent the governor of Ninguta to negotiate with the Vayvoda Arshinsky; the latter, who does not seem to have been very intelligent, managed as best he could. He sent the Cossack Milovanov to Peking with the mission of proposing to K'ang-hsi nothing less than that he become a vassal of the Tsar.¹⁴⁴ Surprisingly enough, Milovanov returned to Nerchinsk with a whole skin, and accompanied by the Mandarin Mangutei. Following this incident, the discussion concerning a surrender of Gantimur was continued. Milovanov was replaced in Peking by Setkul-Ablin, a gifted talker, who previously had accompanied Baikov and Perfiliev to China. Sometimes the *vayvoda* pretended that he was waiting for instructions from Moscow, sometimes he countered that Gantimur, who was old, could not leave Nerchinsk. Moscow, on its part, declared that it was impossible to translate K'ang-hsi's letter, because it was written in Manchu.

Having tried all manner of subterfuges, Moscow decided to send Ambassador Spathari to China; it was

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

at the time of the latter's encounter with Father Verbiest in Peking that the diplomatic activity of the Jesuits in Sino-Russian relations began. Let us consider the personality of this new Russian envoy.

Spathari was not a Russian, and prior to his appointment as the Tsar's representative in China he had spent only four years in Moscow; this was nothing extraordinary in Russia at that time. Had not a Scottish Catholic, Menzies, represented the Greek Orthodox Tsar at the Vatican? Spathari was actually a Greek, but he was born in Moldavia and educated in Constantinople. At that time the great ecclesiastical school of Constantinople was the principal center of Greek-Byzantine civilization and the Greek Orthodox religion. To this intellectual background Spathari added the acquisitions of his many sojourns in the Occident. He had stayed in Berlin at the court of Friedrich Wilhelm; he had lived in Stettin with his exiled Moldavian prince; in Stockholm he had been the representative of his prince at the court of Charles XI; he had been to Paris on a diplomatic mission. This was the origin of the "curious mixture of Byzantine and Occidental culture" in him of which his Rumanian biographer speaks.¹⁴⁵

The checkered career of Spathari, nevertheless, is obscure at certain points. He was accused once or twice of treason; he was expelled from Berlin; in Moldavia he suffered an "unspeakable punishment"—the prince had the cartilage separating his nostrils cut. His biographer nevertheless assures us that he "was much more than a mere adventurer." It matters little, however. The Russia of that time was not fastidious in her choice of servants, and the suburb of Moscow ("German Sloboda") was a veritable foreign concession populated by adventurers of all countries. Moscow employed them unhesitat-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ingly, since at this period of growth and transformation everybody was useful to her.

Spathari's notoriety arose much later in his life by reason of his influence among the Balkan Orthodox group and through his relations with the Occidental intellectuals—the French De la Neuville and Father Avril, the Swiss Sparwensfeldt, the German Rinhuber, and the Dutch Witsen. At the time of his arrival in Russia he was rather a modest figure. A letter addressed to the Tsar by Dositheus, Patriarch of Jerusalem, served to open the doors for him. Dositheus, the undisputed head of the Greek Orthodox movement and the principal opponent of Occidental influence, undoubtedly saw in Spathari a faithful disciple who should be installed in Russia. But everything about Spathari was surprising and unpredictable. Bearing nothing but this recommendation, Spathari was welcomed by Artamon Matveiev, one of the first of the Russian "Occidentals," who was married to a Scotswoman and was a patron of foreign scholars; Matveiev became very powerful by reason of the fact that his niece Natalie had been chosen Tsarina; he had just taken over the direction of the Pòsol'ski Prikaz (Ambassadorial Chancellery) succeeding another well-known reformer, Ordin-Nashokin. He appointed Spathari as Latin, Greek, and Moldavian translator. Furthermore, he was interested in science and had created in his *Prikaz* a kind of academy where, in addition to the translation of diplomatic documents, historical and theological works were translated and composed and which he caused his protege to enter. Within three years Spathari had produced a rather large number of memoirs which consisted for the most part of dull, semi-religious, semi-historical compilations resembling medieval "encyclopedias," with such queer titles as "Arithmologion," "Chrestomologion," "The Nine Muses and the Seven Arts."

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

In this field Spathari rapidly gained the favor of his chief. He became the teacher of Matveiev's son and was received at his house, where the literati of Moscow gathered. Matveiev valued the scholar and writer in him; he also knew of his experience in the diplomatic missions; this was why he thought of this favorite of his when the question of sending a mission to China arose.

Relations with China were tense. It was of the utmost importance to send to China a man whose outlook was different from that of Baikov, Setkul-Ablin, Milovanov, or the Vayvoda Arshinsky. Above all it was necessary to obtain reliable information concerning the political situation and the intentions of the Emperor K'ang-hsi.

Was it at this time that the Russians first thought of obtaining information through the Jesuits of Peking? This is not improbable. Even Baikov, in 1656, had been informed of the presence in Peking of Father Adam Schall, whom he named "Adamsha,"¹⁴⁶ and later, in 1673, Menzies, in Rome, discussed the possibility of utilizing the Siberian route for communication with missionaries in China. Be these conjectures what they may, the *gramota* (credentials) given to Spathari was accompanied, for the first time, by a Latin translation¹⁴⁷—the first diplomatic document of Russo-Chinese relations written in Latin.

Spathari left Moscow on the 3rd of March, 1675, equipped with all the data on Siberia and China which he was able to assemble, i.e., the *stateini spiski* (official reports) of the envoys and couriers who had visited these regions before, as well as descriptions of two Dutch embassies to China.¹⁴⁸

We will not follow Spathari in his journey across Siberia (he has left us a description of the journey which makes entrancing reading) but only note an important event which took place in Tobolsk—his encounter with

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Yuri Krizhanich, the famous forerunner of Pan-Slavism. It is necessary to say a few words about Krizhanich who, in the opinion of a Russian historian, was "the first theoretician of the Russian national ideology."¹⁴⁹

Krizhanich, like Spathari, came from the Balkans, but Krizhanich was a Slav (Croatian) and a Catholic. He had come to Russia at the time when a sharp struggle was in progress between two cultural currents—the Latinism trickling in from the Occident by way of Catholic Poland, and the neo-Byzantinism brought from Constantinople by the Orthodox Greeks. He was as much opposed to the one party as to the other, since he advocated a purely Slav and, above all, Russian, civilization. He called for a union of all Slavs, Orthodox as well as Catholic, around Russia. His program implied a political alliance with Poland and a religious union of the churches.

These conceptions were new and far in advance of the times, and the opponents of them were more numerous than their supporters. Opposed by the Greeks, disowned by Rome,¹⁵⁰ Krizhanich soon became suspect in Moscow and was sent to Tobolsk, where he lived in exile for almost fifteen years. It was there that he wrote his chief works, among them the famous "Politics" which he sent in manuscript to the Tsar; these reports, which were not published until the middle of the 19th century, thereafter brought him posthumous fame.

Spathari was attracted to Krizhanich; a man of vast culture, familiar with several languages, and well-informed concerning Siberia by reason of his fifteen years' stay there, this exile had clear ideas regarding a policy for Asia. "He was a mere dilettante in politics," says P. Pierling of him, "but a dilettante of genius."

Long and frequent conversations began between the two men. "For more than a month," Krizhanich wrote

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

later, "there was not one day that Spathari did not lunch and dine with me." The Russian envoy derived information and ideas from Krizhanich which he knew how to utilize.

We are well informed concerning Krizhanich's program, since it was set forth in the manuscripts prepared for the Tsar and published two centuries later by Bezsonov. In these, Krizhanich warned the sovereign in Moscow against a too-rapid territorial expansion; he pointed out the danger of establishing *ostrogs* in ever remoter regions. He preached colonization and the populating of regions already occupied, rather than the acquisition of new, half-desert areas. "It is in an abundant population that the state finds its strength," he wrote, and he objected passionately to those who advocated the continuation of the onward movement. He foresaw the risk of a war with China. "Only our enemies are interested in turning us away from realizable undertakings and to push us on to things impossible to carry out. Should the Russian people plunge into a stupid war with China, the Germans (i.e., Occidentals) and the Turks take advantage of the opportunity and seize the Russian state."¹⁵¹ Colonization of Siberia, peace and trade with China—these were the ideas which Krizhanich transmitted to Spathari, and which were to triumph later at the Conference of Nerchinsk.

Spathari, always eager for information and constantly seeking data, finally left Tobolsk; he took with him a large volume, handwritten by Krizhanich, on the subject of the trade to be established with China,¹⁵² and two notebooks containing a description of Siberia and the cities of China.¹⁵³

It was to take him another year to get to Peking, and this was to be a year of further education for his inquisitive and methodical mind. He noted accurately

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

all waterways, soil conditions, and distances between towns and villages. Ruins, idols, customs, rituals, dwellings—nothing escaped his observation. In Nerchinsk he paid a visit to Prince Gantimur in order to assure him of the Tsar's protection, and he promptly noted: "He is the best of all the Tungus, a great and courageous man, one might say a Titan; he has nine wives and more than thirty children, not counting the daughters." He wrote down in his notebooks what the Tungus told him, about the Amur River, the island beyond this river (Sakhalin), and Japan, where "many Portuguese and some Jesuits are living."¹⁵⁴

When Spathari finally arrived in Peking he found his opportunities for observation suddenly curtailed, since the embassy was in a great building resembling a prison, with an imposing guard at the doors. We can easily understand what the encounter with Father Verbiest, in the presence of the mandarins of the *Li-fan-yüan*, meant for him under these conditions.

We do not know the reason that Verbiest came to see Spathari, nor even how he knew that Spathari would be able to come to an understanding with him. Perhaps the Mandarin Mala, who had gone to the frontier to interrogate the Russian envoy, gave this information in his report. The fact remains that none of the earlier envoys of Russia had been visited by a Jesuit.

Spathari promptly arranged that Verbiest serve him as interpreter. "The Chinese mandarins asked Verbiest," Spathari noted in his official diary, "whether the ambassador could converse with him. And he answered them: very well, indeed. They then asked me whether I could make myself understood completely. And I asked him to thank the Emperor for having sent me such a learned man." One of the mandarins asked

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

that the name of this unknown language be written down for him on a piece of paper. "Latin, a difficult language, which only scholars can speak," Verbiest told him.¹⁵⁵

Spathari remained in Peking for three and a half months. Later, Father David, a Jesuit living in Moscow, said in a letter to Rome that Spathari "had lived in the closest contact with Father Verbiest."¹⁵⁶ Thus, it was not only mutual sympathy that had brought the two European "scholars" together in a strange and remote world, but the opportunity of mutual service through exchange of data necessary to their respective fields of action.

Verbiest had spent seventeen years in the heart of China; for seven years following a dark period of persecutions which he had shared with his master and predecessor, Adam Schall, he had been President of the Mathematical Tribunal and had enjoyed considerable influence at the court of K'ang-hsi; this dramatic change in his situation had been due, among other reasons, to his undeniable diplomatic talents and his fine comprehension of Chinese psychology. His correspondence¹⁵⁷ reveals him to have been a man of broad vision and perhaps a too vivid imagination, but of an intense activity which let escape no opportunity for planning new projects. He was in touch with the court of Louis XIV through Father de la Chaize, with the court of Leopold of Austria through the Assistant of Germany, and in direct correspondence with Jean Sobieski, the King of Poland. The encounter with Spathari led him to envisage the unsuspected possibilities in an immense country in the immediate neighborhood of China; in one of his letters to Rome he was to remark how desirable it would be to "penetrate into this empire which extends to China and across which a line of

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

communication could be established along an uninterrupted chain of missions."¹⁵⁸

The conversations with Father Verbiest were of no less benefit to Spathari. From the first discussion with the mandarins on the inevitable questions of protocol, which the Chinese knew how to manipulate according to the occasion, Verbiest was lavish in giving counsel to the Russian envoy. He sent him a book in Latin on the ceremonials of the Chinese court and at the same time advised him to resist the Chinese demands. Eventually, Spathari and the mandarins came to an understanding, and Spathari was even freed of the obligation of *kotowing* (touching the ground with the forehead). This, however, did not prevent the court from publishing a purely propagandistic bulletin, of which we reproduce here the translation made by E. H. Parker. (Again we notice how careful the court was to withhold from the public the fact that the relations which China was forced to enter into with Russia were on the basis of Russian equality with China; this was perhaps one of the reasons why Jesuits rather than Chinese were employed as intermediaries).

"The White Khan of Russia," says the official bulletin, "sent his subject Nicolai Hambriolovitch with tribute of local articles. His presentation was to the effect that Russia lay far away in remote obscurity; that from ancient times there had been no relations with China; that he [the Tsar] was ignorant of Chinese letters and unacquainted with the proper style of address, that he now inclined towards civilization, expressed his devotion, and was desirous to open tribute relations."¹⁵⁹

Spathari was granted several imperial audiences. They developed along the well-known lines which have been described repeatedly. A few passages of the description given in Spathari's *stateini spisok* are worth

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

quoting here. At the first audience not a word was spoken. "The Emperor sat on the throne of lacquered wood," Spathari tells us. "He is a young man of twenty-three years, with a face pitted by smallpox. Around him were his brothers and relatives, seated on exceptionally beautiful white furs. Noblemen, wearing peacock feathers in their head-dress, served tea in yellow wood cups; this tea was boiled with butter and milk in the Tartar fashion. Each dignitary, who received a cupful, bowed, his left hand on the ground and holding the cup in his right. Music played softly, and all around the hall many kinds of perfumes were burning in huge bronze vases on pedestals of marble."

At the second audience, Spathari was obliged to kneel when the Emperor addressed him to put the ritual question concerning the health of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich; (the *nakaz* of Baikov had strongly insisted on this formality twenty-two years earlier!) Verbiest translated the question and Spathari's ceremonial answer. The Emperor put still other conventional questions: as to the age of the Tsar, his height, the date of his accession. Spathari answered precisely: fifty years, tall in height, he has reigned for thirty years. This was in July, 1676; neither the ambassador nor anybody else in Peking knew that Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich had been dead for seven months.

The discussion finally came down to the matters at hand. The mandarins of the *Li-fan-yüan* asked whether the envoy had anything to communicate outside of what was contained in the *gramota*. Thereupon Spathari delivered a note in Latin containing twelve points which he had prepared in collaboration with Verbiest. Naturally, neither the Gantimur affair nor the conflicts over the Amur River were among them. First place was given to the question of choice of a language for cor-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

respondence between the two states. Next, the titles of the Tsar and of the Khan were examined, and translation of letters, which had been sent to the Tsar previously and which were written in Manchu, was asked for. The other points concerned the question of freedom of the trade to be established, the sending to Russia of precious stones as well as 40,000 pounds of silver in exchange for Russian products, and other commercial questions. This maneuver of Spathari's was a skillful one since the note represented an "cstoppel," at least provisionally, of the Chinese demands, on the pretext that they were written in the Manchu language, which Moscow was unable to translate. The Russian envoy also tried to confirm the Jesuits in their function of official translators. In fact, he entered into discussion of only those points which were of primary interest to Russia, and sought to postpone consideration of the remaining points until his return to Moscow.

The Russian proposals could not be satisfactory to the Chinese. The commercial questions did not interest them. "Sorry questions which concern merchants and which are unworthy of a discussion between two states," they were to say later to the ambassador Ismailov! They demanded, therefore, priority of discussion for "imperial" questions. That meant arrival at an impasse. As often happens in such cases, the conflict came into the open on the question of formalities of protocol. Spathari was offered presents for the Tsar from the Emperor and was asked to kneel to receive them; Spathari refused. The matter was taken under discussion, Spathari being obliged to wait in the rain for half an hour for the reply of the Emperor; he was not satisfied with the reply, and the split deepened. Spathari insistently requested an answer to his twelve points in the form of a letter, addressed by the Emperor to the Tsar, in which

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

all the titles of the Emperor were to appear, but what he received was a decree of K'ang-hsi: after recalling that a letter of the Emperor to the Tsar had remained unanswered and that the demarches attempted with Danilo (Arshinsky) had been without result, K'ang-hsi laid down three conditions, fulfillment of which was required as a precondition of the maintenance of amicable relations between the two countries: (1) that Gantimur, accompanied by a Russian ambassador, be sent to Peking; (2) that such ambassador be a reasonable man who would submit to the requirements of protocol; (3) that there be no further disturbance of the peace on the frontiers.¹⁶⁰

The issuance of this decree marked the end of the Russian embassy. The Russian mission was considered a failure, but the failure was more apparent than real, since Spathari had obtained what he desired—a respite for the settlement of "imperial" questions (frontiers and deserters) until his return to Moscow, where it would be possible to discuss these matters in the light of the information which he had been able to gather in China. It is here that the significant help which he had received from the Jesuits becomes apparent.

The Rumanian biographer of Spathari goes so far as to say that Verbiest's services rendered to Spathari "amounted to actual treason, since he made known to the ambassador all the state secrets of China."¹⁶¹ This is an exaggeration. In reality, the Jesuit did not reveal a single secret datum and, far from harming China, as can be seen from a reading of the *stateini spisok* of Spathari,¹⁶² all this information, very important to Russia, was, on the contrary, to contribute to a rapprochement between the two countries.

It was a Jesuit, says Spathari in his report, who secretly conveyed to him the information relating to

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

the revolt of Wu San-kuei, the suppression of which absorbed the Emperor's entire attention and prevented him, temporarily, from taking military measures against the Russian advance on the Amur River. The Russian advance was greatly disturbing to China, who wanted to use the Gantimur affair to clarify the situation. If the Russians would return this powerful leader to China, she thought, the native tribes would be so impressed by this that they would soon desert the Russian *ostrogs*. These *ostrogs* would thus lose their *raison d'être* and the Tsar would have no further interest in maintaining garrisons there. But if the Russians refused to return Gantimur, they should under no circumstances, according to the advice of the Jesuits, be permitted to go beyond the points they had hitherto attained—Nerchinsk and Albazin. The Chinese were in fact well aware that the Russian forces were weak, and they were even surprised to see them venture so far away from their bases as to bring them in proximity with a powerful neighbor; the Chinese had formerly regarded the Russian forces as irregulars (*lo-ch'a*), but now, knowing them to be supported by the Tsar, the Chinese were obliged to send to the border considerable troops as soon as they became available.

This was the important advice which Spathari brought back to Moscow. If we add to this the fact that during his stay in Peking, thanks to the Jesuits, he had persistently collected data about China—her condition, military forces, etc.—and that on departing he had left behind in Peking a number of Fathers¹⁶³ who had become discreet and useful friends, his mission cannot be regarded as having ended in complete failure.

Before leaving, Spathari had given to the Fathers' church a present of a silver-plated Byzantine ikon of

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

St. Michael, which is now in the new church of the Russian mission.¹⁶⁴ When he left Peking he took with him a letter from Verbiest addressed to the Tsar. This letter has often been fantastically interpreted. It has even been claimed that the Father wanted to leave China and in the letter offered his services to the Tsar! Only the Russian text of the letter (undoubtedly written by Spathari) has been preserved in the Moscow archives and reproduced in Verbiest's correspondence.¹⁶⁵ There is nothing in this letter which would permit of such interpretation since it contains only expressions of homage to the Tsar, praises of Spathari, and a description of the reception given Spathari in Peking. What, then, was the real aim of this letter? An indirect indication is given us by Professor Liu.¹⁶⁶ The latter asserts, on the basis of Chinese sources, that Spathari insistently asked the Chinese court to give him a letter for the Tsar, "otherwise, he said, he would not dare to return to Russia." In this connection it should be recalled that twenty years earlier, Baikov, finding himself in a similar situation, had turned to the Dutch ambassadors who were present at the Chinese court at the time for a letter attesting to his stay in Peking.¹⁶⁷ It is not unlikely, therefore, that Verbiest's letter, undoubtedly written in agreement with Spathari, was intended to be a testimonial of the manner in which the ambassador had accomplished his mission.

Spathari, who had left Peking in September, 1676, heard in Selenginsk of the death of Tsar Alexei and the accession of Tsar Fcodor. He was no longer in a hurry to return to Moscow. He stayed in Selenginsk for six months in order to write his report and prepare a long account of his expedition. His *"Journey Across Siberia from Tobolsk to Nerchinsk and the Frontiers of China,"* although it remained in manuscript until the end of the

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

19th century, quickly became known and assured him deserved fame. In singular contrast to his heavy theological compilations in the Oriental fashion, Spathari wrote his "Journey" in the manner of modern explorers, with precise details and a very exact map (Baddeley states that thanks to this map he was able to correct errors in maps printed in the 20th century); this memoir was used by Father Avril, Witsen, Sparwenfeldt, Notaras, and others, but was only published by J. Arseniev in 1882. A second work with the title "*Description of the Original Zone of the World, Asia, in which is Contained the Description of the Empire of China,*" was likewise written in Selenginsk in 1676. It was published in 1910, and Baddeley proved that it was an almost literal translation of a work of Father Martini, which had been given to Spathari by Verbiest,¹⁶⁸ but in which Spathari had suppressed everything that might reveal its real authorship. Baddeley accuses him of plagiarism in this connection, but this expression seems too extreme. Spathari added two chapters on the routes leading from Russia to China. "That which is situated above China," he wrote, "Siberia and the country of the Moñgols, was completely unknown to this day, and the Jesuits themselves, during the conversations which we had in the capital of China, heard these things with astonishment." *Mutatis mutandis*, Father Avril likewise took those chapters for his own use without saying so,¹⁶⁹ which surprised nobody at that time.

In May, 1677, Spathari had to leave Selenginsk. In Yeniseisk, an unpleasant surprise was awaiting him. The *vayvoda* had received orders from Tsar Feodor to search the ambassador and confiscate everything that was found on him. However, he was authorized to continue on his way to Moscow, where he arrived in January, 1678. There he had to clear himself of grave charg-

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

cs laid against him because of his connection with his former chief and patron, Artamon Matveiev, now in disgrace and accused by the new favorites, the Miloslavskis, of numerous crimes of which the chief one was "black magic." According to a physician, David Berlov, and a dwarf, Zakharii, who gave evidence at the trial, Matveiev, together with a Dr. Stephan and the translator Spathari, read a "black book" and summoned up demons. Matveiev protested that he read only books good for the soul and not contrary to God; he added that Spathari was a learned man who had faithfully served the Tsar and was incapable of teaching evil sciences.¹⁷⁰ Matveiev was condemned to exile in Pustosersk. Spathari, a less conspicuous figure, was acquitted, but he lost all influence and during the reign of Feodor lived in retirement and silence, although retaining his position as translator in the Prikaz.

What had happened during this time to the relations which he had established with Verbiest? We have only a letter addressed to him by the Father and dated November 24, 1686, i.e., ten years after Spathari's departure from Peking. It was an answer to news that Verbiest had received of him through the couriers Veniukov and Favorov, who came to Peking with a proposal to end hostilities.¹⁷¹ This was during the regency of Sophia, when the direction of foreign affairs was in the hands of Basil Golytsin, an innovator and partisan of Occidental civilization, with whom Spathari had again become *persona grata* in the Prikaz, a fact which is detectable beginning with the preliminary negotiations at Nerchinsk.

During the years of Spathari's disgrace, Moscow did not put to any use the results of his mission, the documents he had collected, and the precious information he had brought with him. The consequences were unfortu-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

nate for Russia, since she might, by having put them to use, have avoided a violent conflict with China.

While Spathari was still in Siberia on his return journey from Peking, he had warned the local authorities that it was dangerous to venture on the Amur River beyond Albazin, and he had proposed maintenance of the *status quo* at least until he had returned to Moscow. This warning was not followed. On the contrary, expansion, at the instigation of the new *vayvoda* of Nerchinsk, Voeikov, with the collaboration of Milovanov, whom we already know and with whom Spathari was on bad terms, was pursued more actively than ever. According to Ravenstein,¹⁷² whose usually precise information was based on Muller's documents, new *ostrogs*, forts and villages were founded between 1676 and 1682 along the Amur River and its tributaries. At the end of 1682, Russian possessions on the Amur consisted of (1) Albazin and four villages surrounding this fortress;¹⁷³ (2) Nov-ozetsk, Selymzhinsk and Dolonskoi on the tributary Zeya; (3) Dukikansk on the tributary Amgun; and (4) Turgursk and Udsk near the Sea of Okhotsk. K'ang-hsi, greatly alarmed by this rapid advance, sent letter after letter to the local authorities and the Tsar of Moscow, but he received no reply to them. This is why, in 1683, he despatched a large military expedition which in a short time took everything that had been established by the Russians beyond Albazin. The *ostrogs* and villages were destroyed, the soldiers killed or taken prisoner. Towards the end of 1683 there remained on the banks of the Amur River only the fortress of Albazin.¹⁷⁴ It is therefore wrong to say, as has often been said, that at Nerchinsk, Russia gave up her possessions on the Amur and its tributaries, since her possessions had already been lost five years before.

The real meaning of the Treaty of Nerchinsk has been

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

much discussed. Certain Russian historians consider it to have been a diplomatic defeat of Russia, and some try to find the reasons for it in the baneful influence or the "intrigues" of the Jesuits.¹⁷⁵ We do not intend here to enter into this discussion, but only to point out that the treaty remained unchanged for one hundred and seventy years, and that certain of its provisions remain in force today. It is of interest also to note that the principal Russian delegate, Golovin, after his return from Nerchinsk, received official praise, was appointed *boyar* and *namyestnik* (viceroy) of Siberia, and eventually became the principal negotiator of treaties entered into by Russia with various states of Europe.¹⁷⁶

As to the role of the Jesuits, whether it was harmful or beneficial, it was, in the opinion of this writer, above all greatly exaggerated. The diary of Father Gerbillon, which describes it, received, it is true, much publicity, since it was the testimony of the European who had contributed to the making of the first agreement between China and a western power. The consequences of the Treaty of Nerchinsk were certainly considerable; the mass of Asia's peoples still on the move was for the first time divided into spheres of influence of the two great empires, and the contribution of the Jesuits to the making of this treaty gained for the Christians the promulgation by K'ang-hsi of an edict of tolerance.

Nevertheless one cannot help being somewhat disappointed on reading the famous diary of Gerbillon. In the light of information which we possess today, the role of Gerbillon (Pereyra hardly intervened) in the negotiations at Nerchinsk appears less significant than one would be led to believe by his words. "There was nobody," Gerbillon wrote, for example, "from the ambassador to the lowest soldiers, who did not proclaim loudly that the

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

success was due to us, and that without us this peace would never have been made."¹⁷⁷

The instructions with which the delegates of both sides had come to Nerchinsk were couched in a way that indicated that a virtual agreement had existed between them well before the conference. The orders of K'ang-hsi to his plenipotentiaries stated: "At the opening of the conference, you should try to retain *Ni-pu-chu* (Nerchinsk). But if they (the Russians) demand this town, you may draw the boundary along the Argun River."¹⁷⁸

Moscow, for its part, directed Golovin to demand, first, the Amur River as a frontier; if he could not obtain this, he was to fix the frontier at the tributaries Bistra and Zeya; or, as a last resort, to have it moved back to Albazin.¹⁷⁹ Through a secret *ukaznaia gramota* which Golovin received on September 30, 1687, i.e., two years before the conference, he was even authorized to yield Albazin, the forts of which would have had to be destroyed, in exchange for the opening of trade relations.¹⁸⁰

The two rivals had agreed, therefore, before the intervention of Father Gerbillon, to have the frontier run between Nerchinsk and Albazin and to return the latter town to the Chinese after destroying the forts. This was the first article of the treaty. Furthermore, the western frontier was to follow the Argun River. This was article two of the treaty. Naturally, the fact that the agreement already existed in the minds of the two parties did not prevent the conference from being conducted in the Oriental fashion: excessive demands on both sides, which were withdrawn the next day; attempts at intimidation by the use of military demonstrations; pretenses of breaking off, and preparations to depart.

In all this strife, the Jesuits acted as intermediaries; they often crossed the river to transmit from one camp to the other new demands and new objections; some-

THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

times they succeeded in brushing aside psychological obstacles which arose, but they produced no constructive idea of their own.

Undoubtedly it was necessary that the ideas which existed in the minds of the two delegations be formulated and stated precisely in terms acceptable to both parties, but in this phase of the conference the role of Gerbillon and Pereyra does not seem to have been any more considerable than, for example, the role of the Latin-Russian translator Andrei Bielobotsky. Gerbillon was a newcomer to China:¹⁸¹ he could not have known either Chinese or Manchu well. As to Pereyra, Gerbillon himself tells us that he did not know how to read Manchu.¹⁸² The Chinese plenipotentiaries were all Manchus and the first draft of the agreement, as has recently been shown by Walter Fuchs,¹⁸³ was written in Manchu.

Actually, the bases of the agreement of Nerchinsk had been laid well before the intervention of Father Gerbillon. Not only in regard to determination of frontiers, but on general questions of relations between China and Russia, the really constructive ideas which finally triumphed and permitted both countries, in spite of their seemingly irreconcilable ideologies, to meet and to negotiate on a basis of equality, originated with the work of documentation in which three men had collaborated: Krizhanich, Spathari, and Verbiest.

The Jesuit Fathers therefore accomplished their real historical mission in the domain of Sino-Russian relations as scientific collators more than as translators or inspirers of political action.

Their activity was not to end with the period which we have just reviewed, but was to extend for three quarters of a century longer until long after Nerchinsk. The works of inquiry which they were to undertake; the documents concerning China, the bordering countries, and

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

even Siberia, which they were to collect; the knowledge which they were to acquire concurrently of both European and Asiatic affairs were to make them for a long time valuable informants whose assistance was sought by China as well as Russia.

For Russia, they were, indeed, the first Orientalists and sinologists at a time when sinology hardly existed. For China, they were the first "Occidentalists" at a time when Chinese knowledge of the Occident was practically non-existent.

Their role was not an easy one and their actions were sometimes wrongly interpreted by their contemporaries. The diplomatic history of both countries, however, will gratefully preserve the names of Father Verbiest and Father Gerbillon (the latter for the period after Nerchinsk) and Father Perrenin, Father Gaubil, and Father Cibot, the latter three having been elected Corresponding Members of the Academy of Sciences of Moscow.

By contributing through their labors to better knowledge of both countries, the Jesuit Fathers enabled the two great rival powers to arrive at a much more correct valuation of one another and to maintain for many years in their relations a policy at once realistic and reasonable.

CONCERNING A STRANGE DOCUMENT

A FEW years ago, a very strange document was published in Peking by the National Palace Museum.¹⁸⁴ The document is a *nakaz* (instructions) given by the *vayvode* of Nerchinsk, Danilo Arshinsky, to the Cossack Ignatii Milovanov, who had been sent to Peking in 1670 for the special purpose of proposing to the Emperor K'ang-hsi no less than that the Emperor become a vassal of the Tsar. "The Great Sovereign," says the *nakaz*, "Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all of Great, Little, and White Russia, Master of numerous states, already retains under his supreme control several tsars and kings and their states, to whom His Majesty the Tsar grants favors and lends assistance. The Bogdoi Khan (Emperor of China) would do well likewise to beg for the protection of His Majesty the Tsar, of the Great Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Duke, etc., and to become a protégé under his supreme control. The Great Sovereign, Tsar, etc., then would lavish his favors on Bogdoi Khan, grant him his imperial protection, and defend him against all enemies. And the Bogdoi Khan, himself forever protected under the supreme control of His Majesty the Tsar, would pay a tribute to the Great Sovereign, while his subjects would trade freely with the Tsar's subjects to the profit of both states."

This document is unique in the annals of China's relations with foreign countries. We know that traditional Chinese ideology considered not only the countries immediately surrounding China but also distant states as natural tributaries of the Emperor of China. This conception, deeply rooted in Chinese civilization, crystallized

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

in the course of the centuries into a carefully elaborated system, of which a recent work remarks that, if we do not take it into consideration, ". . . it is impossible to understand China's relations with the Western world in the course of the last three centuries."¹⁸⁵ The Chinese conception naturally clashed with European theories and not only provoked constant collisions, but contributed much to the unleashing of the Sino-European wars of the 19th century. Nevertheless, in the course of all these conflicts, no western country, in its relations with the Chinese, would have put forward claims going farther than reciprocal equality.

The offer made to the Emperor of China that he submit to the protectorate of the Tsar of Moscow, therefore, is in every respect a fantastic idea, and it would be interesting to know what circumstances led to this offer being made and, especially, what China's reaction to it was.

The contents of the famous *nakaz*, or at least the part containing the absurd proposition, has been known to Russian historians for a long time. The Moscow archives, indeed, preserved the copy of this document which Milovanov himself, on his return from his mission with the answer of Emperor K'ang-hsi, delivered to Moscow in 1671, together with the report of the *vayvode* of Nerchinsk. As early as the end of the 18th century, Bantysh-Kamensky, who reproduced this document in his *Diplomatic Collection*,¹⁸⁶ was struck by its peculiar character. "Could such a proud court," he exclaimed, "as the Chinese court, receive calmly a call to submit which did not even come from the Tsar himself, but from his subject!" Bantysh-Kamensky, it should be noted, had access to only one copy of the document, and this an incomplete one, as we have been able to ascertain. The original, published in Peking, includes, in addition to the offer of a

CONCERNING A STRANGE DOCUMENT

protectorate, which was reproduced verbatim in the copy, other parts, which are omitted and a reading of which makes the Russian action appear even less comprehensible. Thus we find that the document makes mention of earlier Russian embassies to China: those of Baikov in 1656, and Yarishkin and Setkul-Ablin in 1659 -- which indicates that the *vayvode* of Nerchinsk was well aware of the previous Russian attempts at establishing relations with China, attempts which had failed not because of demands emanating from the Russian court, but precisely because of demands of the Chinese court that her neighbors be considered as vassal countries.

On the other hand, the original of the *nakaz* contains explanations regarding the case of Prince Gantimur, a Chinese subject who had gone over to the Russian side with his entire tribe and who was claimed by China as her subject,¹⁸⁷ and also regarding the activity of the Cossacks at Albazin, who were mistreating Chinese subjects at the border. These explanations, presented by way of excuse, do not square with the simultaneous proposition made to the Emperor of China that he submit to Russia. All of these new details, revealed by the publication of the complete text of the *nakaz*, do not facilitate a more exact understanding of this strange document.

Nevertheless, they elucidate another aspect of this affair which has for a long time been obscure. We know that the letter of Emperor K'ang-hsi brought back by Milovanov notes the explanations furnished by "Danilo" (the *vayvode* Danilo Arshinsky) regarding the questions of Gantimur and the Cossacks of Albazin; it is precisely these two points that do not appear in the copy of the *nakaz* delivered to Moscow by Milovanov. On the other hand, K'ang-hsi's reply does not contain one word on the subject of an offer of vassalage made to him.¹⁸⁸ From this it was easy to conclude that, contrary to Milovanov's

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

"statement" concerning it,¹⁸⁹ the famous *nakaz* had undoubtedly not been conveyed to the Chinese court. This assumption was all the more logical since the document in question was not, strictly speaking, a message addressed to the Emperor, but instructions given to the Russian emissary, who was to make his declaration orally.¹⁹⁰ Now that the original of the *nakaz* in the archives of the Imperial Palace in Peking has been discovered and the complete text is known to us, this hypothesis falls. We are forced to admit that the document was actually delivered to the Chinese court and the K'ang-hsi's letter on the question of Gantimur and the Cossacks of Albazin was, indeed, the answer to it.

It is no less true that K'ang-hsi's answer entirely ignored the first section of the *nakaz*, which contained the offer of a protectorate. Are we, then, obliged to return to the old hypothesis of Bantysh-Kamensky, which supposed that the Chinese court had no knowledge of this offer? "It seems," Bantysh-Kamensky wrote, "that the Chinese ministers did not dare to report the *nakaz* to the Bogdoi Khan (Emperor of China), or else that the Jesuits, in their translation, caused the detrimental import to disappear". The latter suggestion must be ruled out; there can be no question as to the fact that Jesuits did not intervene in this affair. The document in question was written in Russian, a language the Fathers did not know, and it has been shown that the role of the Jesuits as interpreters in Sino-Russian relations did not begin until six years later, with the arrival of Spathari's embassy in Peking (1676), when Latin was adopted as the intermediary language by the two countries.

The editors of the document collection of the Peking Palace deemed it necessary to furnish an explanation of the famous document and the results which it produced. Lu Tsi-jen, in the introduction to the collection, rightly

CONCERNING A STRANGE DOCUMENT

points out that one cannot plead complete ignorance of China on the part of Russia at the time the latter took the strange step that she did. Not only Moscow, but the *vayvode* of Nerchinsk, the author of the document, knew the reasons for the failure of previous Russian embassies to Peking. How, then, can we explain his *nakaz*? Did the *vayvode* note a weakening in China's intransigent attitude, and did he believe this was an opportune moment to call not only for relations on the basis of reciprocal equality (which had been obstinately refused by China up to that time), but the outright submission of the Emperor to the protectorate of the Tsar of Moscow? Lu Tsi-jen seems to be inclined towards this explanation. He recalls the circumstances under which Milovanov's mission had been sent to China: the Chinese officials had arrived in Nerchinsk to demand the return of Gantimur and had brought with them a letter from the Emperor. "It would seem," says the author of the Introduction, "that this letter, as well as the successes of Russian expansion on the Amur River, served the Russian *vayvode* as a pretext for proposing to the Chinese Emperor that he place himself under the protection of the Tsar."¹⁹¹

It is difficult to accept this explanation. We have no definite information concerning the alleged letter of the Emperor which was supposed to have been brought to Nerchinsk by the Chinese officials prior to the arrival of Milovanov's mission. Neither the original nor a translation of this letter has been recovered; there is no mention of it in any later document; neither does it figure among the four Chinese documents which Spathari took to Peking to be translated.¹⁹² The only allusion to this subject is contained in a report to Moscow made by the *Vayvode* Arshinsky, dated February 18, 1671, in which it is said that "... there came to Nerchinsk Fort from the river Shingal (Sungari), as envoys from the

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Bogdoi Tsar (Emperor of China), nine men in all, and they brought a letter, saying that it was from the Bogdoi Tsar." Arshinsky reported that he accepted this letter and translated it into the Tangut (sic!) language, "but whether the translation is correct or not he cannot say, for in Nerchinsk there are no interpreters." Baddcley remarks in regard to this: "That Arshinsky, having no interpreters, nevertheless translated K'ang-hsi's missive into Tangutan (Tibetan) is very strange! There is undoubtedly some mystification here."¹⁹³ To seek the reason for Arshinsky's extraordinary demarche in the fact of the successes of the Russian expansion on the Amur River is even less justified than to seek it in a supposed letter of the Emperor. As a matter of fact, around 1670 this expansion had declined in comparison to the preceding period, when the expeditions of Khabarov, Stepanov, and Nagiba had succeeded in establishing *ostrogs* all along the Amur River and its tributaries, especially on the Zeya. This first wave of the Russian expansion, which emanated from Yakutsk as the center, was broken in 1670 by the Chinese counter-offensive. "By 1671 nearly the whole of the Amur had been abandoned by the Russians," says Baddeley.¹⁹⁴ It is true that in the interval another wave, much less important, coming from the Baikal, reached the Shilka River and founded Nerchinsk as a new administrative center. But on the Amur River proper, the Russian advance was halted until 1682, when a new surge of expansion began, which was ended, as we know, by the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. It is likewise true that shortly before 1670 Albazin was retaken and reconstructed by Nikifor Chernigovsky. But Chernigovsky was a rebel; he had fled with several Cossacks from Ilimsk, where they had killed the *Vayvode* Obukhov, and his relations with the Russian authorities were not straightened out until 1675 when, after being condem-

CONCERNING A STRANGE DOCUMENT

ned to death by Moscow, he was finally pardoned. In 1670, Russia's position on the Amur River could hardly have served as the *vayvode's* pretext for making his insolent demarche.

Furthermore, it is well established that Milovanov's mission was sent to Peking not at the initiative of Arshinsky, but at the demand of Chinese mandarins. This is confirmed in the report of Arshinsky himself, as well as in the "statement" of Milovanov in Moscow. What circumstances could have led the Chinese to send emissaries to Nerchinsk? Was this act really a sign of weakness in the Peking government? We know now that this was not so. It was a simple reconnaissance skilfully carried out by the Chinese military expedition which was preparing to attack the new center of Russian expansion and which had advanced a distance of two days' march.

Spathari's *stateini spisok* gives us the details. The methodical Spathari, as we know, cleared up a good many obscure questions of the early period of Sino-Russian relations. Before he departed for China he had informed himself on the embassies and mission which had preceded him; in Moscow he spoke with Arshinsky; in Tobolsk and Nerchinsk he rounded out his knowledge; he added to his retinue the bearer of the famous *nakaz* and the reply of the Emperor K'ang-hsi—Milovanov himself. Spathari, therefore, was especially well informed concerning Milovanov's mission and the causes which had brought it about; all the circumstances, moreover, were frequently discussed in the conversations which he had with the Chinese ministers. Spathari pretended that unlike the embassies of Baikov, Perfiliev, and Setkul-Ablin which were sent at the initiative of the Russian court, his embassy was the result only of the request of the Chinese court. Milovanov, who had been invited to Peking by the Chinese mandarins, had indeed brought with

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

him a letter from the Emperor (written in Manchu and therefore undecipherable by the Russians) as well as presents which he had been given for the Tsar, which gave proof of the desire of the Chinese court to revive the relations which had been interrupted after the failure of the previous embassies. It so happened that the *Askaniama* Mala,¹⁹¹ who had come to meet Spathari in Naun (Tsitsikhar) and with whom Spathari had negotiated in Peking, was the same mandarin who, six years earlier, in 1670, had brought Milovanov to Peking. This is Mala's explanation, given through Father Verbiest, of the Chinese demarche. "At the time that Baikov, Tarutin, Setkul, and others came to China," said Mala, "Cossacks were invading the Amur River and ravaging the regions belonging to tribes subject to China. It was pointed out to the ambassadors each time that the conduct of the Cossacks was grossly inconsistent with the declarations of friendship emanating from Moscow. To this they invariably replied that those on the Amur River were irregulars and unruly elements (*вори*), who were acting without the Tsar's authorization."

It should be noted that this explanation of the Russian envoys was not a mere diplomatic subterfuge; it was not far from the truth and corresponded, besides, to the ideas which the Chinese themselves had formed concerning this matter. We know that the Cossacks who founded *ostrogs* on the Amur River were called *lo-ch'a*¹⁹⁶ by the Chinese as distinguished from *O-lo-ssu*,¹⁹⁷ which referred to Russians who were subjects of the Shagan Khan (the White Khan, that is, the Tsar), whose dominion was situated far away in the northwest and whose emissaries, in order to get to Peking, had to travel a long way, going up the Irtysh to get through Chinese Turkestan, Mongolia, and the Gobi desert. "Upon the order of the Emperor," Mala continued, "our forces, despatched

CONCERNING A STRANGE DOCUMENT

by water and land routes, succeeded in rapidly exterminating the *lo-ch'a*. But some years later, when Gantimur, a subject of the Emperor, fled with his men to Nerchinsk, His Majesty learned to his surprise that the Russians had set up there a new center of expansion on the Shilka River. Nagai Timor was ordered to advance on Nerchinsk with six thousand men and ten cannon." Whether the Russians at the Shilka River were the *lo-ch'a* who formerly came from the north, starting from Yakutsk, or this time the *O-lo-ssu*, coming from the west, was a question of great importance. Occupied in suppressing riots in the south, China was still able to undertake a local expedition against the *lo-ch'a*, but was not anxious to enter into a major conflict with Moscow. Therefore, Ma-la, who at that time had only the rank of *zarguchei* (secretary), was sent to Nagai Timor in Naun in order to clear up this question. "A Daur was sent to Nerchinsk to see Gantimur and to inform himself through Gantimur as to the origin and the conditions of his new protectors."¹⁹⁸ The Daur was taken by Gantimur to Arshinsky, who received him well and told him that "he and his men were not *lo-ch'a*, but regular subjects of the White Tsar, that the *ostrogs* in Nerchinsk and Albazin had been constructed at the order of the Sovereign. [Here Arshinsky probably exaggerated. It should be pointed out that while Moscow preferred to deny any connection with the Cossacks on the Amur River, and often disavowed even its own *vayvodes*, it was to the interest of the latter to shield themselves with the authority of the Tsar, so that to each Chinese demand they replied that they would refer it to Moscow]. The *ostrogs*, the Daur was told, were established not with a view to attack, but merely to supervise the levying of the *yasack* (tribute) on the subdued peoples; finally, that the Tsar wanted to live in friendship with the Bogdoi Khan and to develop trade

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

relations with China. The Daur was released and was free to join the Chinese troops, which were now only two days' march from Nerchinsk. Mala at once transmitted the information obtained to Peking and advised that since the men in the *ostrogs* on the Amur were really subjects of the Tsar, the dispute be settled by peaceful means. It was at this moment that K'ang-hsi issued the order to hurry Mangutai to Nerchinsk with the request that the Russian emissaries come to Peking to receive a letter from the Emperor to the Tsar. In fact, ten Cossacks, with Milovanov at their head, were brought back to Nerchinsk by Mangutai, and it was Mala himself who accompanied them from Naun to the capital. There they were received by the Emperor, who delivered to them his letter for the Tsar, after which they were sent back to Nerchinsk, still followed by Mangutai. The letter contained the request for Gantimur's extradition, but its primary purpose was to make sure that the Nerchinsk people really were subjects of Moscow.¹⁹⁹

This was the origin of Milovanov's mission. The version of the *Askaniama* Mala is corroborated by numerous later documents, since the Chinese, in their notes addressed to Moscow, often went back to the origin of the disputes concerning the Amur River region.²⁰⁰ This version was likewise accepted by Spathari.

But if Milovanov was invited to Peking only to pick up a letter for the Tsar, where did the idea come from to entrust him on this occasion with the mission of offering a Russian protectorate to the Emperor of China? To begin with, it should be stated that the *Vayvode* Arshinsky acted in this instance without the knowledge of Moscow which, when it learned of the action through his report, removed him from his post. The report of the unfortunate *vayvode* shows, moreover, that he was quite aware that he had exceeded his authority since, accord-

CONCERNING A STRANGE DOCUMENT

ing to Spathari,²⁰¹ he did not have the right to undertake diplomatic relations with China without precise instructions from Moscow. Obviously, however, the request of the Chinese mandarins had caught him unawares; he did not dare to refuse it, knowing that Chinese troops were advancing on Nerchinsk; on the other hand, he wanted to shield himself behind Moscow's authority and be able to act, as his *nakaz* says, "according to the *ukaz* of the Tsar." Now, the only document at his disposal which appeared to give him a prerogative was an old *nakaz* which had been delivered by the Tsar to Arshinsky's predecessor, the *Vayvode* Pashkov. In his report, Arshinsky stated frankly that in the instructions for Milovanov he had simply copied the *nakaz* to Pashkov. (He took care not to say that he had added explanations concerning Gantimur and the Cossacks of Albazin, which apparently explains why this part of the document was omitted in the copy presented to Moscow).

Now, which *nakaz* was it that the Tsar gave to *Vayvode* Pashkov? Bantysh-Kamensky, in publishing this part of Arshinsky's report, remarked that this *nakaz* was not found in the archives. Baddeley, reproducing Bantysh-Kamensky's remark, confirmed that the exact text of the *nakaz* in question is unknown. But what had been true in Bantysh-Kamensky's time was no longer true in Baddeley's time. The original of this *nakaz* had in fact been discovered among the family of Pashkov and published at the end of the 19th century.²⁰² It is true that this publication of the *nakaz* passed almost unnoticed during Baddeley's time. We are indebted to a young French scholar, Pierre Pascal, for having rescued this document from oblivion. In the course of research in the Moscow archives in connection with his noteworthy work on the Raskol,²⁰³ Pascal became interested in the

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Pashkov history. One of the main figures of the Raskol, the Protopope Avvakum, who had been exiled to Siberia, was indeed attached to Pashkov's expedition in 1655, when the latter was entrusted with the mission of subjugating tribes of Transbaikalia. Thus Pascal recovered the *nakaz* given to Pashkov on this occasion, which contained, among other things, "the speeches to be made to the native chiefs of the Daur, Ducher, Gilyak, etc." It was the text of these speeches that the *Vayvode* Arshinsky, lacking other official instructions, did not hesitate to insert in the preamble of his *nakaz* given to Milovanov, as speeches to be made to the Emperor of China! Thus the enigma, which has for so long puzzled the historians, may be solved. The strange document of 1670 did not at all reflect Moscow's policy, nor was it the result of a well thought out plan of the *vayvode* of Nerchinsk; it was simply an enormous blunder made by the latter.

We may ask why this blunder of Arshinsky's had no troublesome consequences for Moscow and for the Russian emissary himself. We cannot acquiesce in the belief of the author of the *Introduction to the Documents in Russian Preserved in the National Palace Museum in Peking* that the arrogant offer resulted only in "Milovanov's detention under armed guard in Peking for a fortnight, after which he was sent back to Nerchinsk, accompanied by a mandarin who carried a new letter concerning Gantimur and presents for the Tsar."²⁰⁴ The treatment accorded Milovanov was not exceptional. All envoys, ambassadors, and couriers who came to Peking were, as we know, received in the same manner. Baikov and Spathari, Ides and Izmailov, the Portuguese and Dutch ambassadors, up to the English ambassadors at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries all were on their arrival in Peking confined in

CONCERNING A STRANGE DOCUMENT

the building assigned to them and were kept in military custody; in advance of their imperial audience they could not leave the building without a special permit and without an escort. Milovanov himself, who had come back to Peking six years after his first trip, to announce the arrival of Spathari's embassy, was detained in military custody for four weeks.²⁰⁵ On the contrary, we can say that Milovanov in 1670 was much more cordially welcomed and better treated than all other Russian emissaries to Peking both before and after him. In fact, he was the first Russian to be admitted to an audience with the Emperor, from whom he received presents and a letter for the Tsar; on his return to Russia he was accompanied by mandarins not to the border, as was the custom in the case of Russian envoys, but as far as Nerchinsk. Bantysh-Kamensky rightly asks: "How could the Bogdoi Khan receive emissaries who brought such an offensive proposition, treat them so well, and send them back with honors?" His supposition that the offensive part of the *nakaz* had been suppressed when this document was translated still remains the most logical one. But who could have been able to suppress this part of the document so that the document was not only inoffensive but actually favorable to China? We have sought in vain in the official Chinese records for an answer to this question. The *Shih-lu*, as well as the *Tung-hua lu* are completely silent on Milovanov's mission; they do not mention any Russian envoy to Peking in 1670, i.e., in the ninth year of K'ang-hsi. This should not surprise us since the Chinese records are not much concerned with diplomatic relations; most detailed and precise when discussing armed conflicts, they ignore or classify among miscellaneous events the arrivals of ambassadors from foreign countries; thus the *Shih-lu* devotes only three lines to the Dutch embassy of Goyer

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

and Keyser of 1655, concerning which Nieuhoff left us an entire volume which was at once translated into several languages;²⁰⁶ another important embassy, that of Izmailov in 1719, the details of which have become known to the whole world thanks to the noteworthy account by J. Bell, a Scottish physician attached to this embassy,²⁰⁷ is not mentioned there at all.

Fortunately this writer with the help of Professor Kao Kien-long, of the University l'Aurore has been able to find an important piece of testimony concerning Milovanov's mission in the writings of a contemporary of that period, Chang Yu-shu, a great minister and celebrated *litterateur* of the reign of K'ang-hsi.²⁰⁸ The well known collection, *Chao-tai ts'ung-shu*²⁰⁹ contains Chang's work, *Wai-kuo chi*,²¹⁰ in which the following passage, is found:

"In the fourth month of the ninth year (of K'ang-hsi), Russia sent an envoy to present his *piao* (official letter) as a sign of submission (sic!), but the text of it was incomprehensible; the script went from the bottom to the top, like the Taoists' charm seals [a form of Chinese writing]. Therefore, their [the Russians'] envoy was summoned to translate the document in order to present it [to the Emperor]."

Thus the old maxim "*Is fecit cui prodest*" was once again confirmed. Who was the most interested in avoiding a violent reaction on the part of the Chinese to the arrogant proposition if not the emissary himself, who was in their hands! Consequently it was Milovanov who had the good sense to give (probably through his Mongol interpreter, who under the name of *tolmach* Afanasii Fedorov appears in the list of Milovanov's retinue) such a translation of the *nakaz* that not only did the dangerous passage disappear, but the entire document was transformed into a *piao* and presented as a

CONCERNING A STRANGE DOCUMENT

"sign of submission!" The Cossack Ignatii Milovanov must undoubtedly have had real diplomatic talent. His capabilities, moreover, must quickly have been appreciated, since thenceforth he was often utilized in the various missions. Moscow, which undoubtedly was delighted with the way things had gone, promoted him to *centurion*, and he was attached to Spathari's embassy in 1676. It was again he who went to Peking in advance of Spathari to announce the ambassador's arrival, and he who returned to Moscow with the latter's first report to the Tsar.²¹¹ Later, in 1682, we find him raised to the nobility as *syn boyarski* [boyar's son] and on a mission on the Zeya River, entrusted with agricultural colonization of the region; of this mission he has left us a detailed account, accompanied by a map which was the first to show the tributaries of the Amur River.

Such is the history of the strange document which had been the subject of an extended controversy in Russian historical literature and which can now at least be elucidated, thanks to recent publications: the complete text of the document, published by the Imperial Palace Museum of Peking; the text of the *nakaz* to the *Vayvode* Pashkov, which was not known to Baddeley but was rediscovered by Pierre Pascal; and, finally, the testimony of the Chinese minister, Chang Yu-shu, of which we have just given the translation.

Can we be sure, however, that the Chinese court never learned the exact import of the document in its possession; that the blunder of the *Vayvode* Arshinsky was not only dissembled momentarily, by the skill of the Cossack Milovanov, but had no subsequent effect on Sino-Russian relations? This writer, although he does not have precise information, does not dare to affirm it.

Milovanov's *coup* was audacious and not without risk.

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

In his "statement" he had revealed that there were at that time in Peking some "Russian traitors," emigres who knew the Chinese language, who were married to Chinese women, and who were employed in the service of the Emperor. Two of these emigres, "Anashka" Uruslanov and "Pakhomka," had even come to see the Russian emissary at his residence.²¹² Fortunately for Milovanov, the Chinese during his stay obviously had had no recourse to these emigres for the translation of the Russian text. But what of later? In 1676 this same Milovanov, as has been said, was again in Peking; he brought with him a recent document of Arshinsky's successor, Pavel Shulgin, announcing the imminent arrival of the ambassador Spathari. "This *nakaz*," Milovanov tells us, "was forcibly taken away from me by the Chinese and translated by the Russian traitors, and the translating was done in the presence of the Emperor himself."²¹³ Spathari affirms that there were already at that time thirteen Russian emigres in Peking, all in the service of the Emperor, and "one of these traitors, a man versed in Russian and Chinese, was employed in the *Li-fan-yüan* for Russian matters." Spathari was highly mistrustful of these emigres; when the *Askaniama* suggested to him that he write a memorandum in Russian concerning the matters he wished to discuss, Spathari categorically refused, nor did he hide his reasons for doing so. "There are present here several Russian traitors," he said, "to whom they certainly would turn to translate my writings, and these people, by their very nature as traitors, certainly would give an inexact translation in order to create disputes and harm the good relations existing between our two sovereigns."²¹⁴ Now Spathari, as we know, brought to Peking the letter of K'ang-hsi which had been delivered to Milovanov, which Moscow pretended not to be able to decipher, and which

CONCERNING A STRANGE DOCUMENT

it had returned to the Chinese for translation. Could it not have been that, with their habit of reconstructing the historical record of each affair they dealt with, the Chinese had unearthed the famous document, to which the letter brought back by Spathari constituted the reply, and had had it translated by the Russian official of the *Li-fan-yüan*?

This is only a conjecture, but, if accepted, it would explain rather satisfactorily several obscure facts concerning Spathari's mission. The discovery of the exact meaning of Milovanov's demarche must certainly have dismayed the Chinese. The mere acceptance of a document of this character was already a serious blow to the Emperor's prestige; to have replied to the document in a letter from the court was even more humiliating. We know that the letter was kept by the Chinese, who refused to return it to Spathari. Why? No explanation was given. Father Verbiest, who was called upon to translate it into Latin, was given a formal order not to inform Spathari of the translation. Spathari, after giving orders to "close all doors and windows and let nobody enter, begged the Father to tell him the contents, at least orally. The Father finally yielded, but demanded that it be kept an absolute secret, since if the Chinese learned of it he would lose his head."²¹⁵ No explanation of this prohibition could be given, either by Spathari or by Father Verbiest. But, strange coincidence!—the attitude of the Chinese towards the Russian ambassador changed abruptly. On his arrival in Peking, Spathari had been well received; the Emperor several times received him in audience and invited him often to court dinners; he even had his portrait painted by order of the Emperor. Then, suddenly, Spathari became *persona non grata* and pretexts were sought to drive him from Peking. The court protocol, at first applied only mildly to the Russian am-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

bassador, suddenly began to be rigorously observed. The ambassador was summoned to court on a rainy day, was obliged to wait outside for a whole day, and was given the order to kneel in the mud in order to receive the presents for the Tsar. Spathari's refusal brought about the end of his mission. Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain this sudden change in the Chinese attitude. Spathari himself gives no explanation of it at all; the accusations raised against him by certain members of his embassy, especially by Milovanov, were not substantiated. Some charged the ambassador of Moscow with dealing in precious stones in Peking, when he bought a ruby for the Tsar; others accused the members of the mission of bad conduct and drunkenness; we may likewise suppose that Spathari roused the suspicion of the Chinese through the relations that he tried to establish with the Kalmyk emissaries who had come to Peking. All these are explanations which the documents do not at all confirm.

The supposition that the Chinese court discovered the real sense of the *nakaz* of 1670 could, in our opinion, be placed legitimately side by side with the hypotheses advanced to explain the failure of Spathari's mission.

RUSSIAN EMIGRES IN CHINA AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

AMONG the still obscure chapters relating to early relations between Russia and China, there is one which holds especial interest for historians. It concerns the emigres — the Russian prisoners or deserters — referred to collectively, if somewhat inaccurately, as "Albazinians," i.e., "defenders of Albazin," who, after surrendering to the Chinese, were brought to Peking to be employed in the service of the Emperor.

The presence of a large number of Russians in the Chinese capital at a time when access to it by any foreigner was made so difficult is a most interesting phenomenon in itself, but interest is added by the fact of the completely unexpected historical consequences. Although these deserters and prisoners (for whose exchange the Treaty of Nerchinsk made no provision) should normally have been considered by Russia as renegades, even traitors, Russia quaintly claimed the right of religious protection over them, as former subjects.

This clever policy was first conceived and then applied by Peter the Great. Within a few years it resulted in the establishment of a permanent Russian mission in Peking, which was called the "Ecclesiastic and Diplomatic Mission"; this mission was already in existence in 1716, during the reign of K'ang-hsi, and its status was officially recognized by the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727) which was concluded during the reign of Yung-ch'eng (1723-1735), at the very time when, by order of this emperor, Christians were being persecuted and most of the Jesuits exiled.

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

From this time on and until the establishment of foreign legations in Peking in 1860 (more than one hundred and thirty years), the Russian mission was the only European representation in China.

We are poorly informed concerning the events which led to these important results, since many details of the Russian colony, which served as a pretext for Russia's claims, and of the circumstances surrounding the formation and status of the "Russian Company" are unknown.²¹⁶

Gaston Cahen whose scrupulous exactness in research is well known, in 1912 expressed himself as follows on this subject: "The fact that Chinese troops, in their conflicts with the Russians on the Amur River and its tributaries during the last years of the 17th century, took prisoners and brought them to Peking during the various sieges of Albazin and other places, probable in itself, is confirmed by more than one piece of testimony. But the certainty vanishes as soon as we try to go further into the details of the events. What was the number of these captured Russian soldiers? What were the names of the personages, the military and religious chiefs? How did they settle in Peking?"²¹⁷

In an endeavor to answer these various questions,, the writer, with the kind cooperation of Kao Kien-long, Professor in the Aurora University, Shanghai, has explored the Chinese sources.

Up to only a few decades ago, documents in Chinese constituted a domain reserved to the linguists-sinologists who were concerned with the "historical texts" as merely specimens of the official style. Today, thanks to the collaboration among Chinese and non-Chinese students, more fruitful results are obtainable especially in the field of China's relations with foreign countries, in the study of

RUSSIAN EMIGRES IN CHINA

which, however, Chinese and foreign sources must be compared and found to be mutually complementary.

Even if the language barrier can be overcome without too much difficulty, the voluminousness of the accessible Chinese historical literature still constitutes the greatest difficulty on the path of research. "The Chinese write much," Maurice Courant remarked in this connection;²¹⁸ "they are perhaps the people who wrote the most." Concerning the last three centuries, during which China's relations with the modern Occident were being gradually established, there are a considerable number of works—travel diaries, memoirs, and narratives—but real historical documents are rare, scattered, and of uneven value. It was only twenty years ago that the collection and publication of the Archives of the Imperial Palace in Peking, relating to the last dynasty, was begun, and the undertaking was interrupted by the events of 1937; the published collection, although lacking notes or commentaries, are a precious source of material on Chinese foreign relations; unfortunately, however, they relate almost exclusively to the 19th century.

To make up for this, we have annals, official chronicles, and non-official compilations covering the 17th and 18th centuries. The *Tung-hua lu*,²¹⁹ published during the second half of the 19th century by Wang Hsien-ch'ien,²²⁰ a mandarin of the State Historiographer's Office of the Tung-hua Gate (the great east gate of the Palace area) in Peking, contains a series of edicts, decrees, petitions, memoirs or official reports, arranged in chronological order, from 1583 to 1875.²²¹ In another official publication, the *Shêng-hsün*²²² or "Sacred Teachings," many documents of this kind are found but, instead of being arranged chronologically, they are arranged according to subject. The most considerable collection of documents has become accessible through the edition, brought out

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

in 1937 by the government of Manchukuo of the *Ch'ing Shih-lu*,²²³ "Veritable Records," or official accounts, of the principal events which occurred under each reign of the last dynasty, arranged in chronological order. These three works in themselves constitute an enormous literature comprising several thousand volumes;²²⁴ the documents concerning China's foreign relations are buried in a mass of valueless chapters, such as diaries of petty events of court life; there is no index to help us find our way in it.

In this immense ocean of historical literature, the approach to which naturally intimidates every explorer, there are, fortunately, a few small islands: these are the special collections in which texts and excerpts of documents have already been brought together and arranged in groups.

Thus, concerning China's relations with the Mongols, Dzungars, and Russians, a collection called *Shuo-fang pei-shêng*²²⁵ (Historical Source Book of the Northern Regions) collates previous works and reproduces geographical and historical texts on the subject of these peoples; its authors were Ho Ch'iu-t'ao²²⁶ and Kuo Sung-tao,²²⁷ who presented their work to the Emperor in 1858 and received flattering honors.²²⁸

In the section of this collection concerning Russia, in addition to ancient writings, some of which were translated into foreign languages, there are others less well known in the Occident. The most frequently used is the *I-yu lu*,²²⁹ an account of the Chinese embassy sent in 1713-14 across Siberia and the Volga to the Khan of the Torguts, Ayuki. Then comes the *P'ing-ting Lo-ch'a tang-lüeh*,²³⁰ an important official publication relating to the campaigns against the Russians before the Treaty of Nerchinsk. Besides these works, originally written in Chinese, there are translations into Chinese of older

RUSSIAN EMIGRES IN CHINA

works in foreign languages, such as that of Father Verbiest relating to Muscovy and Poland, and the *Description du Monde*, by Father Jules Aleni, dated 1621. In particular, there are certain treatises which were written by the editors of the collection, such as the one on trade with Russia, and one on the Sino-Russian schools established in Peking at the beginning of the 18th century (O-lo-ssu-kuan, where the Russians learned Chinese, and O-lo-ssu-hsüeh, where Chinese learned Russian); these treatises have the merit of indicating precisely the sources used, and often they reproduce texts, excerpts of ancient works, and archive specimens.

Some works of fantasy are also to be found, such as the "Notes Taken under the Roof while the Sun is High" (*Yen-p'u tsa-chi*), the author of which is Chao I (1727-1814), a great poet and famous statesman under the reign of Ch'ien-lung.²³¹ Another poet, Sun Yung, glorified the emperors for their policy of "pacifying the Russians"; his verses, written in 1823, are, oddly enough, quoted by Ho Ch'iu-t'ao, the editor of the "Historical Source Book of the Northern Regions," as founded upon accurate historical documents.

The title of one of these documents (*Feng-shih O-lo-ssu hsing-ch'eng lu*), when this writer first encountered it, aroused his interest. It contains the account of the journey of a certain Chang P'êng-ko (1649-1725), who accompanied the members of the delegation to the Conference of Nerchinsk. It was possible to identify the author with the help of the *Shih-lu* which, under date of the 26th day, 3rd month of the 27th year (April 26, 1688) relates that the Emperor sent Chang P'êng-ko, an official of the Court of Judicature and Revision, to Russia to participate in the conference.²³² Thus, finally, we may have the testimony of a Chinese member of this conference concerning which only the famous diary of

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Father Gerbillon and the *stateini spisok* of Golovin (still preserved in manuscript in the Moscow archives) are known, and which are the only accounts left by the negotiators of Nerchinsk! But disappointment is in store. By order of the Emperor, Chang P'êng-ko had to return before reaching Nerchinsk, and his work contains only a description of the journey up to the Russian frontier.

It was among these very scattered parts of the *Shuo-fang pei-shêng* that there was finally found a treatise directly on the subject with which we are occupied here. It was written in 1833 and bears the title *O-lo-ssu tso-ling k'ao*,²³³ (Researches on the Russian Company); it is a very interesting condensed study giving an historical account of the Russian detachment since its establishment under the reign of K'ang-hsi, and reproducing texts and documents drawn from various contemporaneous sources. A complete translation of it will be found below. In spite of the dryness of its style, it is extremely interesting, since it is a rare, if not the only, Chinese monograph on the subject of the Russian emigres of the 17th century.

The author of the memoir was Yu Chêng-hsieh²³⁴ (1775-1840), a native of Anhwei Province, who became a *chü-jên* (second degree graduate, i.e., M.A.) under the reign of Tao-kuang and who is known as a great scholar. He had arrived in the capital in 1805, at the time that the great Russian embassy of Count Golovkin²³⁵ was expected there, and he was commissioned to prepare a "Compilation on affairs regarding Russia," which in spite of some inaccuracies and other defects is often quoted by Chinese historians. His study relating to the Russian Company is part of another work bearing the title "Various Articles of the Year Kuei-ssu" (Kuei-ssu lei-kao) (thirteenth year of Tao-kuang, 1833).

The main sources used by Yu Chêng-hsieh were:

- (1) *Pa-ch'i t'ung chih*,²³⁶ or "Annals of the Eight

RUSSIAN EMIGRES IN CHINA

Banners." This is a well-known official publication on the subject of the origin and status of the Manchu army which had been organized by the first sovereigns of the Ch'ing dynasty into eight corps or "banners." These Annals consist of two hundred and fifty *chüan* (chapters), combined into twenty-four sections; they were begun by order of the Emperor in the 5th year of Yung-chêng (1727) and finished in the 4th year of Ch'ien-lung (1739). There is a Russian translation of them by one of the first Russian sinologists, A. Leontyev, and published in sixteen volumes as early as 1786 by the Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg. Later they were made wide use of by T. F. Wade in his classical work, *The Army of the Chinese Empire*, published in 1851.

(2) *P'ing-ting Lo-ch'a fang-lüeh*, or "The Method of Pacifying the Lo-ch'a." This work, of an official character, already mentioned above, is included in the compilation *Shuo-fang pei-shêng*, where the study by Yu Chêng-hsieh is found. The term *Lo-ch'a* is here used to designate the Russian irregular detachments whom the Chinese met on the Amur River (the usual name of Russians generally was *O-lo-ssu*). The origin of the term *Lo-ch'a* has been much discussed. Some consider it only as a transcription of the Russian word *lovchi*, meaning "hunter"; which may be explained, they say, by the fact that the Russian detachments on the Amur River, in addition to Cossacks, were composed of hunters. Others—and their opinion is shared by P. Pelliot—give to this term a pejorative sense by seeing in the *Lo-ch'a* an assimilation of the new invaders with the *Lo-ch'a* of the Sino-Indian pantheon, i.e., to the Rakshas (demons who devour men).²³⁷ It is interesting to note that the latter hypothesis was presented as early as 1806 by the author Yu Chêng-hsieh, but it was opposed by Ho Ch'iu-t'ao, the editor of the *Shuo-fang pei-shêng*. However this may

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

be, the *P'ing-ting Lo-ch'a fang-lüeh* is one of the most important sources relating to the Sino-Russian conflicts which brought about the Treaty of Nerehinsk, since it contains the most complete collection of official documents of that period, arranged in chronological order.²³⁸ Since the publication of the *Shih-lu* ("Veritable Records") in 1937, it has been confirmed that most of the edicts, decrees, memoirs, and other documents contained in the *P'ing-ting Lo-ch'a fang-lüeh* are found in the *Shih-lu* word for word or in only slightly modified form.

One might ask, which of these two collections is the older? If the *P'ing-ting Lo-ch'a fang-lüeh* itself furnishes no indication as to the date of its composition,²³⁹ the *Shih-lu* can shed light on the subject. Indeed, on the 11th day of the 9th month of the 24th year of K'ang-hsi (October 8, 1685),²⁴⁰ the Emperor approved the report of the Dean of the Academy (Hanlin) in which it was proposed, on the occasion of the seizure of Yaksa (Albazin), to write the *Fang-lüeh* (military history) of the campaign against the *Lo-ch'a*. Since the *Shih-lu* on the reign of K'ang-hsi was not written until after the death of the Emperor (1722), it follows that the *P'ing-ting Lo-ch'a fang-lüeh* is an earlier source than the *Shih-lu*.

(3) *Shêng-hsün*, or "Sacred Teachings." This comprehensive official publication, likewise mentioned above, contains several hundred *chüan* (chapters), with the documents of each reign of the preceding dynasty arranged according to subject matter, but containing little data on China's relations with foreign countries. The part concerning K'ang-hsi's reign has been used by Yu Chêng-hsieh; it consists of sixty *chüan*, grouped in thirty-two sections, one of which, with the title "Pacification of the People from Afar,"²⁴¹ concerns mainly the Mongols. The few texts found there which relate to the Russians appear in a more complete form in the *Shih-lu*. This con-

RUSSIAN EMIGRES IN CHINA

formity should not surprise us, since both the *Shih-lu* and the *Shêng-hsün* were written in a parallel way under each reign, and their simultaneous completion was marked by special ceremonies, since both were considered as accounts of the fulfillment of the mandate received from Heaven by each emperor. The compilations—and especially the *Shih-lu*—were venerated as sacred objects, but while the “Sacred Teachings” were intended for the public, the “Veritable Records” were written for the Emperor only, in five copies, one of which was sent to the Mukden palace and the others carefully kept in the Peking archives. It was the sovereign’s duty to have one *chüan* of his predecessor’s *Shih-lu* read to him every day in order that he might acquaint himself with the conduct of state affairs.²⁴²

In addition to these three main collections of documents, Yü Chêng-hsieh quotes in his study some sources of lesser importance, such as the “Annals of Jehol,” written by order of the Emperor in the 21st year of Ch’ien-lung (1756); the “Biography of Sabsu,” military governor of Heilungkiang, who played an important role in the campaigns against the Russians under the reign of K’ang-hsi; and, finally, the *Ssü-i k’ao*,²⁴³ or “Inquiry into the Relations with all Foreign Countries”; the latter is a section of a more complete work of an official character entitled *Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao*,²⁴⁴ or “Inquiry into the Politics of the Great Dynasty,” and written by order of the Emperor Ch’ien-lung (1747) in two hundred and thirty-six *chüan* (chapters) combined into twenty-five sections.

Since Yü Chêng-hsieh wrote in 1833, he obviously could not have made use of the *Tung-hua lu* of Wang Hsien-ch’ien, which did not appear until the second half of the 19th century; nor did he have access to the *Shih-lu*. In the notes which the writer has added to the trans-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

lo and his companions were sent to the capital as soon as they had surrendered.

The *Fang-lüeh* says: "In the seventh month of the same year [1684] one *Lo'ch'a* by the name of Fei-yu-to-la [Fedor] was captured and sent to the capital to live."

It is to this surrender that the "Annals of Jehol" refer, mentioning an Imperial edict of the sixteenth day of the twelfth month of the twenty-third year (January 20, 1685) saying: "We accepted the surrender of Russians of the Heng-kun region; we did not kill them, but we support them [feed them]."²⁵

In the third month of the twenty-fourth year (1685), a group of seven *Lo-ch'a*, one of whom was called Ko-wa-li-la [Gavrila], was captured; one [of the group] fled.²⁶ In the fifth month [June, 1685] the town of Ya-k'o-sa [Yaksa, or Albazin] was taken and Pa-shih-li [Vasilii] and forty men voluntarily came over to our side."²⁷ Thus the total number mentioned by the *T'ung-chih* is confirmed: "The seventy persons of the last two times." In the seventh month (August, 1685—after the seizure of Albazin) the *Lo-ch'a* sent a group of four men, one of whom was called I-fan, to urge our [inhabitants of] O-lo-ch'un to submit [to the Tsar]. These men were captured by [the Chinese], then released, and authorized to return. There are many *Lo-ch'a* by the name of I-fan. The I-fan mentioned here is not the one who came over to our side in the seventh year of K-ang-hsi. The "Annals of Jehol" mention an Imperial edict of the fourteenth day of the sixth month of the twenty-fourth year (July 15, 1685) which says: "Ya-k'o-sa has already been driven to extremities and [its garrison] has surrendered; we pardoned them and permitted them to return." The *Ssu-i-k'ao* says: "In the seventh month of the twenty-fourth year [August, 1685] I-fan and his companions, four men in all, were released and authorized to return." However, the source [of this information] is not indicated, which makes the reader suspicious. As for the six persons, among them Ko-wa-li-la [Gavrila], they were also released at the time when our soldiers advanced; the two men brought by Nan-tai were likewise released. According to the *Fang-lüeh* containing Ko-wa-li-la's depositions "the

RUSSIAN EMIGRES IN CHINA

two men who had been released earlier were sent [as couriers] to the Tsar."²⁵⁸

By way of summarizing what was said above: One man came over to our side in the fifth year of Shun-chih (1649); I-fan and his companions came over to us in the seventh year of K'ang-hsi (1668); thirty-three men were captured in the twenty-second year (1694), seventy-two men in the twenty-third and twenty-fourth year (1685), of whom twelve were permitted to return. This makes approximately one hundred *Lo'ch'a*²⁵⁹ who lived inside of T'ung-chih (the T'ung-chih gate in Peking) in the Huchia-chüan Street. As for their family names and their origin, the *Pa-ch'i shih ts'u t'ung-p'u* (the Genealogical Register of the Eight Banners) does not mention them.

What conclusions can be drawn from the data that we have just examined? At first glance they seem barren, containing merely some more or less identifiable names, as well as certain dates. However, these precise data, although lacking description, suffice to reconstruct to a certain extent the relations between the events, described better in Russian sources, but which appear isolated there and unconnected. We are now able to make them more comprehensible, elucidate the motives and probable causes, and thus place them in historical perspective.

The date of the "Russian Company's" establishment and the information as to its original composition destroy the legend that this "Company," or "Hundred," had been made up of Albazinians whom, out of vanity and caprice, the Emperor had sought to use as a picturesque guard. We have seen that the Russian detachment was constituted in 1684, i. e., two years before the fall of Albazin, and that its first contingent was not composed of Albazinians at all, but of Grigorii Mylnikov's and Gavril Frolov's Cossacks, who had been taken prisoners on the middle course of the Amur River and its tributaries. In the light of these facts, the passing over to China

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

of one part of Albazin's garrison in 1685 also does not appear to be the cause of the formation of the Russian detachment in Peking, but rather one of its consequences, if not its aim. The event coincided, indeed, with the beginning of the decisive campaign against the *Lo-ch'a*, and, far from being the result of a caprice, was obviously part of an overall plan of this campaign. Russian prisoners undoubtedly had been captured before 1683, in former conflicts with Khabárov, Stepanov, Nagiba, and Chernigovsky, which had lasted more than thirty years. Very probably, they were treated as were all prisoners of that time, i. e., if they were not killed, they became slaves who were sold or forced to work. For the first time, in the beginning of the campaign of 1683, the order was given by the Emperor not to put the prisoners to death, but to feed them, treat them well, and, finally, send them to Peking to form a special unit.

The *P'ing-ting Lo-ch'a fang-lüeh* shows us how carefully the great campaign against the *Lo-ch'a* was elaborated. It comprised, besides concentrations of military forces in outposts of Hei-lung-chiang, a complete system of communication and transportation, and a ship-building program and economic plan to assure the supply of provisions for the troops and starve the opponent at the same time; furthermore, it included a propaganda project, the famous "pacification of the far-away people," which was in the old Chinese tradition.

The emperor well knew the peculiar situation that the *Lo-ch'a* on the Amur River were in at precisely this time. These dangerous men, a handful of whom, entrenched at Albazin or behind the *ostrogs*, stood up against considerable Chinese forces, were for the most part fugitives, on bad terms with the authorities, "outlaws" for whom the way back to Russia was practically closed.²⁶⁰ In the letter that the prisoners, Ivan and Mi-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

hailo Molodoi, were entrusted to take to Albazin, the *Li-fan-yüan*, as we have seen, hinted at this situation in a very Oriental way. "In case they (the *Lo-ch'a*) should have difficulties in returning home because of the long way they have to go, we are ready to receive those who sincerely surrender; we shall grant them favors so that each one can lead a decent life."²⁶¹

A number of favors were granted these *Lo-ch'a*. Instead of dispersing them among various existing units, as certain mandarins suggested, they were grouped in a special company of the Banner with the Yellow Border, which was the most aristocratic and was recruited from among the elite of the Manchus. They were also favored with unusual privileges—they received land in perpetuity, houses, money to establish themselves in Peking, and good pay. Their chiefs were elders of the Russian emigres. By means of skillful publicity, these measures in favor of the *Lo-ch'a* were made known by Russian emissaries sent to "pacify" the *Lo-ch'a* who continued to resist. All this would be incomprehensible if we did not see that the creation of a Russian group in Peking had a well-defined political aim which was tied up with the great campaign undertaken to stop Russian expansion on the Amur River.

We know that the "pacification" policy was only partially successful. It certainly contributed to the rapid disappearance of the remote *ostrogs*, and, to a great extent, was responsible for the schism, created in the very midst of Russian expansion, in Albazin,²⁶² but it was incapable of solving the whole problem, the character of which, moreover, changed when the Russians returned to Albazin in 1686. On the latter occasion the matter was taken in hand by the central Russian power, which sent regular troops under the command of Colonel Beiton, and this put an end to the independence of the irregular *Lo-ch'a*.

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

It is significant that from this time on the ranks of the "Russian Company" were not increased by new recruits. The Russian prisoners taken during the campaigns of 1686-1688 were not sent to Peking. After the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Russian unit completely lost its political *raison d'être* and became a simple detachment of the imperial guard. Its command was no longer entrusted to the Russians, and after the death of Lo-to-hun the Company was commanded by Manchu princes or high officials. Moreover, the Russian character of this unit disappeared rapidly owing to the steps toward assimilation which were undertaken; the most effective of these was marriage of the emigres with Chinese women. The only tie which united them with Russia, therefore, was likewise loosened. In spite of the presence among them of a priest brought from Albazin, the emigres showed themselves more and more indifferent to religion, tolerating in their homes the idolatrous practices of their wives, and even ceasing to have their children baptized.

But then Russia intervened to claim the duty of religious protection for her former subjects. This intervention and the results obtained are sufficiently well known, since they constitute the history of the Russian ecclesiastical mission. Here we shall only comment upon the role which, according to some Chinese documents, the presence of a group of Russian emigres played in the capital.

That the existence of these emigres was used only as a pretext by Russia there is no doubt whatever if we examine carefully the letter of the *Li-fan-yüan* which Isbrantes Ides, the first Russian envoy after the Treaty of Nerchinsk, brought back from Peking in answer to Russian requests. We see there that the motive alleged at that time was quite different. Ides demanded the establishment of a church, not for the "Albazinians," but

RUSSIAN EMIGRES IN CHINA

for Russian merchants, who came periodically to Peking with caravans. He based himself on the precedent of the existence of a "Latin church" in the capital. The reply of the *Li-fan-yüan* was categorical: "It is impossible that churches for all neighboring and distant states be established in Peking . . . The people from all Latin Kingdoms who came to live permanently in our country constructed only one church."²⁶³ Immediately, the Russians gave another motive by asking for the construction of a church and the authorization of residence for the ecclesiastical personnel—not for Russian merchants, but for the people who had come to China "permanently," i. e., the Russian emigres. Without losing time, Russia officially entered into relations with these emigres. The same year, the Metropolitan of Siberia, Ignatii Rimsky-Korsakov, sent a *gramota* to the emigre priest, Maxim Leontiev, and the following year the caravan brought to Peking priests bringing books and various cult objects for the consecration of the emigres' church, which was established in a pagoda provided by the Emperor.²⁶⁴

We know that despite the more plausible pretext, the Chinese were slow in authorizing a permanent mission. The priests who arrived with caravans were obliged to return with them. But subsequent caravans brought new priests, and relations with the emigres were thus maintained. This was certainly not what Russia desired, but Peter the Great was prudent; he did not in the least want to offend the Chinese nor arouse the opposition of the Jesuits, whose services he valued, but whom he feared. An opportune moment had to be waited for, and this did not come until 1713.

A Chinese book of major importance, the *I-yu-lu*, by Tulishen (cf. note 229), gives details of the negotiations which resulted in the establishment of the first permanent Russian mission. In exchange for the facilities pro-

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

vided the Chinese embassy to the Turguts for crossing through Siberia, K'ang-hsi finally felt obliged to consent to the Russian demands. In 1716, a religious group, with Ilarion Lezhaiskii as archimandrite, was in Peking, but the purpose of the establishment of this mission was still to care for the needs of the Russian emigres. Indeed, it was considered as being in the service of Emperor K'ang-hsi, who supported all its members in the name of the needs of "his Russians." The archimandrite and the priests were raised to the rank of mandarin; seven subordinate employees were incorporated into the Russian Company; thus they obtained the privileges of the Banner men and were even married at the church, as is borne out by a later letter of the *Li-fan-yüan* to "our Russian daughters."

This letter of the *Li-fan-yüan*, addressed to Prince Gagarin, Governor of Siberia, and dated the 56th year of K'ang-hsi (1718), marks an important step towards the establishment of a permanent Russian mission. After the death of the archimandrite Lezhaiskii, which occurred on April 26, 1718, in Tung-shan, near Peking, China turned to Russia to ask whether she wished to send a new archimandrite or preferred to recall the other members of the mission. Thus the dependence of the mission on the Russian government was officially recognized.²⁶⁵

Russia was not slow to appreciate what was involved in this situation. The archimandrite Antonii Platkovsky, who had come to Peking with Izmailov's embassy in 1720, had already declared with indignation that his predecessor was considered as being in the service of China. When he returned to Peking at the head of a new mission (including student interpreters) which had been definitely recognized by the Treaty of Kiakhta, he succeeded in making it independent of Chinese administration and henceforth dispensed with the "Albazinians,"

RUSSIAN EMIGRES IN CHINA

who were no longer needed, even as a pretext. The mission now established its residence not in the Russian emigres' section, but in the Palace of the Ambassadors, where a new church was constructed. From this time on there were two churches and, so to speak, two missions: one, the official Russian mission in Nan-kuan; the other, the mission of the emigres in Pei-kuan.²⁶⁶ The two were not always in complete agreement. The head of the official mission did not succeed in compelling obedience from the priest of the Pei-kuan.²⁶⁷ But this was no longer of importance. The role of the "Albazinians" in the establishment of the permanent Russian mission in China had been terminated and with this their history, more or less, ends.

The subsequent fate of the "Albazinians" is no longer of general historical interest. Nor did it differ from the fate of emigres of all time.

Used for political ends first by China and then by Russia, the "Albazinians" were abandoned to their fate. Unlike almost all other foreigners who came to China during that period, they have left no accounts, either of their journeys, their adventures, or the country which adopted them. The level of their culture was certainly not high, but this would not suffice to explain why they did not record their experiences, since among them were men of some training, such as the "Moscovite" of whom Father Gerbillon speaks.²⁶⁸ This former defender of Albazin "who had settled in Peking, and who was a minor official there" furnished Father Gerbillon with detailed information on the geography, ethnography, and customs of Siberia, "the greatest part of which he had travelled through several times."²⁶⁹

European travellers, on their return from China, published their accounts; the missionaries, who had come to stay permanently, sent accounts to their European correspondents. But the "Albazinians?" Their relations with

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Russia were broken off, and they could not leave China. Official Russia herself preferred to use her own agents, priests, and students of the mission, rather than the services of the less certain emigres. More and more estranged from Russia, and not completely assimilated by China, they soon became a separate, singular type, which the official publication of the Russian ecclesiastical mission in China has recently described in the following terms:²⁷⁰

"From the middle of the eighteenth century on, a type of 'Albazinian' came into being in Peking, idle and without any trade, who even considered any useful occupation unworthy of him by reason of the fact that he belonged to the imperial guard. Very extravagant, proud of himself and of his privileged position, not knowing how to use his leisure or to overcome an unbearable boredom, he could always be seen roaming the streets, the hotels, and theatres, and often smoking opium. Thus, physically and mentally ill, and crushed by debts, he soon fell into the hands of the capital's usurers and became the talk of his section. It is remarkable that such a type of 'Albazinian' could have existed during the whole course of the Mission's history . . ."

FOOTNOTES

¹ Eighteen million people perished during the years 1211-1223 alone. (O. Wolf, *History of Mongols From Early Times to the Death of Ogotai Khan*, 1875, p. 111).

² Yaroslav died in Karakorum, having apparently been poisoned by the Mongol Regent Turakina, a woman.

³ Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from East-Asiatic Sources*, London 1888, p. 73. Bayan was a minister under Toghhan-Timur Khan (1338-1368) and was known for his cruelty; the project which called for the killing of all inhabitants with the name of "Chang," "Wang," and "Chao" in order to suppress the Chinese revolts, is ascribed to him. (H. Horworth, *History of the Mongols*, part 1, p. 310).

⁴ V. Bartol'd, *History of Oriental Studies in Europe and Russia*, Leningrad, 1925, p. 171 (in Russian).

⁵ *Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia by Antony Jenkinson and Other Englishmen*, v. 1, London, 1886, Hakluyt Society, No. 72.

⁶ V. Bartol'd, l.c., p. 187.

⁷ V. Kljuchevskij, *Accounts by Foreigners of the Muscovite State*, Petrograd, 1918, pp. 41-73 (in Russian).

⁸ J. Nicuhoff, who was in Peking with the Dutch embassy of Goyer and Keyser at the same time as the first Russian ambassador, Bajkov, was astonished that the latter refused to submit to the ceremony of *kotow*. "It is strange that this ambassador was not willing to be reasonable!" (J. Nicuhoff, *Ambassade de la Compagnie Orientale des Provinces Unies*, Leyden, 1665, p. 208).

⁹ Until quite recently it was assumed that the first Sino-Russian contacts were established starting from 1576, when two Cossacks, Ivan Petrov and Burnash Yalyshev, travelled to China. In fact, a report of this journey exists in the Russian archives; it bears the title *Descriptions of Countries Beyond Siberia*, which is strange, as the Russian conquest of Siberia had not even been begun in 1567. The information contained in this report on Mongolia and China is repeated almost verbatim in a report of a later journey, that of Petlin, in 1618-1620. The historian Karanuzin, comparing the two reports in the beginning of the 19th century, concludes, logically enough, that Petlin himself never went to Mongolia nor to China and simply copied the report of the journey of 1567. It has recently been established, however, that the opposite is true. The information about Mongolia in both reports, especially the information concerning Lamaist monasteries, corresponds fairly accurately with the situation in Mongolia at the beginning of the 17th century, but not as of 1567. It would therefore appear that the date 1567 and false names were added to one copy of the Petlin report through an error of the copyist; the names were not completely invented; Petrov accompanied Tjumenets to Mongolia (1616), and Burnash accompanied the Mongol envoys on their return from Moscow (1618). (Cf. Bartol'd, l.c., p. 187).

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

¹⁰ For the Chinese name see Notes in Chinese at the end of this book.

¹¹ Cf. Notes in Chinese.

¹² Cf. Notes in Chinese.

¹³ From that time on it has been divided into three *ajmaks*, or Khanates; Dzhasaktu in the west, Tushetu in the center, and Chechen in the east, near Manchuria.

¹⁴ Altyn Khan, of Tümed (1532-1585), had introduced Lamaism into his province, from whence it spread throughout Mongolia. He should not be confused with Altyn Khan of Outer Mongolia, who professed himself to be a "subject" of Moscow in 1634, and who will be dealt with later.

¹⁵ "Altyn Khan" is not a personal name, but a title which the Kyrgyz gave to the Mongol Khans in their neighborhood, because they believed them to be very rich. "Altyn Khan" means "Golden Khan." The name of the Altyn Khan who fostered the first relations with Russia was Ombor-erdeni, or Erdeni-Khungtajdji. (H. Howorth, l.c., part 1, p. 455).

¹⁶ Thus the Chinese embassy sent to the Turghuts, on the lower Volga, in 1714, was motivated by the desire to create a menace in the rear of the Dzungars. (Cf. T'u Li-shen, *I-yu lu*).

¹⁷ De Mailla, *Histoire generale de la Chine*, Paris, 177-1785, v. 11, p. 97.

¹⁸ The first Khutuktu was sent to Outer Mongolia by the Dalai Lama in 1604.

¹⁹ Cf. Bartol'd, l.c., p. 187.

²⁰ Cf. Notes in Chinese.

²¹ Cf. Notes in Chinese.

²² The Russian envoy Bajkov was there at that time and it is not difficult to understand why the Chinese insisted that he perform *kotow* in the presence of an envoy of Altyn Khan, a subject of Moscow.

²³ Lobzdan was still living in 1691, since Gerbillon met him among the "obscure princes" at "The Meeting of the Tartar States." (Du Halde, *Description de la Chine*, IV, p. 170).

²⁴ Cf. Notes in Chinese.

²⁵ Du Halde, *Description de la Chine*, IV, p. 168.

²⁶ K'ang-hsi Shih-lu, 23rd year, 5th month, 19th day (July 1, 1684), v. 115, p. 20a.

²⁷ For the Chinese name of this Manchu dignitary cf. W. Fuchs, *Der Russisch-Chinesische Vertrag*, Monumenta Serica, vol. 4, p. 551. Cf. also Notes in Chinese.

²⁸ K'ang-hsi Shih-lu, 27th year, 3rd month, 3rd day (April 3, 1688), v. 134, p. 3b.

²⁹ W. F. Mayers, *The Chinese Government*, London and Shanghai, 1897, p. 119, Par. 596.

³⁰ G. Cahen, *Histoire des Relations de la Russie avec la Chine*, Paris, 1912, pp. 40-41.

³¹ N. Bantysh-Kamenskij, *Collection of Diplomatic Matters Between the Russian and Chinese Governments from 1619 to 1792* (in Russian), Kazan, 1882, p. 55.

³² Fêng-Shih O-lo-szu hsing-chêng lu, by Chang P'eng-ko; Cf. Notes in Chinese.

³³ Ch'u-Sai chi-lüeh, by Ch'ien Liang-tse; Cf. Notes in Chinese.

³⁴ Ch'ien Liang-tse, l.c., 9th and 10th day of the 6th month in the 27th year of K'ang-hsi.

FOOTNOTES

³⁵ Ch'ien Liang-tse, l.c., conclusion.

³⁶ In 1675 Spathari indicated three routes to China: one via the Irtysh River and Chinese Turkestan, a second via the Yenisei River and Mongolia, and a third via Nerchinsk and Naum. Petlin, in 1619 took the second route; Bajkov, in 1656, the first one; Spathari himself, in 1675, and Ides, in 1693, the third one. The couriers of Golovin, Korovin, and Loginov took a fourth route via Selenginsk and Urga, which became the principal route of communication between China and Russia beginning with the 18th century.

³⁷ An interesting correspondence is preserved in the Imperial Palace in Peking which reveals that the *vayvode* of Nerchinsk became angry about this change, which caused him to lose the advantages of the caravans' passage through his town in favor of his colleague from Selenginsk (*Documents in Russian Preserved in the National Palace Museum of Peiping*, Peiping, 1936, documents Nos. 8 and 72.)

³⁸ Father Hue, who travelled in Inner Mongolia in the middle of the 19th century, estimated that one-third of the male population there were lamas. Pozdnejev, at the end of the 19th century, found that this proportion had increased to five-eighths for Outer Mongolia.

³⁹ G. Cahen, l.c., p. 190.

⁴⁰ As to the caravans before 1727, cf. Cahen, l.c., p. 94; for those after 1727, cf. N. Bantysh-Kamenskij, l.c., pp. 197, 218, 238, 243, 249, and 258. This is their abbreviated list with the dates of arrival in Peking:

1 Vasilij Lobanov and Vasilij Kazantzev, 1696.

2 Stepan Ljangušov and Ivan Savatejev, 1698.

3 Timofei Bokov and Grigorij Oskolkov, 1700.

4 Ivan Savatejev, 1704.

5 Grigorij Oskolkov, 1706.

6 Pavel Hudjakov, 1708.

7 Ivan Savatejev, 1710.

8 Pavel Hudjakov, 1712.

9 Grigorij Oskolkov, 1714.

10 Mikhail Gusjatnikov, 1716.

11 Vasilij Ifin, 1718.

12 Feodor Istopnikov, 1721.

¹³ Lange and Molokov (replacing S. Tretjakov, who died in Irkutsk) with three language students, Vojekov, Pukhov, and F. Tretjakov, 1727.

¹⁴ Lange and Molokov, with four language students, Poznjakov, Bykov, Barshchenkov, and Vladyn, 1732.

¹⁵ Lang, 1737.

¹⁶ Erofej Firsov, with the preaching monk, Lavrentij, 1741.

¹⁷ Lebratovskij, with the archimandrite Gervasij, 1744.

¹⁸ Vladyn, with the archimandrite Amvrosij Yumatov, 1755.

⁴¹ Alexandre Ular, *Un Empire Russo-Chinois*, Paris, n. d., p. 47 ff.

⁴² Cf. N. S. Trubetskoy, *On the Problem of Russian Self-Consciousness*, Paris, 1927; P. N. Savitsky, *Russia as a Separate Geographical World*, Paris, 1927; G. V. Vernadsky, *Outline of Russian History*, Paris, 1927 (all in Russian).

⁴³ There is no work on Sino-Russian relations during the 18th century and first half of the 19th century which even remotely calls to mind the outstanding work of J. Baddeley (*Russia, Mongolia, China*, London, 1919) covering the 17th century, or the work of G. Cahen (*Histoire des Rela-*

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

tions de la Russie avec la Chine sous Pierre le Grand, Paris, 1912) covering the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 1941, announced a work by Statton on Sino-Russian relations during the 18th century, with documents.

⁴⁴ Cf., for instance, E. Ravenstein, *The Russians on the Amur*, London, 1861, or *Priamurie*, Moscow, 1909 (in Russian), both serious works.

⁴⁵ N. Bantysh-Kamensky, *Collection of Diplomatic Matters Between the Russian and Chinese Governments from 1619-1792*, Kazan, 1882, p. 334, (in Russian).

⁴⁶ N. Bantysh-Kamensky, l.c., p. 373.

⁴⁷ Cf. the writer's article in *Bulletin de l'Universite l'Aurore*, 1943, III, t. 4, No. 2 pp. 395-418.

⁴⁸ Vladislavich caused a lieutenant of artillery named Hannibal to come to St. Petersburg to assist in the construction of the fortress at Selenginsk. He was an old acquaintance. In 1704, Vladislavich, at that time a young merchant and Russian secret agent in Constantinople, sent three young Negro slaves to his friend Spathari as presents to be offered to the Russian dignitaries. Spathari offered the smallest of these boys to Peter the Great, and gave the following information in a letter, dated the 15th of September, 1704, to Golovin: "The youngest of these Araps (Negroes) is baptized, he is called Abraham and belongs to a princely family." (P. Panaitescu, *Nicolas Spathar Milescu, Melanges de l'Ecole Roumaine en France*, 1925, p. 147). The biographer of Spathari, in reproducing this letter, added no comment. Apparently he did not recognize in the little Abraham the future Abraham Petrovich Hannibal, well-known favorite of Peter the Great and maternal great-grandfather of Pushkin.

⁴⁹ Maurice Courant, *L'Asie Centrale aux XVIIe et XVIIIe Siecles*, Paris, 1913, p. 53.

⁵⁰ N. Bantysh-Kamensky, l.c., p. 199.

⁵¹ Cf. Notes in Chinese.

⁵² Cf. Notes in Chinese.

⁵³ Cf. Notes in Chinese.

⁵⁴ Cf. Notes in Chinese.

⁵⁵ *Ch'ien-lung Shih-lu*, vols. 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 522, 523, 529, 538.

⁵⁶ Decree of the 23rd day, 7th month, 21st year (August 18, 1756), *Ch'ien-lung Shih-lu*, v. 517, p. 8a.

⁵⁷ Bantysh-Kamensky, l.c., p. 269.

⁵⁸ The author desires to make a slight chronological correction. The chief of the revolt, Ch'ing-kung-tsa-pu, was captured and executed not "in the tenth month of the 21st year," as Courant indicates, but on the 28th day of the 11th month of the same year (January 17, 1757) as the imperial decree of the 15th day of the 12th month (*Ch'ien-lung Shih-lu*, v. 523, p. 15b) specifically states.

⁵⁹ Letter of the *Li-fan-yüan* to the Russian Senate, dated the 23rd day, 11th month, 24th year.

⁶⁰ Letter from the *Li-fan-yüan*, of the 18th day, 6th month, 29th year.

⁶¹ Letter from the *Li-fan-yüan*, of the 18th day, 6th month, 29th year.

⁶² Cf. Bantysh-Kamensky, l.c., pp. 378-393. The author has drawn so much from this work that he feels impelled to say a few words concerning it and its author. Nicholas Bantysh-Kamensky was associate and later the suc-

FOOTNOTES

cessor of the historian Muller as director of the *Foreign Affairs' Archives* in Moscow. There he composed, in 1792, his *Collection of Diplomatic Matters Between the Russian and Chinese Governments from 1619-1792*, but he did not receive permission to publish it either at that time or in 1803, in spite of its having been dedicated to Tsar Alexander I. It was only in 1882, almost a century after its completion, that a limited number of copies of the work were published on the occasion of the tercentenary of the conquest of Siberia. The book by Bantysh-Karnensky, remarkable in its own time, is still of great value today, since it consists of annals of the official *Archives of Foreign Affairs*. Furthermore, all Chinese documents, with their exact dates, are referred to therein, which facilitates research into Chinese chronicles, the documents of which are generally classified in chronological order without any index.

63 Cf. the excellent work by J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, *On the Ch'ing Tributary System*, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 1941, pp. 137-246.

64 Priamurie, pp. 57-59.

65 I. M. Maisky, *Modern Mongolia*, Irkutsk, 1921 (in Russian).

66 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

67 Cf. V. A. Riassanovsky, *Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law*, Tientsin, 1937, p. 63.

68 *The Code of the Li-fan-yüan* of 1789 was translated into Russian by Father Hyacinth Bichurin. (*Notes on Mongolia*, 1828, v. 4). There is a German translation of this work by von der Borg (1832).

69 The Code of 1815 was likewise translated into Russian by S. Lipovtsev, *Rules of the Tribunal of Foreign Affairs*, 1828.

70 V. A. Riassanovsky, l.c., p. 132 ff.

71 Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself, in his early speeches, did not hesitate to declare that, in the name of the principle of "racial democracy," all the minorities, especially the Tibetans and the Mongols, should be assimilated ("converted") by the Chinese. It was only later, during the first Kuomintang Congress, that he abandoned this point of view and caused the adoption of a resolution under which the right of freedom of choice of all racial groups in China was recognized. (Tseng Yu-hao, *Modern Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy*, Shanghai, 1934, pp. 92-93.)

72 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

73 J. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China*, 1894-1919, Washington, 1919.

74 Cf. I. J. Korostovets, *Von Ginggiskhan zur Sowjet-republik*, Berlin, 1926; on the correspondence between Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Khutuktu, cf. C. L. Chu, *The Last Ten Years of Sino-Russian Relations* (Far Eastern Foreign Relations Research Bureau) Harbin 1926 (in Chinese); cf. also Chen Taengtsu, *Recent History of Outer Mongolia*, Shanghai, 1924 (in Chinese).

75 At the moment when Sazonov was writing his report, Russia and Japan had concluded only the agreements of 1907 and 1910, which defined their spheres of influence in Manchuria only. It was not until later, on the 21st of October, 1912, and on the 25th of May, 1915, that the line of demarcation between the Russian and Japanese interests was drawn in Mongolia.

76 The 13th of April, 1912; cf. Chu, l.c., p. 145.

77 Chu, l.c., p. 137

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

⁷⁸ Chu, l.c., p. 138.

⁷⁹ Chu, l.c., p. 138.

⁸⁰ Chu, l.c., p. 139.

⁸¹ *North China Daily News*, November 14, 1912.

⁸² *idem*, November 20, 1912.

⁸³ *idem*, December 19, 1912.

⁸⁴ *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 863, Article 4 of the joint declaration of Sun Yat-sen and A. Joffe.

⁸⁵ Telegram of Lin Jen-chin to the *Wai-chiao-pu* (Office of Foreign Affairs), dated November 12, 1912 (*China Times*, November 14, 1912).

⁸⁶ When Panama became separated from the Republic of Colombia, the United States, because of her interests in the Canal Zone, at once recognized the new independent state.

⁸⁷ The manifesto of the revolutionaries accused Yüan Shih-k'ai, among other things, of recalling his troops from the northwest, and of sending them to the south, to the detriment of Chinese interests in Mongolia, where "Russian imperialism was not opposed." (*North China Daily News*, July 17, 1913).

⁸⁸ The order accused the Kuomintang members of Parliament, among other things, of refusing to ratify the Sino-Russian agreement on Mongolia, and seeking to create an armed conflict with Russia and overthrow the government.

⁸⁹ For the complete text of the treaty of November, 1913, cf. J. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China*, vol. II, p. 1066.

⁹⁰ "From the Chinese point of view, the agreement could not help being considered as a great diplomatic victory for China," (Ken Shen Weigh, *Russo-Chinese Diplomacy*, Shanghai, 1928, p. 180).

⁹¹ These documents were published in the *Krasnyi Arkhiv* (Red Archives) and were translated into English in 1932-33 in the *Chinese Social and Political Review*, Peiping, vols. XVI and XVII.

⁹² Sazonov to Miller, January 17 (30th), 1914.

⁹³ Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to His Majesty, January 6 [19], 1914.

⁹⁴ Malcovich-Malevsky to Sazonov, January 5 [18], 1914.

⁹⁵ In order to save Sain-Noyan Khan's prestige, the St. Petersburg government granted him, before his departure from St. Petersburg, a loan of three million rubles, but demanded in return the assignment of a Russian financial adviser to Urga; it also furnished him with a certain amount of arms and ammunition, which Mongolia pledged "not to use against China."

⁹⁶ The complete text of the agreement is given by MacMurray, l.c., vol. II, p. 1239.

⁹⁷ For the complete text, cf. *Vestnik Asii* (*Asia Herald*) Harbin, No. 40, pp. 45-47.

⁹⁸ Cf. *Vestnik Asii*, No. 38-39, p. 212.

⁹⁹ Ataman Semenov, *Concerning Myself*, Harbin, 1938, p. 149 (in Russian).

¹⁰⁰ C. L. Chu, *The Last Ten Years in Sino-Russian Relations*, Harbin, 1926, p. 159 (in Chinese).

¹⁰¹ Cf. notes 26-32.

FOOTNOTES

- 102 *The Spectator*, March 13, 1936, p. 460.
- 103 *Revue de Paris*, October 15, 1936, p. 889.
- 104 *Ataman Semenov and Mongolia*, Collection of despatches from the Russian legation in Peking addressed to Kolchak, from the archives seized in Omsk, Moscow, n. d. (in Russian).
- 105 *North China Daily News*, August 6, 1919.
- 106 Ken Shen Weigh, *Russo-Chinese Diplomacy*, Shanghai, 1928, pp. 191-193.
- 107 N. N. Kniazev, *The Legendary Baron*, Harbin, 1942 (in Russian).
- 108 The forces of Baron Ungern, when they entered Mongolia, numbered altogether 1,045 men, of whom 200 were Russians and the rest Tartars, Bashkirs, Buryats, and Mongols, who were joined by a Japanese company under the command of Captain Suzuki, formerly stationed in Dauria [Manchuria].
- 109 As to the treasury of Baron Ungern, the information is conflicting. The Ataman Semenov affirms having given Ungern, before his expedition, seven million gold rubles (*Ataman Semenov*, l.c., p. 119), while Kniazev indicates that at the time of his entry into Mongolia the Baron had only 360,000 gold rubles (*N. N. Kniazev*, l.c., p. 31).
- 110 N. N. Kniazev, l.c., p. 53.
- 111 *Letters Captured from Baron Ungern*, published by the Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States of America during the Washington Conference, 1921-1922.
- 112 N. N. Kniazev, l.c., p. 141.
- 113 Cf. P. Dufour, *L'aventure du Baron Ungern-Sternberg*, *Bulletin de l'Université l'Aurore*, 1942, pp. 599 ff. and 942.
- 114 The victims of these "purges" were Mongols as well as Russian inhabitants. In Uliassutai, the entire Russian colony, with the exception of two or three families, was massacred; (cf. *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 577).
- 115 *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 576.
- 116 Ken Shen Weigh, l.c., p. 207.
- 117 I. M. Maisky, *Modern Mongolia*, Irkutsk, 1921 (in Russian).
- 118 Cf. the note of Bodo-lama to Peking of October 6, 1921 (*Nation*, November 23, 1921); note of the same author to Moscow of September 10, 1921, and the answer of Chicherin of September 14, 1921 (*Pasvolsky, Russia in the Far East*, New York, 1922, p. 180).
- 119 *Collection of Documents Concerning the Period from November 1, 1917, to December 14, 1921*, published by the Russian Legation in Peking, 1920 (in Russian).
- 120 For the complete text of the declaration of July 25, 1919, and September 27, 1920, cf. *China Year Book*, 1924, pp. 868-870.
- 121 After the death of the Khutuktu, which occurred on May 20, 1924, the Chief of State was not replaced, and Outer Mongolia was proclaimed a "Republic without a President."
- 122 For the complete text of the constitution of 1924, cf. *China Year Book*, 1926, p. 795.
- 123 Declaration of the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, to the Congress of the Soviets in Tiflis, 1924.
- 124 Cf. Andre Pierre, *L'U.R.S.S. et la Mongolie*, *Revue de Paris*, October 15, 1936.

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

- 125 More than seven million animals were lost.
- 126 The separation of church and state was proclaimed in 1926.
- 127 *Pravda*, April 8, 1935.
- 128 The frontier between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia was purely arbitrary and was never marked on the ground, inasmuch as both states were parts of China.
- 129 Note of the *Wai-chiao-pu* of April 7, 1936.
- 130 Note of the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, of April 8, 1936.
- 131 *Pravda*, April 10, 1936.
- 132 "We get along very well with the Muscovites, but we are obliged to be noncommittal in the extreme in order not to give offense at the Court." (Letter from Father de Ventaven, *Lettres Edifiantes*, IV, p. 307, quoted by Pfister in *Notices Bibliographiques et Biographiques*).
- 133 J. B. Du Halde, *Description Geographique, Historique, Chronologique, Politique et Physique de l'Empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie Chinoise*, 4 vols, The Hague, 1735.
- 134 *Correspondance de Ferdinand Verbiest de la Compagnie de Jesus*, edited by Fathers H. Jossion, S. J. and L. Willaert, S. J., Commission Royale d'Histoire, Bruxelles, 1938.
- 135 A hitherto unpublished (in manuscript) work by Father H. Bernard on the first mission has been graciously made available to the writer by the author.
- 136 Walter Fuchs, *Der Russisch-Chinesische Vertrag von Nerchinsk vom Jahre 1869; eine Textkritische Betrachtung*. In *Monumenta Serica*, vol. IV, part 2, 1940, Peiping.
- 137 P. Wiegner, *Textes Historiques*, vol. III, 1922.
- 138 The French translation of the *Gramota* by H. Nicolet de Chollet is given in the *Bulletin de l'Universite l'Aurore*, 1942, III, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 783-786.
- 139 The Slavic-Greco-Latin Academy of Moscow was not founded until 1687.
- 140 *Documents in Russian Preserved in the National Palace Museum of Peiping*, Peiping, 1936, Document No. 6.
- 141 Maurice Courant, *La Siberie, Colonie Russe*, Paris, 1920.
- 142 Expedition of Volynsky in 1608, of Golytsin in 1616, of Tukhachevsky in 1636, of Grechaninov in 1637, of Starkov and Neverov in 1639.
- 143 Letter of the 13th day of the 5th month, of the 9th year of K'ang-hsi, quoted by Fu-kuang Chen in *Sino-Russian Diplomatic Relations, The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. X, No. 2, p. 485.
- 144 *Documents in Russian Preserved in the National Palace Museum of Peiping*, Peiping, 1936, Document No. 1.
- 145 P. P. Panaitescu, *Nicolas Spataru Milescu, Melanges de l'Ecole Roumaine en France* 1925, Part I.
- 146 *Lettres et Memoires d'Adam Schall S. J. Relation Historique*, pp. 304-308, note 5.
- 147 P. P. Panaitescu, l.c., p. 85.
- 148 The embassy of Goyer and Keyser in 1655, and of Van Horn in 1665. The description of the first embassy, by J. Nieuhoff, contains several passages devoted to Father Adam Schall (Scaliger) whom the author criticizes vehemently for his "opposition" to the Dutch projects (pp. 203-206).
- 149 P. Miliukov, *Outline of the History of Russian Culture*, vol. III, p. 137, Paris, 1930 (in Russian).

FOOTNOTES

¹⁵⁰ Before his journey to Russia, Krizhanich presented to the Congregation of Propaganda a memorandum containing a plan of missionary work in Russia. *Cervello turbido e stravagante* was the Congregation's judgment. Krizhanich left for Russia on his own account (cf. P. Pierling, *La Russie et le Saint-Siège*, vol. IV).

¹⁵¹ N. I. Kostomarov, *History of Russia*, I. II, p. 402, Petrograd, 1915 (in Russian).

¹⁵² Titov, *History of Siberia*, p. 115, quoted by P. Pierling, l.c., p. 33.

¹⁵³ P. P. Panaitescu, l.c., p. 86.

¹⁵⁴ This information was erroneous; it was probably Dutch who were there, the residence of Portuguese and Jesuits being at that time prohibited.

¹⁵⁵ P. P. Panaitescu, l.c., p. 101.

¹⁵⁶ H. Bosmans, S. J. *Le Probleme des Relations de Verbiest avec la Cour de Russie*, Bruges, 1913.

¹⁵⁷ *Correspondance de Ferdinand Verbiest de la Compagnie de Jesus*, edited by the Fathers H. Josson, S. J. and L. Willaert, S. J. Commission Royale d'Histoire, Bruxelles, 1938.

¹⁵⁸ *idem* letter No. 69.

¹⁵⁹ E. H. Parker, *China and Russia*, *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 1896, 3rd series vol. 2, p. 14.

¹⁶⁰ Fu-Kuang Ch'en, *Sino-Russian Diplomatic Relations Since 1689*, *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, April, 1926, vol. X, No. 2.

¹⁶¹ P. P. Panaitescu, l.c., p. 109.

¹⁶² J. Baddeley, *Russia, Mongolia, China*, 1919, Vol. II, p. 395.

¹⁶³ Spathari mentioned that there were four Jesuits besides Verbiest. Father Bormans (l.c.) named five; Buglio, Magalhaens, Grimaldi, Pereira, Herdtricht. It seems however, that Spathari's indication is more exact. Father Herdtricht was not in Peking in 1676; he had left there in 1675 (cf. Pfister l.c.).

¹⁶⁴ *Politique de Pekin XXIII*, June 13, 1936, p. 669.

¹⁶⁵ *Correspondance de Ferdinand Verbiest*, letter No. 24. The original is preserved in the Moscow Archives and was published for the first time by J. Arseniev in *New Information on the Service of Nicolas Spathari in Russia*, Moscow, 1900 (in Russian) and translated into French (*Nouveaux Renseignements sur le Service de Nicolas Spathari en Russie*) by H. Bosmans, S. J. (l.c.).

¹⁶⁶ H. M. Liu, *Russo-Chinese Relations up to the Treaty of Nerchinsk*, *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. XXIII, No. 4, p. 409.

¹⁶⁷ Goyer and Keyser, *L'Ambassade de la Compagnie Orientale des Provinces-Unies, par Nieuhoff*, 1665, p. 208.

¹⁶⁸ P. Martini, *Situs Provinciarum Imperii Sinici*, Amsterdam, 1655, *Atlas Sinensis*, 1655.

¹⁶⁹ Father Philippe Avril, *Voyage en divers Etats d'Europe et d'Asie*, 1692. This book contains an unkind reference to Peter I. Brought to the attention of the young Tsar, this passage provoked his rage and resulted in new proceedings against the Jesuits in Russia.

¹⁷⁰ N. Novikov, *History of an Innocent Imprisonment* (in Russian).

¹⁷¹ *Correspondance de Ferdinand Verbiest*, letter No. 73. According to Father David, who had met Spathari in Moscow in 1689, the latter had

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

received from Verbiest "some letters via Holland, which he did not answer for fear of awakening the suspicion of the Muscovites." These letters do not seem to have been preserved (cf. H. Bosmans, l.c.).

172 E. G. Ravenstein, *The Russians on the Amur*, London 1861.

173 Pokrovskaya Sloboda, Panovo, Soldatovo, Andrushkino.

174 This fortress itself was taken by the Chinese and demolished in 1685. It was reconstructed by the Russians the following year and was again besieged by the Chinese. The siege was not lifted until the time of the armistice which preceded the Conference of Nerchinsk.

175 G. V. Vernadsky, *Essay on the History of Eurasia*, 1934, pp. 128 and 129 (in Russian).

176 He was a member of the "Great Embassy" which accompanied Peter to Europe in 1697, signed the Treaty of Commerce with England in 1698, was appointed President of the Prikaz of Ambassadors in 1700, signed the treaties with Denmark and Poland in 1701, and a covenant with Lithuania in 1703 (cf. Bantysh-Kamensky, *Dictionary of Noteworthy People on Russian Territory, 1836-1847*, quoted by Cahen, l.c.).

177 Du Halde, l.c., vol. IV, p. 247.

178 P'ing-ting Lo-ch'a fang-lüeh, pp. 28b and 29a, quoted by H. M. Liu in *Russo-Chinese Relations up to the Treaty of Nerchinsk*, l.c., p. 415.

179 Gaston Cahen, *Histoire des Relations de la Russie avec la Chine*, Paris, 1912. Instruction to T. A. Golovin, *Pieces Justificatives*, pp. III and IV.

180 Gaston Cahen, l.c., p. 40.

181 Gerbillon arrived in China on July 23, 1687; in Peking in February, 1688.

182 Du Halde, l.c., vol. IV, p. 231.

183 Walter Fuchs, l.c., p. 548.

184 *Documents in Russian Preserved in the National Palace Museum in Peiping*, Peiping, 1936, p. 121, document No. 1.

185 K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, *On the Ch'ing Tributary System*, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 1941, pp. 137-246.

186 N. Bantysh-Kamensky, *An Account of Diplomatic Matters Between Russia and China from 1619 to 1792*, Kazan, 1882, pp. 19-20 (in Russian).

187 As to Gantimur, cf. J. Baddeley, *Russia, Mongolia, China*, London, 1919, vol. II, p. 428, note B.

188 There are two translations of this letter of K'ang-hsi in the Moscow Archives. One was made in 1670 by an interpreter in Nerchinsk who, not daring to give a literal translation, improved upon it, added the full title of the Tsar, and softened the terms, which were too haughty. This translation was published by Bantysh-Kamensky (l.c., p. 20, note 1) and by Baddeley (l.c., Appendix of Russian texts, vol. I, pp. CCXXIX). The other translation, generally considered as more in accord with the facts, was made in 1676 by Father Verbiest and brought back by Spathari. It is interesting to note that Baddeley, generally so precise, thought that the translation by Father Verbiest referred to another letter of K'ang-hsi, which had been written in 1671 (Baddeley, l.c., vol. II, p. 196, note 1). He reproduced the text of the translation (*idem*, p. 372), which, however, is dated the 13th day of the 5th month of the 9th year of K'ang-hsi, i.e., July 2, 1670. Already at the end of the 18th century, Bantysh-Kamensky

FOOTNOTES

stated that both translations referred to the same unique letter of K'ang-hsi, written in 1670. Baddeley mistakes also the date of Milovanov's mission by referring to it once as 1671 (vol. I, Introduction, p. IV, and vol. II, p. 339, note 2) and another time as 1670 (vol. II, p. 195, and p. 196, note 1).

189 The original text of Milovanov's statement made on August 29, 1671, at the Prikaz of Siberia, as reproduced by Baddeley in vol. I, pp. CCXXXIX ff., from the manuscript preserved in the Moscow Archives, K. D. (Chinese Court), book III.

190 Milovanov asserted that he was forced to produce the *nakaz* for the Chinese ministers, who refused to return it to him. His "statement," like many other reports by Cossacks concerning their mission in China, did not inspire confidence in the historians.

191 *Documents in Russian Preserved in the National Palace Museum of Peiping*, p. 9.

192 Two letters of the Ming period (one by the Emperor whom Spathari called "Vali," i.e., Wan-li, title of the reign of Shen-tsung, 1573-1620; the other by his son "Dzhukhandi," i.e., Ch'ang-lo, whose reign title was T'ai-ch'ang); one letter by Emperor Shun-chih, dated 1660, and, finally, the letter by Emperor K'ang-hsi delivered to Milovanov in 1670. Cf. *Stateini Spisok (daily report) of the Embassy of N. Spathari to China*, published by Y. V. Arseniev, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 7 and 8.

193 K. D. (Chinese Court), book III, cf. J. Baddeley, i.c., vol. II, p. 428, note B.

194 J. Baddeley, i.c., vol. II, p. 195.

195 The "*Askaniama*" of Spathari is "*Askani-Amban*," a Manchu title corresponding to the Chinese "*Shih-lang*," Vice-President of one of the Six Boards. Mala was Vice-President of the *Li-pu*, the Board of Rites (cf. Baddeley, i.c., vol. II, note K, p. 440).

196 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

197 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

198 Probably the Daur was Sharaldai, who figures in Arshinsky's report as having come to Nerchinsk with four companions in December, 1669, to "trade" (cf. Baddeley, i.c., vol. II, p. 428, note B).

199 *Stateini Spisok of Spathari*, pp. 73-74.

200 Cf. especially the Emperor's letter dated the 6th day, 10th month, 25th year of K'ang-hsi (November 21, 1686), sent to the Tsars Ivan and Pyotr, on the eve of the Nerchinsk Conference. This letter was handed to the couriers Veniukov and Favorov and reproduced almost literally Mala's account of Milovanov's mission (cf. G. Cahen, *Histoire des Relations de la Russie avec la Chine sous Pierre le Grand*, Paris, 1912, p. 38; an English translation of the complete text of the letter was published by Baddeley, i.c., vol. II, p. 425, note A).

201 *Stateini Spisok of Spathari*, p. 25.

202 *Bibliothèque Historique Russe*, 1894, vol. XV, p. 137.

203 Pierre Pascal, *Avançum et les Débuts du Raskol*, Paris, 1938.

204 *Documents in Russian Preserved in the National Palace Museum of Peiping*, p. 9.

205 *Stateini Spisok of Spathari*, p. 42.

206 *L'Ambassade de la Compagnie Orientale des Provinces Unies*, by Nieuhoff, 1665.

207 J. Bell of Antermony, *Travels to Diverse Parts of Asia*, Glasgow, 1763.

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

208 Chang Yü-shu [1642-1711] became a *chin-shih* (equivalent to the doctor's degree) in the 18th year of Shun-chih [1661], Vice-President of the Board of Rites in the 21st year of K'ang-hsi [1682], President of the same Board in the 27th year of K'ang-hsi [1688], President of the Board of Revenue, and *Ta-hsueh-shih* (Grand Secretary) in the 29th year [1690]; he also was Chancellor of the Hanlin Academy [1684] and director-general of the *Ping-ting shuo-mo fang-lüeh*, the official history of the campaigns against Galdan, Bushktu Khan of the Dzungars [a tribe of the Eleuts, or Olots, known also as Kalmyks] [1697-1708] as well as the *Ming-shih* (History of the Ming Dynasty). Cf. Notes in Chinese.

209 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

210 Cf. Notes in Chinese. It can only refer to Milovanov as Russian emissary to Peking in the 4th month of the 9th year of K'ang-hsi; the famous *nakaz*, indeed, is dated April 13 [23], 1670, i.e., the 4th day of the 3rd month of the 9th year, and the Emperor's reply brought back by Milovanov is of the 13th day of the 5th month of that year.

211 *Stateini Spisok of Spathari*, p. 9.

212 Cf. Milovanov's "statement" in the *Prikas of Siberia*, J. Baddeley i.c., vol. I, Appendix of Russian texts, pp. CCXXIX ff.; also cf. our article *Les Emigrés Russes en Chine à la fin du XVIIe Siècle*, in *Bulletin de l'Université l'Aurore*, 1943, vol. 4, No. 4.

213 *Stateini Spisok of Spathari*, p. 42.

214 *idem*, p. 27. The mistrust of the Russian emigres undoubtedly was one of the reasons which determined Spathari to have Latin adopted as the diplomatic language in relations with China.

215 *Stateini Spisok of Spathari*, p. 115.

216 Russian literature devoted to Albazin and the Albazinians is, however, abundant. For the guidance of the reader, a list of the main works, arranged in chronological order, follows:

Bergh, *The Reconstruction of Alabazin and the Conquest by the Chinese*, Syn Otechestva, 1821, LXVIII, pp. 156-165 and 197-204.

Archimandrite Pierre (Kamensky), *Notes on the Albazinians*, Peking, January 9, 1831, re-edited in Peking in 1907.

Parshin, *History of the Town of Albazin from 1654 to 1687*, Moscow, 1844 (based on the works of Muller and documents from the archives).

D. Romanov, *The Town of Albazin*, St. Petersburg, 1857.

I. Selsky, *The Last Siege of Albazin by the Manchu-Chinese in 1687*, Annals of the Russian Geographical Society, East Siberian Section, 1858, vol. V, section 1, pp. 101-118.

K. A. Škachkov, *The Descendants of the Albazinians in Peking*, 1859.

I. P. Bartenev, *The Heroes of Albazin and Dauria*, Russian Archives, 1899, I, pp. 304-366.

Lt. Colonel Chernosubov, *The Conquests of the Amur River by the Russians and the Sieges of Albazin*, Military Collection, 1907, vol. 10, pp. 1-18; vol. 11, pp. 1-18; vol. 12, pp. 1-18.

L. Ulianitsky, *Albazin and the Albazinians*, Annals of the Russian Orientalist Society, Amur River Section, 1912, vol. 1, pp. 67-91.

217 Gaston Cahen, *Histoire des Relations de la Russie avec la Chine sous Pierre le Grand*, Paris, 1912, p. 246.

Cahen intended to supplement his researches in the Russian archives by data from Chinese sources. An illness contracted on his arrival in Shanghai

FOOTNOTES

unfortunately prevented him from undertaking these studies and his work remains based on Russian sources only.

218 Maurice Courant, *L'Asie Centrale*, Paris, 1912, p. 2.

219 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

220 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

221 A first compilation, much abridged, also bearing the name of *Tung-hua lu*, covers only the period from the beginnings of the dynasty to 1735. This was written by Chiang Liang-ch'i [1722-1789], who in 1765 was appointed an editor of the State Historiographer's Office (located near the Great East Gate, Tung-hua Men, of the Palace area), where he made notes from official and private records. The work of Wang Hsien-ch'ien, a mandarin in the same office a century later, was inspired by the original work, the name of which he preserved, but is considerably larger and more comprehensive (cf. P. Pelliot, *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient*, vol. III, p. 686, note 4).

222 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

223 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

224 The *Ch'ing Shih-lu* contains 4322 *chuan* (chapters).

225 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

226 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

227 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

228 Later, Kuo became the first Chinese minister to be sent to Europe.

229 The *I-yu lu*, written by Tulishen (1667-1741), a member and official historiographer of the embassy, was honored by four western translations; one French, by Father Gaubil in 1726; two Russian, by H. Rasokhin in 1741, and by Leontiev in 1782; and one English, by Sir G. T. Staunton in 1821.

230 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

231 Here is a specimen of the eulubrations of this "great poet" regarding the first Chinese embassy to Russia in 1731: "The ambassador To Shih was very handsome, especially because of his beard and his eyebrows; the Russian sovereign liked him. And the treaty in eighteen articles which he brought back from his journey was completed on the pillow of the Empress." It is true that the editor of the *Shuo-fang pei-sheng*, in reproducing this anecdote, takes care to qualify it as "slanderous."

232 *K'ang-hsi Shih-lu*, chapter 134, p. 15a.

233 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

234 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

235 The embassy of Count Golovkin was not authorized to go to Peking. Obligated to wait for two and a half months in Kiakhta, it crossed the border on January 1, 1806, but it was again stopped at Urga, where the viceroy of Mongolia demanded that the ambassador perform the ceremony of *kotow* (k'o-t'ou) in front of the Emperor's picture. The ambassador refused and advanced the precedent of McCartney (the Chinese asserted that the ambassador of Great Britain had conformed to the ceremony demanded). He had to return on February 10, 1806. A mission of scholars headed by Count Jean Pototsky were a part of the embassy (cf. Timkovsky, *Journey to Peking*, 1820).

236 Cf. Notes in Chinese.

237 *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient*, vol. III, 1903, p. 686.

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

²³⁸ It is surprising to note that the work has been translated neither into Russian nor any other foreign language, although it is often quoted by modern Chinese historians writing in foreign languages.

²³⁹ Perhaps the date is mentioned in the imperial edition of this work, which Pelliot says he never saw (*Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient*, *ibid.*).

²⁴⁰ *K'ang-hsi Shih-lu*, chapter 122, p. 4a.

²⁴¹ Cf. Notes in Chinese.

²⁴² Cf. W. Fuchs, *Über die Shih-lu der Mandju Dynastie*, Beiträge zur Mandjurischen Bibliographie und Litteratur, Tokyo, 1936, p. 56.

²⁴³ Cf. Notes in Chinese.

²⁴⁴ Cf. Notes in Chinese.

²⁴⁵ It is not easy to recognize the Russian names in the Chinese transcriptions, and it is even more difficult to identify the persons bearing these names. Therefore, only conjectures can be made in comparing names and dates indicated in the Chinese texts with the data contained in other sources.

"Wu-lang-ko-li" is most probably Uruslanov, a Moslem baptized by the *vayvode* of Yakutsk, who gave him the first name of Ananii. Uruslanov acted as interpreter in the embassy of Petrillovskii, sent from Yakutsk to Peking in 1649, i.e., in the 5th year of Shun-chih. The embassy did not reach Peking, but Uruslanov, who had gone ahead, escaped to China (cf. E. G. Ravenstein, *The Russians on the Amur*, London, 1861, p. 22). Undoubtedly it is of him that Spathari spoke in his report of 1676: "At present there are approximately thirteen Russian emigres in China . . . one of them 'Onashka' (contemptuous nickname of 'Ananii') a Tartar by origin, is especially honored because he was the first to immigrate to China." (J. Arseniev, *Stateini Spisok of N. Sparthari's Embassy to China*, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 123).

²⁴⁶ Lo-to-hun may be identified with the officer of the guard ("Hia," or "Hsia") of whom Father Gerbillon speaks in his account of his third journey to Tartary (cf. Du Halde, *Description de la Chine*, vol. IV, at the Hague, 1735, p. 303): "On the previous night," Gerbillon wrote, "the Emperor ordered one of his Hsia, who is Turkish by origin, although he was born in Peking and was Captain of the Moscovites who are in his service, to follow me everywhere I should go . . . This Hsia knows something of the Moscovites' language and was on both journeys which we made to negotiate the peace between the two Empires."

²⁴⁷ Maci, a high official during the reigns of K'ang-hsi and of the Yung-cheng. Cf. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, Library of Congress, Washington, 1944, vol. 1, p. 560.

²⁴⁸ Marquis Kung-a-la, the father-in-law of Emperor Chia-ch'ing, held the highest posts—Minister of Rites, Minister of Public Works, Minister of War.

²⁴⁹ It is useless to try to identify I-fan (Ivan) and his companions. It need only be stated that their arrival in China (1668) coincided with the establishment on the Amur River, and especially in Albazin, of a group of fugitives of whom Chernigovsky was the leader. The latter, together with eighty-four men, had revolted in Kirensk, killed the *Vayvode* Obukhov, and fled to the Amur, where the fugitives, strong in numbers, could disregard the local authorities. Moscow condemned them to death. On the list of the condemned (cf. *Priamurie*, Moscow, 1909, p. 15-16)

FOOTNOTES

were Chernigovsky "with his companions" and a certain Ivashko (Ivan) Pereleshin with seventeen men. In 1675, when Chernigovsky was pardoned, the letter of pardon (the act of reprieve) did not mention Pereleshin and his men. It is not improbable that some of these fugitives had escaped to China.

²⁵⁰ Mala (1632-1692), a high official of K'ang-hsi's reign and a delegate to the Nerchinsk Conference in 1689.

²⁵¹ The thirty-one men captured in 1683 together with their chief, Grigorii, who constituted the nucleus of the Russian Company in Peking, are easily identifiable from the concordant data of Chinese and Russian sources. It is the detachment of Grigorii Mylnikov and sixty-seven companions which was sent to the middle and lower course of the Amur River in July, 1683, to reinforce the garrisons of the *ostrogs* founded the preceding year (1682) by Gavrila Frolov. Near the Hei-lung-chiang (Aigun), a great Chinese army, moved on five hundred and sixty ships (Wisén, *Noorden Oost Tartary*, p. 96, estimated it to consist of 15,000 men, a probably exaggerated number), was commissioned to destroy the Russian *ostrogs*. Mylnikov, on the invitation of the Chinese, went ashore to negotiate, but was treacherously captured. Part of his men then surrendered and were sent to Peking with their chief (cf. Ravenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 45, and C. de Sabir, *Le Fleuve Amour*, 1861, p. 18; both authors relied on documents gathered by Muller and partly by Fisher).

²⁵² It was on this occasion that the imperial edict was promulgated inaugurating the new Chinese policy towards Russian prisoners which the *K'ang-hsi Shih-lu* (chapter 111, p. 7b) reproduces under date of the 15th day of the 7th month of the 22nd year (September 15, 1683). Therein it was ordered that the two "subjected *Lo-ch'a*" brought by Nan-tai be treated well, "so as to make known our generosity." In a later edict (*K'ang-hsi Shih-lu*, chapter 112, p. 4b), dated the 9th day of the 9th month of the same year (October 28, 1683), the Emperor speaks of "some thirty *Lo-ch'a* who had surrendered in the neighborhood of the Hei-lung-chiang." "Having received the report about this," he said, "we prohibited their execution, believing thus to follow Heaven's will; we ordered that they be nourished and treated well." This policy of "generosity," however, only had meaning when it rested on appropriate propaganda. This explains why two of these "well-treated" prisoners, I-fan (Ivan) and Mí-hai-lo Mo-hai-tui (Molodoi) were immediately sent to Albazin with a letter to urge the Gossacks to follow the example of the "obedient *Lo-ch'a*."

²⁵³ The *K'ang-hsi Shih-lu* (chapter 112, p. 17b) quotes the more complete text of the Emperor's instructions which stresses the reason why the Russians, instead of being dispersed among different Banners, were organized together in a special unit. "The obedient *Lo-ch'a* are numerous," the Emperor said, "they have to be organized in a special company so that, assisting each other, they can give us better service."

²⁵⁴ General Sabsu (Sa-pu-su) was one of the chief commanders of the Chinese troops in the campaigns of 1682-1687 against the Russians on the Amur River.

²⁵⁵ "Fei-yo-to-la" (Fedor) was captured by the Daurs during a reconnaissance made in the vicinity of Yaksa (Albazin); two Russians were killed and another captured. Fedor furnished to his captors information concerning military preparations in Albazin and confirmed that the Gossacks of Albazin had already been informed by the released prisoners

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

(Ivan and Mihailo Molodoi) that "all those who surrender voluntarily are given liberty and receive presents from the Emperor." Cf. *P'ing-ting Lo-ch'a fang-lieh* under date of the 17th day of the 7th month of the 23rd year (August 27, 1684).

256 "Ko-wa-li-la" (Gavrila) and his six companions were also captured by the Daur in February, 1685, during a new reconnaissance in the vicinity of Yaksa. Gavrila furnished valuable military information concerning the situation of Albazin, the condition of the fortifications, the arrival of the new commander "Oliksa" (Alexei Tolbuzin) and the reinforcements expected there. The Emperor ordered that the prisoners be compensated by gifts of clothing and hats; he had them handed over to General Sabsu, to be freed by him at the moment when his troops advanced on Albazin. (Cf. *K'ang-hsi Shih-lu*, chapter 120, p. 19b).

257 It is in this short sentence that the author sums up the most outstanding event of Albazin's sieges, i.e., the coming over to China of about forty of Albazin's defenders, who refused to return to Nerchinsk with the rest of the garrison. On July 5, 1685, the Chinese commander-in-chief reported: "The town's inhabitants were terrorized and the commander of the *Lo-ch'a*, 'Lekso' (Alexei Tolbuzin) approached us in order to negotiate the surrender of the fortress. In conformity with the generous orders of the Emperor, Pengcun (commander-in-chief of the Chinese forces) permitted all *Lo-ch'a* to retreat freely. Forty *Lo-ch'a* alone, with Pashih-li (Vasilii, adjutant chief) at the head refused to return home and were received by us." (*K'ang-hsi Shih-lu*, chapter 121, pp. 9ff.). It is interesting to note that these forty Russians were not sent to Peking, at least not at first. On receiving the above mentioned report, the Emperor caused an answer to be made to Pengcun, that he was "very satisfied with the occupation of Yaksa and with the treatment given to the *Lo-ch'a*. The *Lo-ch'a* who surrendered with Pa-shih-li (Vasilii) at their head must be sent to Sheng-ching (Mukden)." (*K'ang-hsi Shih-lu*, chapter 121, *ibid.*).

258 They brought to Moscow, in 1685, a letter of the Emperor, dated the 22nd year (1683), which caused the immediate dispatch to Peking of Veniukov and Favorov with peace proposals, and the nomination of Golovin as ambassador to the Nerchinsk Conference. (Cahen, *Histoire des Relations de la Russie avec la Chine*, Paris, p. 24, note 2, and p. 33, note 3).

259 The Russian called this detachment the "Russian Hundred" (*Russkaia Sotnia*). (Cahen, *l.c.*, p. 262, note 2).

260 Later, in 1686, ordering that a note be sent to Moscow through the Dutch embassy, the Emperor remarked, in his instructions to the Minister of War: "Very probably, the lack of answers to our (previous) letters is due to the interruption of communications with Ni-pu-chu (Nerchinsk), or to the fact that the *Lo-ch'a* of Yaksa (Albazin) were considered as criminals having no right to return to their country." (*K'ang-hsi Shih-lu*, chapter 127, p. 10a).

261 *K'ang-hsi Shih-lu*, chapter 112, p. 4b.

262 The account which is usually given of the capitulation of the fortress is too idyllic. Indeed, according to that account, one part of the garrison had been authorized to retreat peacefully to Nerchinsk and the other part, no less peacefully, went over to the Chinese side. It is more likely that dissension broke out among the defenders of Albazin, with the sub-chief Vassilii at the head of the opposition. Consequently, Commander

FOOTNOTES

Tolbuzin had to capitulate and the dissidents preferred to go over to China rather than return to Nerchinsk.

263 G. Cahen, i.e., *Pieces Justificatives*, p. XXXV.

264 The news of the establishment of a Russian church in Peking soon became known in Europe. Witsen, the scholarly mayor of Amsterdam, gave the details to Leibnitz in a letter of May 20, 1698: "The last letters which I received from Moscow tell me that a Greek priest has already been sent from Tobol in Siberia to Peking, where he has arrived and where, with the permission of the Emperor of China, he had a Moscovite or Greek temple built, and that he had even already baptized twenty Chinese according to the custom of the Church." (*Oeuvres de Leibnitz*, Edition Fouche-Careil, vol. VII, p. 450). In another letter to Leibnitz, dated January 22, 1699, Witsen communicated: "I was informed that the Moscovites in Peking consist of those who deserted the army of His Tsarist Majesty . . . and of the people around the town of Albazin; they were taken when the Chinese besieged this place and the town is destroyed at present. Among them are women and some priests. The king of China gave them complete freedom under the condition that they are obliged to live in those sections under China's domination . . . Some of these Moscovites in Peking serve the king of China as horsemen, others run inns and sell spirits." (*ibid.*, p. 254).

265 *History of the Russian Hierarchy*, by Amvrosii, quoted in *Works of the Ecclesiastical Academy of Kiev* (in Russian), 1860, book IV, p. 302, note 1.

266 The "mission" of the emigres included the regular priest Lavrentii who had come with Lezhaiskii's mission, the sextons Joseph Diakonov and Nikanor Klifusov, the bell-ringer Peter Yakovlev, and the old Dmitri Nesterov, a former Cossack of Albazin (Cahen, i.e., p. 259).

267 Cahen, i.e., p. 260, note 1.

268 Du Halde, *Description de la Chine*, at the Hague, 1735, vol. IV, p. 65.

269 "Twice or three times he had made the journey from Tobolsk, his birthplace, to Moscow; he went from Tobolsk to Selenga, from there to Nerchinsk, where he stayed for a year, from Nerchinsk to Yaksa (Albazin), where he spent eight years." (Du Halde, i.e., *ibid.*).

270 *Kitaitski Blagovestnik*, Peking, 1935, No. 3, p. 8.

NOTES IN CHINESE

(FIGURES REFERRING TO CORRESPONDING FOOTNOTES)

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 10 外蒙古 | 196 羅刹 |
| 11 內蒙古 | 197 俄羅斯 |
| 12 小王子 | 209 昭代叢書 |
| 20 九白 | 210 外國紀 |
| 21 茶 | 219 東華錄 |
| 24 平定羅刹方略 | 220 王先謙 |
| 26 康熙實錄 | 222 聖訓 |
| 27 阿喇尼 | 223 實錄 |
| 32 <u>張鵬翻</u> ， <u>奉使俄羅斯</u>
<u>行程錄</u> ，見 <u>朔方備乘</u>
卷四十二。 | 225 朔方備乘 |
| 33 <u>錢良擇</u> ， <u>出塞紀略</u> ，
見 <u>昭代叢書</u> 或其他叢
書。 | 226 何秋濤 |
| 51 青涼雜卜 | 227 郭嵩泰 |
| 52 東華錄 | 229 異域錄，國理探 |
| 53 清實錄 | 230 平定羅刹方略 |
| 54 乾隆實錄 | 233 俄羅斯佐領考 |
| 66 理藩院則例 | 234 俞正燮 |
| 72 外藩 | 236 八旗通志 |
| | 241 桑達人 |
| | 243 四裔考 |
| | 244 父敵通考 |

Index

- Agathon—155
 Aktsha—77
 Albazin—118, 122, 124, 129, 130,
 132, 135, 137, 146, 152, 156-163,
 n. 249, n. 255, n. 262
 "Albazinians"—76, 145, 157, 160,
 162-164
 Aleni, Father Jules—149
 Alexei Mikhailovich, Tsar—115,
 119, 127
 Altyn Khan—5-12, 21, 37, 47, 50
 Ambans, Chinese—57
 Amgun River—122
 Amor—96
 Amur River—12-14, 24, 27, 32, 37,
 39, 41, 46, 104, 106, 112, 115,
 118, 122, 124, 131-136, 141, 146,
 151, 157-159, n. 249, n. 251, n.
 254
 Amursana—33, 35
 Anfu clique—72
 Anfuites—76
Annals of Jehol—153, 156
Annals of the Eight Banners—150,
 151, 154
 Ao-fu-na-hsi (see Athanasii)
 Ao-ko-t'u (see Agathon)
 Arani—14-17
 Argun River—21, 124
Army of the Chinese Empire—151
 Arseniev, J.—120
 Arshinsky, Danilo—101, 106, 109,
 117, 127, 129, 131-133, 135-138,
 141, 142
 "Asiatic Corps"—69, 77
 Athanasii—155
 Aurora University—140, 146
 Avril, Father—108, 120
 Avvakum, Protopope—138
 Ayuki, Khan—148
 Baddeley—120, 132, 137, 141
 Baikal Lake—12, 132
 Baikal Region—97, 132
 Baikov—101, 102, 104, 106, 109,
 115, 119, 129, 133, 134, 138, n.
 36
 Balkan War—43
 Banner of the Yellow Border—159
 Bantysh-Kamensky—128, 130, 137,
 139
 Barga—49, 65
 Barrow, Captain—70
 Barshchenkov—n. 40
 Barum-Tereledge River—77
 Bashkirs—n. 108
 Batur—16
 Bayan—2
 Belton, Colonel—159
 Bell, J.—140
 Berlin—36, 107
 Berlov, David—121
 Bernard, Father H.—n. 135
 Bezsonov—111
 Bichurin, Father Hyacinth—n. 68
 Bielobotsky—125
Biography of Salsu—153
 Bistra River—124
 Black Irtysh River—45
 Bluntchlie—49
 Bodo, Premier—85
 Bogdoi Khans—83, 127, 130, 135,
 139
 Bokov, Timofei—n. 40
 Bolshevism—69
 Bormans, Father—n. 163

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

- Buddhism—71
 Buddhists—1
 Buglio, Father—n. 163
 Buryat Mongols—13, 91
 Buryat Region—68, 70
 Buryats—4, 49, 69, 71, 82, 102, n. 108
 Butkevich—84
 Bykov—n. 40
 Cahen, Gaston—15, 22, 146
 Canal Zone—n. 86
 Canton—22, 51
 Carpinì, Piano—2
 Catherine II, Empress—28, 37
 Catholic Christians—1
 Catholic Missions—23
 Chahar—6
 Chai—11
 Chamberlain, W. H.—71
 Chang Ching-tun—55
 Chang P'eng-ko—16, 149, 150
 Chang Tso-lin—80
 Chang Tsü-lin, General—87
 Chang Yu-shu—140, 141
 Chao I—149
 Chao-tai ts'ung-shu—140
 Charles XI—107
 Chekiang—51, 53
 Chên Chun-ming, General—51
 Ch'ên Tê-chuan—51
 Chêng-I, Amban—73-76
 Chernigovsky, Nikifor—132, 158, n. 249
 Chia-ch'ing Emperor—39, n. 248.
 Chiang Liang-ch'i—n. 221
 Chicherin—n. 118, n. 123
 Ch'ien Liang-tse—16
 Ch'ien-lung—33, 34, 39, 149, 151, 153
 Ch'ien-lung Shih-lu—33
 Chi-li-kuo-li (see Grigorii)
 China—1-9, 11-13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20-25, 27-30, 32-40, 42-44, 46-51, 53-55, 57, 58-61, 64-66, 68, 70-72, 75, 79-81, 84-91, 94, 96, 97, 99, 101-107, 109, 111, 113, 114, 117-120, 122, 123, 125-129, 131, 133-137, 139, 145-148, 152, 156, 157, 161-164
 China Year Book—82
 Chinese—3, 4, 6, 10, 13, 14, 16, 18, 30-32, 34, 39-42, 45, 47, 72, 75, 77-80, 82, 91, 102, 114, 116, 118, 124, 128, 133, 134, 136, 140, 142-145, 151, 161
 Chinese Annals—2, 6, 14
 Chinese Eastern Railway—86, 87
 Chinese Republic—46, 47, 49, 55-57, 62, 65, 66, 73, 90
 Chinese Turkestan—76, 134
 Chin-pu-tung Party—55
 Ch'ing Dynasty—6, 33, 42, 150
 Ch'ing Empire—61
 "Ch'ing Imperialism,"—27
 Ch'ing-kung-tsa-pu—32, 33, n. 58
 Ch'ing Shi-lu—33, 148
 Chingis Khan—1, 4, 26, 34
 Chita—69, 85
 Chiu-pai—11
 Cibot, Father—126
 Colombia, Republic of—n. 86
 Communism—80
 Company of the Yellow Bordered Banner—155
 Confucianists—1
 Constantine—1
 Constantinople—107, 110
Correspondance du Père Verbiest—100
 Cossacks—13, 105, 129, 130, 132, 134-137, 151, 157
 Courant, Maurice—31, 33, 103, 147
 Dairen—85
 Dalai Lama—14, 33
 Daur—135, 138
 David, Father—113, n. 171
 "Defenders of Albazin"—145
 de la Chaize, Father—113

INDEX

- de la Neuville—108
 de Ventaven, Father—n. 132
Description du Monde—149
 Diakonov, Joseph—n. 266
 Dolonor—19, 32
 Dolonskoi—122
 Don River—4
 Dositheus, Patriarch—108
 Druzhina—9
 Ducher—138
 Dukikansk—122
 Dutch—3, n. 148, n. 154, n. 260
 Dzhamsharanov—91, 92
 "Dzhan-Dzhin", Baron—78, 79
 Dzhasaktu, Khan—12, 13, 14
 Dzungar Empire—8, 31
 Dzungaria (Dzungary)—24, 41
 Dzungars—4, 7, 8, 12, 17-19, 21, 30-36, 38, 148

 "Ecclesiastic and Diplomatic Mission"—145
 Elzin-gol—81
 England—54, 60, 70
 English—3, 138
 "Eurasian" school—26

 Fang-lüch—155, 156
 Far East—23, 29, 42, 43, 70
 Far Eastern Republic—85
 Favorov—121, n. 258
 Fedor—156
 Fedorov, Afanasii—140
 Fei-li-p'u (see Philip)
 Fei-yu-to-la (see Fedor)
 Feng-shen-chi-lun—154
Feng-shih O-lo-ssu hsing-ch'ang lu
 —149
 Feodor, Tsar—119-121
 Fey-ya-ko—154
 Firsov, Erofej—n. 40
 Formosa—48, 104
 France—52, 54
 Franks—1

 Frazer, David—72
 Frederick the Great—36
 Friedrich Wilhelm, Emperor — 107
 Erolov, Gavril—157, n. 251
 Fuchs, Dr. Walter—100, 125
 Fukien—104

 Gagarin, Prince—162
 Galdan—13, 14, 16, 18, 33, n. 208
 Gantimur—105, 106, 112, 115, 117, 118, 129-131, 135-138
 Gaubil, Father—126, n. 229
 Gavril—156
Genealogical Register of the Eight Banners—157
 Gerbillon, Father—16, 19, 100, 123-126, 150, 163, n. 246
 Germans—111
 Germany—54
 Gervasij (Archimandrite)—n. 40
 Gilyak—138
 Gobi Desert—15, 91, 134
 Golden Horde—1, 2
 Golovin—15, 16, 123, 124, 150, n. 36, n. 48, n. 258
 Golovkin, Count—150
 Golytsin, Basil—121, n. 142
 Goyer—139, n. 8, n. 148
 Grand Khans of Mongolia—1-4, 6, 10, 12, 13, 18, 20, 35, 45
 Great Britain—70
 Great Khural—90, 94, 95
 Great Wall—6
 "Greater Mongolia"—49
 Grechanin—10, 12
 Grechaninov—n. 142
 Grigorii—155
 Grimaldi, Father—n. 163
 Guendon—95, 96
 Gusiatnikov, Mikhail—n. 40
 Guyak, Grand Khan—2

 Hambriolovitch, Nicolai—114
 Hami—21, 41

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

- Han, the—6
 Handa, Prince—61
 Hankow—56
 Hanlin—152
 Hannibal, Abraham Petrovich—n. 48
 Hanto, Prince—42, 43
 Hayton—2
 Hei-lung-chiang—153, 154, 158
 Heng-kun Region—156
 Herdricht, Father—n. 163
 Historical Source Book of the Northern Regions—148, 149
 Ho Ch'iu-t'ao—148, 149, 151
 Howard, Roy—96
 Hsi-t'u-pan (see Stephan)
 Hsiao Wang-tzu—6
 Hsiung Hsi-ling—56
 Hsü Shu-tseng, General—72-76, 80
 Hu Han-ming—51
 Huang Hsing, General—56
 Huc, Father—n. 38
 Hudjakov, Pavel—n. 40
 Hulunbuir—65, 66, 68
 Hutukhtu (see Khutuktu)
 Ides, Isbrantes—19, 138, 160
 I-fan (see Ivan)
 Ifin, Vasilij—n. 40
 Ili River—24
 Ilimsk—132
 India—70
 Inner Mongolia—6, 19, 20, 32, 49, 57-62, 68, 71
Inquiry into the Politics of the Great Dynasty—153
Inquiry into the Relations with all Foreign Countries—153
 Irtysh River—4, 30, 45, 134
 Ismailov (Izmailov)—21, 116, 138, 140, 162
 Istopnikov, Feodor—n. 40
 Italians—1
 Ivan—154-158
 Ivan, Tsar—n. 200
I-yu lu—148, 161
 Jacobi—28, 34
 Japan—54, 56, 60-64, 70, 71, 85, 94, 112
 Jenkinson, Anthony—2
 Jesuits—99-102, 104, 107, 109, 112-114, 116-118, 120, 123-126, 130, 145, 161
 Jews—1
 Joffe, A.—52, 88, n. 84
 Kachanov—16
 Kalgan—74, 78
 Kalinin—96
 Kalmyks—4, 31, 144, n. 208
 K'ang-hsi, Emperor—13, 14, 20-22, 33, 39, 47, 104-106, 109, 113, 117, 122-124, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 136, 139, 140, 142, 145, 150, 152-157, 162, n. 247
 Kao Kien-long, Professor, viii—140, 146
 Karakhan—87-89.
 Karakorum—1
 Karamzin—n. 9
 Kazantzev, Vasilij—n. 40
 Kentei—77
 Keyser—140, n. 8, n. 148
 Khabarov—12, 132, 158
 Khailar—69
 Khalka—6, 7, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 31, 35, 61
 Khalka, Khan—14
 Khalkas—15, 34, 39
 Kharakula—8
 Khutuktu of Mongolia—8-12, 15, 16, 18-20, 32-35, 44, 45, 47-49, 59-64, 66, 67, 69, 71, 73-75, 78-80, 82, 92
 Kiakhta—22, 23, 29, 38, 64, 77, 83, 91
 Kiakhta, Conference of—23
 Kiakhta, Treaty of—10, 18, 22, 23, 25-28, 37, 38, 58, 65, 71, 100, 145, 162

INDEX

- Kiangsu—53
 Kirilov, Ivan—30
Kitai—5
 Kliusov, Nikanor—n. 266
 Kniazev—n. 109
 Kobdo—57
 Kodama—60-63
 Kolchak—70, n. 104
 Korea—48
 Korostovets—28, 45, 49, 50, 52, 58,
 84, 85, 91, 92
 Korovin, Stepan—15, n. 36
 Korzin—84
 Kosakov—28, 45
Kotow—13, 66, 114
 Ko-wa-li-la (see Gavril) *a*)
 Krasnoyarsk—12
 Krasnoyarsk, Archives of—10
Krasnyi Arkhip—61
 Krizhanich, Yuri—29, 110, 111, 125
 Kropotov—37
 Krupensky—54, 55, 59, 60, 65, 88
 Kudashev, Prince—71, 75
 Kukunor—60
 Kung-a-la, President Marquis—154
 Kuo Sung-tao—148
 Kuomintang—52, 55, 56, 88
 Kuznetsk—12
 Kwangsi—104
 Kwantung—104
 Kypchaks—2
 Kyrgyz—4, 7, 8, 12

 Lamaism—8, 20, 40, 47, 71, 91, 92
 Lamas—8, 20, 49, 73, 76, 80, 82,
 84, 91, 92
 Lange, Lorenz—21, 28, 31, n. 40
 Lavrentii—n. 40, n. 266
 Lebratovskij—n. 40
 Leibnitz—n. 264
 Leontiev, Maxim—161, n. 229
 Leontyev, A.—151
 Leopold of Austria—113

 Lezhaiskii, Ilarion—162, n. 266
 Li Chi-ao—55
 Li Yuan, General—87
 Li Yung-lung—55
Li-fan-yüan—14, 16, 17, 25, 35, 36,
 40, 102, 112, 115, 142, 143, 159-
 162
Li-fan-yüan tse-li—39
 Li Hung-chang—55
 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao—55, 56
 Liang Mên-ting—51
 Likdan, Khan—6
 Lin Jen-chin—n. 85
 Lisbon—80
 "Little Hsi"—73-76, 80
 "Little Kings"—6
 Litvinov—n. 130
 Liu, Profesor—119
 Ljangusov, Stepan—n. 40
 Lobanov, Vasilij—n. 40
 Lobzdan (Lozan)—12
Lo-ch'ao—105, 118, 119, 134, 135, 151,
 152, 154-159
 Loginov—n. 36
 Lo-to-hun—154, 160
 Louis XIV—113
 Lu Ch'en-hsiang—54, 55, 65
 Lu Tsi-jen—190, 191

 Maci, Grand Secretary—154
 Magalhaens, Father—n. 163
 Maisky, I. M.—84
 Makino, Baron—61-63
 Ma-k'o-hsi-mu (see Maxim)
 Makulci, (Mangutei) Mandarin—
 101, 106, 136
 Mala, Mandarin—14, 112, 134-136,
 142, 154
 Malevsky-Malevich—63
 Manchu army—15
 Manchu Empire—31
 Manchukuo—70, 71, 95, 148
 Manchuria—9, 20, 21, 24, 25, 41,
 61, 65, 66, 76, 77, 85, 94

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

- Manchus—6, 9-12, 16, 18, 20, 34,
 39, 41, 80, 91, 95, 106, 125, 159
 Marco Polo—2
 Marignoli—2
 Maritime Province—85
 Martini, Father—120
 Matveiev, Artamon—108, 109, 121
 Maxim—155
 Mayers, W.—15
 McCartney—103
 Menzies—107, 109
 Merick, John—2
Method of Pacifying the Lo-ch'a—
 151
 Miatlev—28, 34, 35
 Mi-hai-lo Mo-hai-tu—155
 Mikhail Feodorovich, Tsar—2
 Miller—59, 64
 Miloslavski—121
 Milovanov, Ignatii—101, 106, 109,
 122, 127-129, 131, 133, 134, 136-
 144
 Ming—6
 Mohammedans—41
 Moldavia—107
 Molodoi, Mihailo—158, n. 255
 Molokov—n. 40
 Mongol Empire—2
 Mongol-Russian Agreement—84, 89
 Mongolia—1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12-17,
 20-25, 28, 29, 31, 35, 37-55, 57-
 61, 63, 65-67, 71-73, 75, 76, 78,
 79, 81-86, 88-97, 102, 104, 134
 "Mongolor" Company—66
 Mongols—1-7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18,
 20, 21, 30, 32, 34, 35, 38-42, 44-
 46, 48-50, 54, 58-60, 62, 64, 69,
 71, 73-82, 84-86, 90, 91, 102, 120,
 148, 152, n. 108
 Moscow—4-6, 8-13, 58, 81, 83-87,
 94, 95, 101, 102, 104, 106, 107,
 109-111, 113, 116-122, 124, 126,
 128, 129, 131, 133-138, 141, 142,
 144, 150
 Moslems—1
 Mukden—153, n. 257
 Muller, Gerhard Friedrich—5, 28,
 32, 37, 122, n. 62
 Mundov, Andrei—8, 101
 Muraviev—28, 45
 Muscovy—149
 Mylnikov, Grigorii—157, n. 251
 Nagai Timor—135
 Nagiba—132, 158
 Nagil—38
 Nanking—56, 91
 Nan-kuan—163
 Nan-tai—155, 156
 Natalic, Tsarina—108
 National Palace Museum—127
 Naun (Tsitsikhar)—19, 20, 134,
 135, 136
 Nei Meng-ku (Inner Mongolia)—6
 Nerchinsk—13-16, 18-20, 30, 101,
 102, 105, 106, 112, 118, 121-124,
 128, 129, 131-133, 135-139, 150,
 154, n. 260, n. 262
 Nerchinsk, Conference of—15, 18,
 100, 111, 149, n. 174, n. 258
 Nerchinsk, Treaty of—14, 18, 21,
 23, 25, 26, 39, 100, 101, 122,
 123, 125, 126, 132, 145, 148, 152,
 160
 Nesterov, Dmitri—n. 266
 Nestorian Christians—1
 Nevelskoy—28
 Neverov, Stepan—11, n. 142
 Nevskij, Alexander—2
New Mirror—91
 Nieuhoff—140
 "Nine Whites"—11
 Ninguta—101, 106
 Ni-pu-ch'u (Nerchinsk)—14, 124
 Nisselrode—28
 Northern Barbarians—6
 Northwestern Frontier Defense
 Force—76
 Notaras—120

INDEX

- Notes Taken Under the Roof While the Sun is High*—149
 Novo-Nikolayevsk—81
 Novozeisk—122
 Nurhaci—6
 Ob' River—2, 4
 Obukhov, Vayvoda—132, n. 249
 Ochiroi Khan—15, 16
 Odoric of Pordenone—2
 Okhotsk Sea—122
 O-lo-ch'un—156
 O-lo-ssu—134, 135, 151
 O-lo-ssu-hsüeh—149
 O-lo-ssu-kuan—149
 O-lo-ssu tso-ling k'ao—150
 Olöts (Dzungars)—17, 35, 36, n. 208
 Ordin-Nashokin—108
 Orenburg—30
 Oskolkov, Grigorij—n. 40
 Ostermann—28
 Outer Mongolia—6, 20-23, 33, 39, 41, 47, 49, 51-53, 57, 58, 62, 64-66, 68, 69, 71, 73, 75, 76, 84, 85, 89-91, 93-97
 Pa-ch'i shih ts'u t'ung-p'u—157
 Pa-ch'i t'ung-chih—150, 154
 Paikes—87
 "Pakhomka"—142
 "Pan-Mongolian" Conference—69, 71
 "Pan-Mongolian Movement"—68-71, 79, 82
 "Pan-Mongolian State"—70, 71
 Panama—54
 Panin, Chancellor—28
 Paris—69, 107
 Parker, E. H.—114
 Pascal, Pierre—137, 138, 141
 Pa-shih-li (see Vasilii)
 Pashkov—12, 137, 138, 141
 Pei-kuan—163
 Pei-ti—6
 Peking—2, 3, 6, 12, 13, 17-23, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 51, 53-55, 56, 59, 60, 64-66, 71-73, 76, 81, 85, 86-90, 101-107, 109, 111-113, 115, 117-119, 121, 122, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136, 138, 139, 141-147, 149, 153, 157-164
 Pelliot, P.—1, 151
 Pengcun—n. 257
 Pereira, Father—123, 125, n. 163
 Perelshin, Ivan—n. 249
 Perfiliev, Vasilii—15, 101, 106, 133
 Perrenin, Father—126
 Persians—1, 3
 Peter the Great—23, 26, 30, 31, 145, 161, n. 48, n. 200
 Petlin, Ivan—8, 101, n. 9, n. 36
 Petrilovskii—n. 245
 Petrov, Ivan—7, n. 9
 Philip—155
 Pierling, P.—110
 Pierre, André—71
 P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang-lüeh—14, 148, 151, 152, 154, 158
 Platkovsky, Antonii—162
 Poland—110, 113, 149
 Porshennikov—101
 Portuguese—3, 112, 138
 Potosky, Jean—n. 235
 Pozdnejev—n. 38
 Poznjakov—n. 40
 Pravda—94, 97
 Pushkin—n. 48
 Pustocrsk—121
 Rakshas—151
 Rashid—2
 Raskol—137, 138
 Rasokhin, H.—n. 229
 Ravenstein—122
 Red Army—82
 Researches on the Russian Company—150
 Rimsky-Korsakov, Ignatii—161

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

- Rinhuber—108
 Rome—109, 110, 113
 Rubruck, William of—2
 Russia—1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 20-23, 25-27, 29, 30-32, 35-40, 42-58, 60-66, 68, 70, 86, 88-93, 97, 99, 101-104, 106-108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 129, 131, 139, 140, 145, 146, 148, 149, 158, 160-164
 Russian-Asiatic Bank—52
 Russian-Chinese-Mongol Agreement—90
 "Russian Company"—146, 150, 157, 160, 162
 Russian emigres—145
 Russian Far East—97
 "Russian Hundred"—n. 259
 Russian-Japanese Treaty—94
 Russian-Japanese War—53
 Russian-Mongol Agreement—85, 87, 89
 Russian-Mongol-Chinese Conference—64
 Russian Revolution—65, 68
 Russians—1-4, 6-8 10-14, 16, 18-20, 22, 47, 69, 79, 84, 92, 102, 103, 105, 106, 109, 118, 122, 124, 132, 134, 135, 140, 145, 146, 148, 149, 152, 153, 160, 161
 Sabsu (Sa-pu-su), General—153, 155, n. 254, n. 256
Sacred Teachings—147, 152, 153, 155
 Sain-Noyan, Khan—59, 60, 61, 64
 St. Michael, ikon of—119
 St. Petersburg—26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 42, 45, 53, 55, 58, 59, 61, 64, 66, 84, 91
 St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences—151
 Sakhalin—112
 Santo, Amban—43-45
 Sa-pu-su (see Sabsu)
 Sarai—1
 Savateiev—20, n. 40
 Sazonov—28, 45, 46, 53, 58, 59-62, 64, 97
 Schall, Father Adam—109, 113, n. 148
 Selenginsk—13, 15, 16, 20, 28, 30, 34, 81, 119, 120
 Selymzhinsk—122
 Semenov, Ataman—68-71, 77, 79, 81, n. 109
 Setkul Ablin—101, 106, 109, 129, 133, 134
 Seven Years War—36
 Shagan, Khan—134
 Shakhansha, Khutuktu—85
 Shanghai—51, 52, 56, 146
 Shantung—76
 Sharaldai (Daur)—n. 198
Shêng-hsün—147, 152, 153
Shih-lu—14, 139, 149, 152, 153, 154
 Shilka River—132, 135
 Shen-tsung—n. 192
Shins Toli—91
 Shingal (Sungari) River—131
 Shishkin, Vayvoda—102
 Shulgin, Pavel—142
 Shun-chih, Emperor—12, 13, 47, 154, 157, n. 192
Shuo-fang pei-shêng—148, 150, 151
 Siberia—3-5, 27, 28, 30, 31, 37, 38, 40, 42, 65, 70, 76, 81, 102, 103, 109-111, 120-123, 126, 138, 148, 161-163
 Sinkiang—102
 Sino-Mongol-Russian Conference—58
 Sino-Russian Treaty—58
 Sino-Soviet Agreement—89, 97
 Sobieski, Jean (King)—113
 Society of Jesus—99
 "Society to Save Mongolia"—51
 Songgotu—17
 Sophia—121
 South Manchurian Railway—60
 Soviet Government—83-85, 88-91, 94, 95

INDEX

- Soviet-Mongol Agreement—85, 87, 88, 89
 Soviet Russia—52, 84, 85, 87, 89, 90, 92-96
 Sparwenfeldt—108, 120
 Spathari, Nicholas—5, 29, 47, 102, 104, 106-122, 125, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136-139, 141-144, n. 36, n. 48, n. 163, n. 171, n. 188, n. 245.
Ssü-i k'ao—153-156
Stalin—96
 Starkov, Vasilij—11, 12, n. 142
 Staunton, Sir G. T.—103, n. 229
 Stepanov—132, 158
 Stephan—155
 Stephan, Dr.—121
 Stettin—107
 Stockholm—107
 Sun Pao-chi—56
 Sun Yat-sen—88, n. 71, n. 84
 Sun Yung—149
 Sungari River—131
 Suzuki, Captain—n. 108

 T'ai-ch'ang—n. 192
 Taidji—20
 Tairov—96
 Tannu-Ola, Republic of—66, 84
 Tannu-Tuva—66
 Tannu-Urianhai—65
 Taoists—1, 140
 Tao-kuang—150
 "Tartar general" of Uliassutai—57
 Tartars—n. 108
 Tarutin—134
 Tibet—8, 31, 41, 60, 68, 70, 102
 Tibetans—41, 69, 79
 Tientsin—51
 Tiumenets, Vasili—7, 8, n. 9
 Tobolsk—109, 110, 111, 133
 Tob-Timur, Khan—2
 Tokyo—59, 61, 62, 63
 Tolbuzin, Alexei—n. 256, n. 257, n. 262
 Tomsk, 9, 11, 12
 Torguts (Turguts)—148, 162
 Transbaikalia—30, 68, 70, 81, 85, 138
 Trans-Siberian Railway—42, 97
 Tribunal of Colonial Affairs, Code of—39
 Troitskosavsk—77
 Tsaidam—60
 Tsetsen, Khan—78, 85
 Tsevan Rabdan—21
 Tsingtao—52
 Tsitsihar—19, 65, 134
 Tsuruhaitu—31
 Tuan Ch'i-jui—51, 72
 Tugursk—122
 Tukhachevskij, Iakov—9, n. 142
 Tulishen—161, n. 229
 Tumed—6
 Tumed, the—34
 T'ung-chih—155, 156, 157
 T'ung-chih Gate—157
 Tung-hua Gate—147
 Tung-hua lu—33, 139, 147, 153, n. 221
 Tung-ahan—162
 Tungus—4, 105, 112
 Turakina—n. 2
 Turkestan—76, 134
 Turks—111
 Tushetu clan—69
 Tushetu, Khan of—9, 10, 12-16, 19, 34
 Ubsa-Nur—12
 Udinsk—15, 16
 Udk—122
 Uighurs, the—1
 Ulan Bator—90, 91, 95, 96
 Uliassutai—57, n. 114
 Ungern-Sternberg, Baron—70, 76-83
 United States—52, 54
 Urga—14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 42-44,

CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

- 49, 50, 52, 57, 59, 60, 63-65, 69,
71, 73, 76, 77, 79-84, 88, 90, 91
Urga-Kalgan Railway—75
Urianhai—66, 84
Urumtsi—41
Uruslanov, "Anashka,"—142
U.S.S.R.—93, 96
Ussuri—39

Van Horn—n. 148
Vasili—156
Vatican—107
Vendée—52
Veniukov—121, n. 258
Verbiest, Father — 100, 107, 112-
115, 117, 119-121, 125, 126, 134,
143, 149, n. 163, n. 171
Veritable Records—148, 152, 153
Verkhne-Udinsk—69, 71
Versailles—72
Vladislavich, Savva—10, 22, 28-30,
37, 97
Vladykin—n. 40
Vocikov—122
Volga River—1, 148
Volynsky, Vayvoda—4, n. 142
Voronkov—28

Wade, T. F.—151
Wai Meng-ku (Outer Mongolia)—
6
Wai-chiao-pu—75
"Wai-fan,"—41 47
Wai-kuo chi—140
Wang, C. T.—88, 89
Wang Hsien-ch'ien — 147, 153, n.
221
Wan-li—n. 192
Washington—80
Weiger, Father P.—100

Wellington Koo—89
Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao—153
Witsen—108, 120, n. 264
Witte, Sergei—28
Wu, C. C.—52
Wu P'ei-fu, General—76
Wu San-kuei—118
Wu-ch'ang—43, 44, 56
Wu-lang-ko-li—154
Wusung—56

Ya-k'o-sa (Albazin)—156
Yakovlev, Peter—n. 266
Yaksa (Albazin)—152, 156, n. 255,
n. 256, n. 257, n. 260
Yakutsk, 132, 135
Yalyshev, Burnash—n. 9
Yamagata—63
Yangtse Valley—56
Yarishikin—129
Yaroslav, Grand Duke—2
"Yellow Church,"—15
Yenisei River—4, 7, 45
Yeniscisk—120
Yen-p'u tsu-chi—149
Yu Ch'eng-hsieh—150-154
Yuan Dynasty—6
Yuan Emperors—6
Yüan Shih-k'ai—47, 48, 52-56, 66,
67, 88
Yumatov, Amvrosij (Archimandrite)
—n. 40
Yung-ch'eng, Emperor — 145, 151,
n. 247
Yunnan—104
Yurin—87

Zakharii—121
Zeya River—13, 122, 124, 132, 141

